State v. Flores

• Decision Date: 20 May 2015
• Docket Number: 32,928.,No. 35,358.,35,358.
• Citation: 355 P.3d 81
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Robert J. FLORES, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

355 P.3d 81

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Robert J. FLORES, Defendant–Appellant.

32,928.

No. 35,358.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 20, 2015.

Certiorari Denied, Aug. 4, 2015,

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Caren I. Friedman, Santa Fe, NM, The Pickett Law Firm, Mark L. Pickett Las Cruces, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

{1} A jury found Defendant Robert J. Flores guilty of reckless child abuse resulting in death, in violation of NMSA 1978, § 30–6–1(D)(1), (F) (2009), and tampering with evidence, in violation of NMSA 1978, § 30–22–5(A) (2003). Defendant raises several issues on appeal involving sufficiency of the evidence, whether statements he made to the police should have been suppressed, the State's destruction of evidence, and his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Because we conclude that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, we need not address the other issues Defendant raises. We reverse and remand to the district court for dismissal of the charges.

BACKGROUND

{2} This case involves the tragic suffocation death of Kalynne Flores, Defendant's four-and-one-half-month-old daughter. Defendant was entrusted with Kalynne's care one evening while the baby's mother worked the night shift. At about 10:30 p.m., Defendant wanted to leave the home to go to the store. He did not want to take Kalynne with him and he did not want to put her in the bed where she usually slept¹ because he did not want the neighbors to hear her cry while he was away. He placed Kalynne on top of clothing in a laundry basket, put the laundry basket inside of a walk-in closet inside of a bedroom, and left the home. Defendant returned home forty-five minutes later, but did not check on Kalynne until a few hours later, at which time he found her dead. The medical examiner ruled that the cause of death was asphyxia

. Defendant was arrested for Kalynne's death the next day, on December 7, 2007. His trial began more than five years later on January 30, 2013.

DISCUSSION

A. Speedy Trial General Principles

{3} The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The New Mexico Constitution affords a similar right: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to ... a speedy public trial.” N.M. Const. art. II, § 14. However, “[a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial [.]” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). “[I]t is ultimately the [s]tate's responsibility to bring a defendant to trial in a timely manner.” State v. Stock, 2006–NMCA–140, ¶ 17, 140 N.M. 676, 147 P.3d 885.

{4} The United States Supreme Court provided four factors to consider in Barker: (1) length of delay, (2) reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. “Each of these factors is weighed either in favor of or against the [s]tate or the defendant, and then balanced to determine if a defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated.”State v. Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 17, 283 P.3d 272. Because none of these factors alone is sufficient to establish a violation, we analyze speedy trial claims on a case-by-case basis. State v. Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 23, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 ; State v. Palacio, 2009–NMCA–074, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 594, 212 P.3d 1148. In analyzing these factors, we defer to the district court's factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, but we independently review the record to determine whether a defendant was denied his speedy trial right and we weigh and balance the Barker factors de novo. State v. Montoya, 2015–NMCA056, ¶ 12, 348 P.3d 1057.

B. Length of Delay

{5} The length of delay serves two purposes in our analysis. First, it acts as a mechanism triggering “further inquiry into the Barker factors once the delay has reached a specified amount of time, depending on the difficulty of the case.” Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 20, 283 P.3d 272 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A delay of trial of twelve months is presumptively prejudicial in simple cases, fifteen months in intermediate cases, and eighteen months in complex cases. Id. ¶ 21. Second, we consider how long the delay extends beyond this presumptively prejudicial period, because “the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [s]tate.” Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 24, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. We calculate the length of delay from the time the defendant “becomes an accused, that is, by a filing of a formal indictment or information or arrest and holding to answer.” State v. Urban, 2004–NMSC–007, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 1061 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{6} The district court found that this was a complex case. Defendant contends that it was a case of intermediate complexity because it involved only “two counts against a single defendant.” We defer to the district court's finding that this was a complex case because it was in the best position to make that determination. See State v. Manzanares, 1996–NMSC–028, ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 798, 918 P.2d 714 (“The question of the complexity of a case is best answered by a trial court familiar with the factual circumstances, the contested issues and available evidence, the local judicial machinery, and reasonable expectations for the discharge of law enforcement and prosecutorial responsibilities.”).

{7} Defendant was arrested on December 7, 2007. His trial began nearly five years and two months later on January 30, 2013. This nearly sixty-two month delay extends almost forty-four months beyond the presumptively prejudicial threshold of eighteen months for a complex case. Once the presumptively prejudicial threshold has been exceeded, the state must present evidence to show that a defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. See Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 16, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. This delay was considered extraordinary and weighs heavily in Defendant's favor unless sufficiently tempered by a consideration and analysis of all four Barker factors. See State v. Maddox, 2008–NMSC–062, ¶¶ 12, 37, 145 N.M. 242, 195 P.3d 1254 (addressing a twenty-eight month delay as “extraordinary” and evaluating all four Barker factors in detail to determine whether the unique facts significantly tempered the prejudice to the defendant), abrogated on other grounds by Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶¶ 47–48, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.

C. Reasons for Delay

{8} “Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay.”Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 25, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The reasons for the delay “may either heighten or temper the prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, different reasons for delay are accorded different weight. Id. Bad faith or deliberate delay in order to hamper the defense or gain some impermissible advantage at trial is weighed heavily against the state. Id. Valid reasons for delay, such as a missing witness, reasonable time needed to oppose the defendant's pretrial motions, and a defendant “go [ing] into hiding” may be “wholly justifiable” and not weighed against the state. Id. ¶ 27 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). More neutral reasons for delay, such as “negligent or administrative delay ... caused, for example, by overcrowded courts, the reassignment of judges, or governmental negligence[,]” State v. Steinmetz, 2014–NMCA–070, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 1145 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), weighs against the state, though “less heavily.” Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 26, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.

{9} However, our tolerance of negligent or administrative delay “varies inversely with its protractedness[.]” Id. ¶ 26 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, where the government's negligence and administrative burdens cause an excessively protracted delay, we weigh such delay heavily against the state. See State v. Taylor,

2015–NMCA–012, ¶ 25, 343 P.3d 199 (concluding that delays caused by the state's negligence and lack of diligence weigh heavily against the state where there was an “excessively long” two-year delay in a simple case); Steinmetz , 2014–NMCA–070, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 1145 (“The degree of weight we assign against the prosecution for negligent delay is closely related to the length of the delay; the longer the delay, or the greater the threat to the fairness to the defendant, the less tolerant we are of the delay.” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

{10} We proceed by dividing the nearly sixty-two month delay in this case into digestible portions and discussing the reasons for each portion. We note that the district court's order denying Defendant's second speedy trial motion did not include findings specific to particular periods of delay except for the State's interlocutory 3 appeal, which the district court found was “a valid reason” for delay. As to the remainder of the delay, the order contained only a general finding that “the majority of the delay [was] due to both parties filing numerous motions and conducting discovery” and that the delays were not “deliberate attempts to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense.”

1. December 2007 to May 2008

{11} During the first six months after Defendant's arrest on December 7, 2007, and the first five months after he waived his arraignment on January 2, 2008, the record shows no activity initiated by the State to prosecute this case other than a request to review Defendant's conditions of release because he was seen at a local basketball game. During this time, Defendant submitted...