State v. Flinn
Decision Date | 28 April 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 75092-1.,75092-1. |
Citation | 154 Wash.2d 193,110 P.3d 748 |
Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Anthony Oren FLINN, Petitioner. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Susan F. Wilk, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, for Petitioner.
Andrea Ruth Vitalich, King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Anthony Oren Flinn appeals his conviction for possession of an incendiary device. Flinn alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a continuance beyond the time for trial period and by considering the judicial conference in deciding the length of the continuance. We hold that the trial judge granted the continuance for good cause—the State's need to prepare for Flinn's diminished capacity defense — and that five weeks was a reasonable period of time to continue the trial under the circumstances of this case.
¶ 2 On the morning of May 6, 2002, police responded to a tripped burglar alarm and found Flinn on the roof of Meany Middle School with "Molotov Cocktails," bottles stuffed with gasoline-soaked socks. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 3. Based on this incident, the State charged Flinn with attempted second degree arson, possession of an incendiary device, and first degree malicious mischief. Flinn was arraigned on May 21, 2002, and the trial date was set for July 18, 2002. On July 5, 2002, Flinn sought and obtained a continuance until August 14, 2002. On August 2, 2002, Flinn requested and received a second continuance for expert witness preparation until August 21, 2002. On August 21, 2002, Flinn requested a third continuance until September 9, 2002, notified the State of his intent to assert a diminished capacity defense, and gave the State a copy of a report written by Dr. Kenneth Muscatel.
¶ 3 On September 9, 2002, the State learned for the first time that certain information it requested in discovery did not exist (psychiatric information, videotape, testing information, raw data). The State requested a continuance to review the materials upon which Dr. Muscatel relied, to interview Dr. Muscatel, and to have a state expert evaluate Flinn. Flinn objected to the State's request for a continuance, arguing that the State had ample time before September 9, 2002, to prepare its case. In response to a question from the judge about how long the State needed to prepare for trial, the following exchange took place:
CP at 20-22 ( ). The judge continued the trial for five weeks, until October 15, 2002. At trial, Flinn was acquitted of the attempted arson and malicious mischief charges but convicted of possession of an incendiary device.
¶ 4 Flinn appealed, arguing that the trial court violated CrR 3.3, the time for trial rule, by (1) continuing his trial without a showing of good cause and (2) considering the fall judicial conference in determining the length of the continuance. The Court of Appeals held that CrR 3.3 had not been violated in Flinn's case and affirmed his conviction. State v. Flinn, 119 Wash.App. 232, 246-47, 80 P.3d 171 (2003). We granted review only on the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the fourth continuance, allegedly violating the time for trial rule, CrR 3.3. State v. Flinn, 152 Wash.2d 1013, 101 P.3d 108 (2004).
¶ 5 "[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Downing, 151 Wash.2d 265, 272, 87 P.3d 1169 (2004). "We will not disturb the trial court's decision unless the appellant or petitioner makes `a clear showing ... [that the trial court's] discretion [is] manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.'" Id. (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)).
¶ 6 Under former CrR 3.3(c)(1) (2002), the rule in effect during Flinn's trial, a criminal defendant in custody must be brought to trial within 60 days of arraignment or the court must dismiss the case with prejudice.1 Former CrR 3.3(c)(1), (i). The court may continue the case when required in the administration of justice. Former CrR 3.3(h)(2). However, the defendant cannot be substantially prejudiced by the delay and the court must state on the record or in writing the reasons for the continuance. Id.
¶ 7 Common law has clarified that "[i]n exercising its discretion to grant or deny a continuance, the trial court is to consider all relevant factors." State v. Heredia-Juarez, 119 Wash.App. 150, 155, 79 P.3d 987 (2003). Allowing counsel time to prepare for trial is a valid basis for continuance. State v. Campbell, 103 Wash.2d 1, 15, 691 P.2d 929 (1984); State v. Williams, 104 Wash.App. 516, 523, 17 P.3d 648 (2001). Scheduling conflicts may be considered in granting continuances. See Heredia-Juarez, 119 Wash.App. at 153-55, 79 P.3d 987 ( ). "[O]nce a valid continuance is granted, ... the wise discretion of the trial court may be used in exceptional circumstances to set cases beyond the 60-day limit of CrR 3.3." State v. Perez, 16 Wash.App. 154, 156, 553 P.2d 1107 (1976).
¶ 8 Even though trial preparation and scheduling conflicts may be valid reasons for continuances beyond the time for trial period, court congestion is not. State v. Mack, 89 Wash.2d 788, 794, 576 P.2d 44 (1978). Defendants can be prejudiced by delay, no matter what the source. Id. at 793, 576 P.2d 44. Such delays are contrary to the public interest in prompt resolution of cases, and excusing such delays removes the inducement for the State to remedy congestion. Id. When the primary reason for the continuance is court congestion, the court must record details of the congestion, such as how many courtrooms were actually in use at the time of the continuance and the availability of visiting judges to hear criminal cases in unoccupied courtrooms. State v. Kokot, 42 Wash.App. 733, 736-37, 713 P.2d 1121 (1986).
¶ 9 Flinn asserts that the judicial conference was the sole reason for the continuance. Arguing that the judicial conference is equivalent to court congestion, Flinn states that the Court of Appeals created a "judicial conference exception" to the general rule that court congestion does not justify a continuance beyond the time for trial period. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 11. However, this is a mischaracterization of the record. The trial court granted the continuance after finding good cause—to allow the State to prepare for Flinn's diminished capacity defense—not because of the judicial conference. If the sole reason for the continuance were the judicial conference, then the justification for the continuance would be similar to court congestion and the court would have to document the details of unavailable courtrooms and judges. Because the judicial conference was not the reason for the continuance, Flinn has not shown that the good cause found was manifestly...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Malone
...A court abuses its discretion when its decision is made for untenable reasons or is based on untenable grounds. State v. Flinn, 154 Wash.2d 193, 199, 110 P.3d 748 (2005). The appellant has the burden of proving abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 15 As a preliminary matter, a criminal defendant has ......
-
State v. Iniguez
...State v. Selam, 97 Wash.App. 140, 142-43, 982 P.2d 679 (1999) (excludable delay for defense counsel's vacation); State v. Flinn, 154 Wash.2d 193, 201, 110 P.3d 748 (2005) (granting a trial continuance to allow the State additional time for trial preparation occasioned by newly received disc......
-
Quadrant Corp. v. American States Ins. Co.
... ... AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, a foreign corporation, Respondents ... No. 74663-0 ... Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc ... Argued ... ...
-
State v. Iniguez
...869 P.2d 392 (1994). Similarly, we review a decision to grant or deny a continuance for an abuse of discretion. State v. Flinn, 154 Wash.2d 193, 199, 110 P.3d 748 (2005). However, a court "necessarily abuses its discretion by denying a criminal defendant's constitutional rights." State v. P......