State v. Dingman

• Citation: 219 P. 760,37 Idaho 253
• Parties: STATE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM DINGMAN, Appellant
• Decision Date: 30 May 1923
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

219 P. 760

37 Idaho 253

STATE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM DINGMAN, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 30, 1923

CRIMINAL LAW-CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM ACT-CONSTITUTIONAL-NOT VAGUE INDEFINITE, UNCERTAIN OR CLASS LEGISLATION-SENSE IN WHICH TERMS "CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM" AND "SABOTAGE" USED-PENAL STATUTE-WHEN SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE-PURPOSE OF ACT-INFORMATION-WHEN NOT DUPLICITOUS-INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD-ITS CHARACTER PURPOSE AND TEACHINGS-MATTERS OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE-ITS LITERATURE-WHEN ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE-HEARSAY EVIDENCE-WHEN ITS ADMISSION ERROR.

1. C S., secs. 8580 and 8581, of the Criminal Syndicalism Act are not unconstitutional as being vague, indefinite and uncertain in their terms, do not violate the 5th, 6th, and 14th amendments to the federal constitution or art. 1, sec. 13 of the Idaho constitution, are not class legislation, do not violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and do not invade the personal liberty of citizens, in attempting to make mere association unlawful.

2. C S., secs. 8580 and 8581, create and define a crime in language sufficiently definite and clear to enable an individual to know with reasonable certainty whether his act is in violation of the same.

3. The legislature in passing the criminal syndicalism statute used the terms "criminal syndicalism" and "sabotage" as those terms had been defined in recent editions of standard dictionaries and encyclopedias as well as by courts, and it intended thereby to denounce that form of syndicalism which advocates crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform.

4. In the enactment of the Criminal Syndicalism Act of March 4, 1917, Laws 1917, p. 459, the legislature used the terms "criminal syndicalism" and "sabotage" in the same sense in which those terms have been used in other similar acts, by the courts in the administration of similar laws, and as such terms are de- fined and commonly understood in standard dictionaries, encyclopedias and works of well-known political writers.

5. The legislature in creating an offense may define it by a particular description of the act or acts constituting it, or it may define it as an act which produces or is reasonably calculated to produce a certain described or defined result, or it may group together various means by which the end may be accomplished and make any one of such means an offense, when done to attain the object denounced by the statute.

6. A penal statute is sufficiently definite, although it may use general terms, if the offense is defined so as to convey to a person of ordinary understanding an adequate description of the evil intended to be prohibited.

7. A statute defining criminal syndicalism is not objectionable for the reason that the offense may be committed in one of several ways: (1) by word of mouth, writing or teaching the duty, necessity or propriety of doing the prohibited acts; (2) by printing, publishing, editing, issuing or circulating books, papers or documents advocating the unlawful doctrine; (3) by openly and deliberately justifying crime or sabotage; (4) by organizing, helping to organize or attempting to organize, or becoming a member, or being a member, continuing to retain such membership in, an assembly of persons who teach or advocate such doctrines.

8. The design and purpose of the legislature in the enactment of these statutes was the suppression of what was deemed by the lawmakers a growing menace in the state, arising from sabotage and other unlawful methods of terrorism, employed in the furtherance of industrial ends, and in the adjustment of alleged grievances against employers.

9. It is the exclusive province of the legislature to declare what acts deemed by the lawmakers inimical to the public welfare shall constitute a crime, and to prohibit the same, and impose approximate penalties for the violation thereof, and judicial construction of such laws is limited to whether the constitutional rights of the citizen have been invaded or violated.

10. Under C. S., sec. 8829, an information is not duplicitous where a single offense sought to be charged may be committed by several means, if the ways and means are not repugnant. Since the acts of advocating the doctrine of criminal syndicalism, organizing, becoming a member of or meeting with an organization that advocates such doctrines, are made unlawful, all of said acts may be a part of one transaction.

11. Since the organization known as the Industrial Workers of the World, organized in 1905 by Eugene V. Debs and W. D. Haywood, has been so frequently referred to in the current literature of the day, including the reported decisions of the courts, standard dictionaries, encyclopedias and works of like character, as being an organization which advocates the doctrine of crime, sabotage, violence and unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial and political reform, books, pamphlets, membership cards, preamble and constitution of the order, applications for membership, copies of the newspaper publication, and other literature pertaining to the teachings, doctrines and purposes and objects of this organization published by authority and with the approval of its leaders, are admissible in evidence against a defendant on trial for being a member of such order.

