State v. Fraternal Knights & Ladies

• Decision Date: 12 July 1904
• Citation: 77 P. 500,35 Wash. 338
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. FRATERNAL KNIGHTS & LADIES.

77 P. 500

35 Wash. 338

STATE v. FRATERNAL KNIGHTS & LADIES.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 12, 1904

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Boyd J. Tellman, Judge.

Action by the state against the Fraternal Knights & Ladies. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

W. B Stratton, E. W. Ross, C. C. Dalton, and E. B Palmer, for the state.

J. W Langley, W. H. Merritt, and Robert D. Hamlin, for respondent.

HADLEY J.

The state of Washington, the appellant in this appeal, instituted this proceeding against the respondent to enjoin and prohibit it from continuing or carrying on the business of fraternal insurance until certain alleged violations of law have been corrected. The complaint avers that the respondent is a fraternal beneficiary corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of chapter 174, p. 356, of the session laws of 1901; that the corporation was organized on the 16th day of April, 1903, and ever since said date has been, and now is, transacting a fraternal beneficiary business, and issuing to its beneficiary members certificates entitling their beneficiaries to payment, in the event of death of the member, or in case of sickness or accident, of the sums set forth in a table or schedule, such payments being in consideration of the monthly payment of installments or assessments in sums set forth in the same table; that the mortuary assessment rates heretofore charged and collected and now being charged and collected by said corporation have been at all times since the organization of the company, and are now, less than the mortuary assessment rates indicated as necessary by the Fraternal Congress Mortality Table, set forth in said chapter 174, p. 356, of the Laws of Washington, 1901, and less than the mortuary rates required by law; that said corporation ever since its organization has been, and now is, transacting and carrying on business in violation of section 12 of said chapter 174, p. 362; that the Commissioner of Insurance of the state of Washington has repeatedly demanded of said corporation, its officers and agents, that the mortuary assessment rates charged and collected by it be increased, and made to correspond with the rates indicated as necessary by said Fraternal Congress Mortality Table, and as required by law, but that it has refused and still refuses to increase said rates or to comply with the requirements of law; that the said Commissioner of Insurance has served upon the Attorney General notice in writing that said corporation has been and is exceeding its powers, is conducting its business fraudulently, and has failed and refused to comply with the law; and that this proceeding is prosecuted at the request of said Commissioner of Insurance. The Complaint prays that the corporation be enjoined from continuing its business until the said violation shall have been corrected, and the costs of this action paid. The corporation demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained. The state elected to stand upon its complaint, and judgment was entered that the injunction be denied and the action dismissed. The state has appealed.

Respondent concedes that chapter 174, p. 356, Laws 1901, is a complete act for all the purposes expressed in its title, without section 12 of the act, but contends that said section is repugnant to section 19, art. 2, of the state Constitution, which is as follows: 'No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be embraced in the title.' The title of the act of 1901 is as follows: 'An act regulating fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations.' Section 12 of the act, which it is claimed is not within the above title, is as follows: 'No association not admitted to transact business within this state prior to the passage of this act shall be incorporated or given a permit or certificate of authority to transact business within this state, as provided for by this act, unless it shall first show that the mortuary assessment rates, provided for in whatever plan of business it has adopted, are not lower than is indicated as necessary by the following mortality table:' (Here follows a table designated as 'Fraternal Congress Mortality Table.) Respondent's argument is that this objection would be less forcible if the minimum rate and the manner of determining it provided by section 12 applied alike to all associations doing business in this state, but that inasmuch as the section attempts to apply the rate to a class not yet in existence, and exempts from its operation all associations already doing business in the state, the matter of fixing a minimum rate for the only members the act can affect becomes a material part, if not the sole purpose, of the act itself, and is not sufficiently indicated by its title. If it is competent for the Legislature to make the classification required by section 12, then we think the title of the act is broad enough to include it, for the reason that the words 'regulating fraternal beneficiary societies,' etc., seem broad enough to require the reader to examine the body of the act for every feature that may properly come within the scope of regulation. The adoption of minimum mortuary assessment rates, and their application under stated conditions, are matters of regulation, and come within the title of the act. Whether it is competent for the Legislature to regulate by classification, we shall hereinafter discuss.

Respondent's next contention is that section 12 aforesaid is vague and uncertain, in that it is alleged no minimum mortuary assessment rate is in fact written in the law itself as the legislative judgment and will. It is true, it is designated as 'Fraternal Congress Mortality Table,' but the section so refers to the table that its terms become a part of the act itself, and it is wholly immaterial by whom it was prepared, or by what, if any, name it is designated. It may be true, as respondent argues, that the table was originally prepared by some body of men bearing no official relation to the legislative body, but that does not prevent the Legislature from adopting the table and incorporating it into law as a regulative feature. It is further argued that such tables belong to the domain of evidence, and that, like other evidentiary matters, they should receive the scrutiny of the courts, and be held subject to impeachment. We think, in the light of modern...