State v. Franchi, No. 98-2596.
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Writing for the Court | TAYLOR, J. |
| Citation | 746 So.2d 1126 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Lorette FRANCHI, Appellee. |
| Decision Date | 13 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-2596. |
746 So.2d 1126
STATE of Florida, Appellant,v.
Lorette FRANCHI, Appellee
No. 98-2596.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
October 13, 1999.
Rehearing Denied December 23, 1999.
J. David Bogenshutz of Law Offices of Bogenschutz & Dutko, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
TAYLOR, J.
The state appeals the trial court's dismissal of the information charging the defendant with aiding the escape of her husband. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The defendant's husband, Vincent Carl Franchi, was an escaped prisoner from Pinellas and Manatee Counties. After his escape, Franchi contacted the defendant and requested her assistance. The defendant first consulted with an attorney, Sid Fleischman, for advice on what she could legally do to help her husband. Fleischman advised the defendant that, as the escapee's wife, she would be exempt from criminal liability under the family member exception of section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1997), the "accessory after the fact" statute. However, Fleischman did not advise the defendant concerning her potential criminal liability under section 843.12, Florida Statutes (1997), the "aiding escape" statute.
Thereafter, the defendant helped her husband by obtaining a motel room for him under a false name, bringing him food daily, and bonding him out of the Broward County jail, where he was being held under yet another false name. The defendant was charged by information with aiding escape under section 843.12. She filed a sworn motion to dismiss, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), asserting advice of counsel as an affirmative defense and attaching Fleischman's affidavit. The state filed a demurrer and motion to strike the sworn motion.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the defendant admitted that her actions satisfied the statutory elements of the aiding escape statute but denied that she had the requisite specific intent to violate the law. She argued that, because section 843.12 is a specific intent crime, mistaken advice of counsel is a valid defense. The state disagreed and contended that aiding escape is a general intent crime, to which the defense of misadvice of counsel does not apply. Upon concluding that section 843.12 requires specific intent and that the undisputed facts established a "misadvice of counsel" defense, the trial court dismissed the information.
Both parties agree that advice of counsel can constitute a valid defense to a specific intent crime. See Huff v. State, 646 So.2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). They disagree, however, on whether aiding escape is a general intent or specific intent crime. The state further argues that intent, whether general or specific, is a jury question not properly addressed in a sworn motion to dismiss.
For years the distinction between specific and general intent...
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Forbes v. State, 4D05-1554.
...to cause any delay during the proceedings, issues regarding state of mind are for the trier of fact to resolve. See State v. Franchi, 746 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). "Determination of the facts, and inferences to be drawn therefrom, is necessarily left to the decision of the trial judge......
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Polite v. State, 3D03-2819.
...simply intend to commit the proscribed act, that is, resisting, obstructing or opposing a person who is an officer. See State v. Franchi, 746 So.2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)("The plain language of the [aiding escape] statute does not require a heightened or particularized intent beyond......
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Smith v. State, 4D13-512
...cannot be ascertained from direct evidence but only inferred from the acts of parties and surrounding circumstances." State v. Franchi, 746 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). As such, there was no error in the trial court sending the charge of attempted aggravated battery to the jury. A......
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Kosterlitz v. Klu, Case No: 2:18-cv-482-FtM-29MRM
...of knowledge or intent is a question of fact for the factfinder, to be determined after trial." (citation omitted); State v. Franchi, 746 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (noting that criminal intent "is generally a jury question that usually cannot be ascertained by direct evidence bu......
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Forbes v. State, No. 4D05-1554.
...to cause any delay during the proceedings, issues regarding state of mind are for the trier of fact to resolve. See State v. Franchi, 746 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). "Determination of the facts, and inferences to be drawn therefrom, is necessarily left to the decision of the trial judge......
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Polite v. State, No. 3D03-2819.
...simply intend to commit the proscribed act, that is, resisting, obstructing or opposing a person who is an officer. See State v. Franchi, 746 So.2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)("The plain language of the [aiding escape] statute does not require a heightened or particularized intent beyond......
-
Smith v. State, No. 4D13-512
...cannot be ascertained from direct evidence but only inferred from the acts of parties and surrounding circumstances." State v. Franchi, 746 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). As such, there was no error in the trial court sending the charge of attempted aggravated battery to the jury. A......
-
Smith v. State, No. 4D13–512.
...cannot be ascertained from direct evidence but only inferred from the acts of parties and surrounding circumstances.” State v. Franchi, 746 So.2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). As such, there was no error in the trial court sending the charge of attempted aggravated battery to the jury. Ac......