State v. Frazier, A97A2469
| Decision Date | 30 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. A97A2469,A97A2469 |
| Citation | 494 S.E.2d 36,229 Ga.App. 344 |
| Parties | , 97 FCDR 4052 The STATE v. FRAZIER. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Timothy G. Madison, District Attorney, Robin R. Riggs, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
William D. Healan III, Winder, for appellee.
The state appeals an order from the Superior Court of Barrow County wherein the trial court suppressed the results of William Scott Frazier's urine test for purposes of a prosecution for possession of cocaine; the trial court found that the implied consent warnings read to Frazier prior to providing the state with a urine sample did not adequately inform Frazier that such consent would include "any purposes other than the stated purpose of prosecution for driving under the influence." This issue is controlled adversely to the state by our decisions in State v. Gerace, 210 Ga.App. 874, 437 S.E.2d 862 (1993), and Beasley v. State, 204 Ga.App. 214(1), 419 S.E.2d 92 (1992). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
Frazier was stopped for driving under the influence; he was read the implied consent warnings verbatim from the statute, OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b). The arresting officer then asked Frazier to take a urine test, and he complied. The urine sample tested positive for cocaine, and Frazier was subsequently charged with DUI and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act: possession of cocaine.
OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(2) states in pertinent part: "Georgia law requires you to submit to state administered chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining if you are under the influence of alcohol or drugs." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 40-5-67.1 is in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed. Steed v. City of Atlanta, 172 Ga.App. 839, 840, 325 S.E.2d 165 (1984). Clearly, the purpose for such test is related to a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs, a misdemeanor offense; the implied consent warnings did not inform Frazier that an additional purpose would be for the prosecution of possession of drugs, a felony offense that is totally unrelated to a traffic stop for which the implied consent warnings were developed. 1
The state maintains that Frazier was told that his blood would be tested for alcohol and drugs, which was done; thus, Frazier was not misled and his consent was voluntary. However, the state's argument ignores the fact that while Frazier was told his blood would be tested for alcohol and drugs, he was also told that the test was being given for the purpose of determining whether he was under the influence for a traffic offense. Any other purpose would exceed the scope of the consent given. 2
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...State, 204 Ga.App. 214, 215, 419 S.E.2d 92 (1992) (administration of drug test required before bond determination); State v. Frazier, 229 Ga.App. 344, 494 S.E.2d 36 (1997) (results of blood tests pursuant to implied consent were inadmissible as to evidence of possession of drugs). Additiona......
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State v. Long, A98A0941.
...v. Burton, 230 Ga.App. 753, 498 S.E.2d 121 (1998). We find Burton and Jewell to be controlling and affirm. Compare State v. Frazier, 229 Ga.App. 344, 345, 494 S.E.2d 36 (1997) (State failed to carry its burden of proving consent was the product of defendant's essentially free and unrestrain......
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State v. Harris
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