12. On a trial of a person charged with organizing, helping to organize, becoming a member, and being a member, continuing to retain such membership, with the Industrial Workers of the World, the same being a society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach, advocate, and which did teach and advocate, the doctrines of criminal syndicalism, sabotage, violence and unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial and political reform, the extrajudicial statements of persons not in any way connected with the action, who are claimed to have told the witnesses who related these alleged conversations that they were members of the organization, and as to its doctrines and teachings, are hearsay and inadmissible.

13. On the trial of one charged with organizing, becoming a member and continuing such membership, and advocating the doctrines of the Industrial Workers of the World, testimony as to the extrajudicial statements of persons not connected with the action, but who claimed to be members of the order, or who the witnesses believed were members of the order, told such witnesses concerning its purposes, teachings and doctrines, was not admissible under the rule with reference to the testimony of co-conspirators in a conspiracy action.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, for Bonner County. Hon. Robert N. Dunn, Judge.

William Dingham was convicted of a violation of the Criminal Syndicalism Act, and appeals. Reversed and remanded for new trial.

Judgment reversed and a new trial awarded.

Albert Streiff, for Appellant.

The law under which the prosecution is had, C. S., secs. 8580 and 8581, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: It is vague, indefinite and uncertain in its terms. (5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to U. S. Const., art. 1, sec. 13, Idaho Const.; Tozier v. United States, 52 F. 917; Holmberg v. Jones, 7 Idaho 752, 65 P. 563; Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 113 Am. St. 315, 7 Ann. Cas. 750, 84 P. 39, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 896; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 23 L.Ed. 563; State v. Mann, 2 Ore. 239; Cook v. State, 26 Ind.App. 278, 59 N.E. 489; Ex parte Jackson, 45 Ark. 158; State v. Gaster, 45 La. Ann. 646, 12 So. 739; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 132, 59 Am. St. 457, 35 S.W. 129, 23 L. R. A. 209; Baltimore & O. Ry. v. Railway Com., 196 F. 690; Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Salem, 166 Ind. 71, 76 N.E. 631; State v. International G. N. Ry. (Tex. Civ.), 165 S.W. 892; Gulf C. & F. S. Ry. Co. v. Dwyer, 84 Tex. 194, 19 S.W. 471; State v. Jack Diamond, 27 N.M. 477, 202 P. 988.)

It is class legislation and attempts to create an unreasonable classification denying equal protection of laws. (Art. 1, secs. 2, 3, art. 3, sec. 19, Idaho Const.; 14th Amendment U. S. Const.; Ex parte Mallon, 16 Idaho 737, 103 P. 374; Green v. State, 83 Neb. 84, 131 Am. St. 626, 119 N.W. 6; State v. Holland, 37 Mont. 393, 96 P. 719.)

It violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. (Art. 1, sec. 6, Idaho Const.; State v. Crawford, 74 Wash. 248, 133 P. 590, 46 L. R. A., N. S., 1039; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 14 Ann. Cas. 764, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A., N. S., 932; Ex parte Wood, 155 F. 190.)

It attempts to invade the personal liberties of the citizens in a manner not justified by law, in that it attempts to make mere association unlawful. (Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 58 Am. St. 576, 36 S.W. 628, 33 L. R. A. 606; Watertown v. Christnacht, 39 S.D. 290, 164 N.W. 62; City of St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 124 Am. St. 750, 109 S.W. 30, 15 L. R. A., N. S., 973; Pinkerton v. Verberg, 18 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579; City of St. Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo. 541, 31 S.W. 915; Gastenau v. Comm. (Tex. Crim.), 56 S.W. 75; City of Lancaster v. Reed (Mo. App.), 207 S.W. 868.)

The information does not state an offense. ( State v. Scheminisky, 31 Idaho 504, 174 P. 611; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct 542, 37 L. ed., 419; State v. Cole, 31 Idaho 603, 174 P. 131; State v. Smith, 25 Idaho 541, 138 P. 1107; State v. Wolf, 56 Mont. 493, 185 P. 556; Foster v. United States, 253 F. 481; State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 30 P. 729; State v. Swenson, 13 Idaho 1, 81 P. 379; State v. Dodd, 84 Wash. 436, 147 P. 9; State v. Muller, 80 Wash. 368, 141 P. 910; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588; ...