State v. Ford, No. 24899.
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Writing for the Court | BURNETT, Justice |
| Citation | 512 S.E.2d 500,334 S.C. 59 |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Chris FORD, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 08 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 24899. |
334 S.C. 59
512 S.E.2d 500
v.
Chris FORD, Appellant
No. 24899.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard January 5, 1999.
Decided February 8, 1999.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General Robert F. Daley, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor Jay E. Hodge, of Darlington, for respondent.
BURNETT, Justice:
Respondent appeals from his conviction for murder and armed robbery and his sentence of life for the murder and 30 years, consecutive, for the armed robbery. We reverse.
FACTS
During jury selection, appellant exercised thirteen peremptory challenges when selecting the jury and the two alternates.
Appellant then explained why he struck these jurors. Appellant struck Juror # 7 because her husband's family was active in the rescue squad, which according to appellant is a "quasi-law enforcement" activity. Appellant struck Juror # 2 and Juror # 99 because they work in the banking industry. Juror # 96 was struck because her husband is a "lieutenant of the Dillon County Police Force." Juror # 89 was struck because, as an employee of McLeod Hospital, she "would tend to believe any evidence presented by any medical person." Juror # 124 was struck because he works for a school district. Juror # 105 was struck because he lived in the same trailer park as the mother of the victim. Appellant struck Juror # 48 because he is a paramedic and "he's worked closely with law enforcement and also worked closely with medical personnel...." Juror # 112 was struck because she works for a church. Defense counsel had a bad experience when a minister previously served on a jury so he avoids placing church employees on a jury. Juror # 113 was struck because he is an educator and because his wife works for Rural Sanitation. According to defense counsel, his law office had recently had problems with this business. Appellant struck Juror # 95 because she works at a local hardware store which is owned by a former longtime Dillon County Magistrate and his employees are exposed to pro-prosecution ideas since many law enforcement personnel regularly visit the store. Finally, appellant struck Juror # 126 for the following reason:
[W]e did not feel comfortable....He's assistant manager of Tomlinsons on Main Street. My wife helped me select the juror and as a teenager she worked there and he worked there at the time. And we feel that he would feel uncomfortable.
And, in fact, last September, when I had a death penalty case, he sold me a pair of shoes to wear in court for that334 S.C. 63trial. So we thought he would be uncomfortable sitting on the jury. We didn't know which way he might go. But it could certainly have a bearing on that. And whenever I go into Tomlinsons we all joke and talk. Of course, we have not talked about this particular trial, but every time I go in there he's asking me about court, different cases going on. And I, certainly, would not want him to be on one of my juries because I wouldn't feel comfortable.
The trial judge voiced concern that these reasons were too broad because most explanations concerned where the juror was employed. The trial judge noted he was most concerned with the strikes exercised against Jurors # 95 and # 126. The prosecution argued the reasons given by appellant were "just too general to be effective. There needs to be a specific reason that this person, in a specific sitting [sic], is offensive, not the State or Defense just saying they work somewhere."3
The trial judge then ruled appellant had violated Batson. According to the trial judge, because appellant exercised all but one of his strikes against prospective white jurors, "[t]he cumulative effect is a lot worse picture than looking at it on an individual basis." The trial judge quashed the jury and ordered selection of a new jury. Further, the trial judge ruled appellant could not strike Juror # 126 during the second jury selection.4 Both Jurors # 95 and # 126 were seated on the second jury.5
Did the trial court err in sustaining the State's Batson challenge and quashing the jury where appellant's reasons for exercising the peremptory strikes were facially race neutral and pretext was not shown?
DISCUSSION As an initial...
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State v. Edwards, No. 4261.
...knowledge of and relationship with a prospective juror is a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike. State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 512 S.E.2d 500 9. Relationship with law enforcement or pro-law enforcement attitude. A potential juror's relationship with a law enforcement offici......
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State v. Cochran, No. 4116.
...ultimately struck five white women, they also struck two black women, and seated one white woman and four white men. See State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 66, 512 S.E.2d 500, 504 (1999) ("Although appellant exercised most of his strikes against white jurors, he did not strike every white juror. .......
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State v. Haigler, No. 24927.
...regarding purposeful discrimination are accorded great deference and will be set aside on appeal only if clearly erroneous. State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 512 S.E.2d 500 (1999); State v. Dyar, supra (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). When the ......
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State v. Shuler, No. 25282.
...to quash the jury panel once he found the Solicitor's reason was a subterfuge, Shuler is entitled to a new trial. See State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 512 S.E.2d 500 (1999). The trial court's determination the State's reason was a subterfuge and not racially neutral was clearly erroneous. See Dy......
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State v. Edwards, No. 4261.
...knowledge of and relationship with a prospective juror is a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike. State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 512 S.E.2d 500 9. Relationship with law enforcement or pro-law enforcement attitude. A potential juror's relationship with a law enforcement offici......
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State v. Cochran, No. 4116.
...ultimately struck five white women, they also struck two black women, and seated one white woman and four white men. See State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 66, 512 S.E.2d 500, 504 (1999) ("Although appellant exercised most of his strikes against white jurors, he did not strike every white jur......
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State v. Haigler, No. 24927.
...regarding purposeful discrimination are accorded great deference and will be set aside on appeal only if clearly erroneous. State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 512 S.E.2d 500 (1999); State v. Dyar, supra (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). When the ......
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State v. Shuler, No. 25282.
...to quash the jury panel once he found the Solicitor's reason was a subterfuge, Shuler is entitled to a new trial. See State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 512 S.E.2d 500 (1999). The trial court's determination the State's reason was a subterfuge and not racially neutral was clearly erroneous. See Dy......