State v. Fredericks
| Decision Date | 08 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D19-2407,4D19-2407 |
| Citation | 293 So.3d 508 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Christopher FREDERICKS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lindsay A. Warner, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert David Malove of The Law Office of Robert David Malove, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
This appeal, of a circuit court’s order granting a motion to suppress, presents the novel issue of whether Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), which proscribed certain limits on law enforcement’s ability to search a vehicle after the driver is arrested, still permits a narcotics K-9’s alert to serve as probable cause for the warrantless search of the vehicle.
More specifically, this case’s facts presents the following question: After the police (1) lawfully investigate a driver who has voluntarily exited his vehicle, (2) lawfully arrest the driver for a narcotics-related offense, (3) lawfully move the arrested driver out of the vehicle’s reach, and (4) timely deploy a narcotics K-9 which alerts to the vehicle to provide probable cause to search the vehicle, are the police still permitted to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle in light of Gant ?
We conclude, under those facts, the answer is yes. Gant appears to permit the warrantless search in this case because, regardless of the fact the driver was out of the vehicle’s reach, the K-9 alert provided probable cause to search the vehicle, that is, made it "reasonable to believe the vehicle contain[ed] evidence of the offense of arrest." Id. at 351, 129 S.Ct. 1710. Moreover, Gant is consistent with longstanding United States Supreme Court precedent holding once probable cause exists that a vehicle contains contraband, the police may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. Thus, we reverse the circuit court’s order granting the motion to suppress.
We present this opinion in three sections:
The material facts of the stop, search, and charges are undisputed.
A road patrol officer ran a license plate check on a car driving in a neighborhood. While the officer waited for the computer to respond, the car turned into a parking space. The computer revealed the registered owner’s license was suspended. The officer pulled his vehicle directly behind the car just as the driver was exiting the car. The officer saw the driver matched the registered owner’s driver’s license photograph.
The officer exited his vehicle and called for a narcotics K-9 handler to respond. The officer would later testify this particular neighborhood was inundated with methamphetamine, and the driver’s body language indicated he may have been under the influence.
The K-9 handler was down the street on another call and readily available. Within four to five minutes, while the officer and driver discussed the suspended license, the K-9 handler arrived. The K-9 handler deployed the K-9 around the driver. The K-9 alerted to a narcotics odor coming from the driver. The officer searched the driver and found two small bags each containing one gram of crystal methamphetamine.
The officer handcuffed the driver and put him in the officer’s vehicle. The driver did not consent to a search of his car.
Nevertheless, the K-9 handler walked around the car with the K-9. The K-9 alerted to a narcotics odor coming from the car’s driver’s side door. The K-9 handler opened the door and deployed the K-9 inside. The K-9 alerted to the center console area. The K-9 handler saw a plastic chewing gum container in the cupholder. He opened it and found fifteen grams of methamphetamine. He then opened the center console and found another fifteen grams of methamphetamine, three grams of cannabis, and two glass pipes, one with methamphetamine residue and the other with marijuana residue. He next looked in the driver’s door pocket and found a digital scale and plastic bags typically used for packaging drugs. He lastly looked at the rear floorboard and found a tin with sixteen grams of marijuana and a loaded handgun.
After the officer read the driver his Miranda rights, the driver admitted he knew of the illegal drugs in his car, and knew he was a convicted felon who could not possess a firearm.
The state charged the driver with five counts: (1) trafficking in methamphetamine based on his possession of more than fourteen but less than twenty-eight grams; (2) possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon; (3) possession of cannabis less than twenty grams; (4) possession of drug paraphernalia; and (5) driving while license suspended.
The driver filed a motion to suppress, arguing that once he was handcuffed and away from his car, the officers were required to obtain a warrant to search his car. According to the driver, the officers’ warrantless vehicle search incident to his arrest violated his Fourth Amendment right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring suppression of the drugs, paraphernalia, and firearm found in his car. In support, the driver relied on, among other cases, Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), Harris v. State , 238 So. 3d 396 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), and State v. K.S ., 28 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ().
The state responded that the cases upon which the driver relied were distinguishable because none of those cases, unlike this case, involved a deployed K-9. Instead, the state relied on pre- Gant and post- Gant cases to argue that a K-9’s alert to a drug’s presence within an automobile constitutes probable cause for a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment’s "automobile exception."
The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. The circuit court initially recognized that once the K-9 alerted to the car, the officers had probable cause to search the car. However, the circuit court ultimately concluded, under Gant , that the officers could not have conducted a warrantless search of the car, unless the driver could have reached into the car when the car was being searched, and it was undisputed the driver here could not do so.
This appeal followed. The state argues the K-9’s alert gave the officers probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the driver’s car under the automobile exception. According to the state, cases like Gant addressing a warrantless search of a vehicle, where the arrestee is out of the vehicle’s reach, are irrelevant here, because none of those cases involved a K-9 alert providing probable cause to conduct the warrantless search of the vehicle. The driver, however, argues Gant controls in any situation where the arrestee is out of the vehicle’s reach.
"The standard of review for motions to suppress is that the appellate court affords a presumption of correctness to a trial court’s findings of fact but reviews de novo the mixed questions of law and fact ...." Pasha v. State , 225 So. 3d 688, 703 (Fla. 2017).
Employing our mixed standard of review, we conclude the circuit court erred in granting the driver’s motion to suppress. Our reasoning lies somewhere between the state’s and the driver’s respective arguments.
That is, Gant applies here, but in the state’s favor, because regardless of the fact the driver was out of the vehicle’s reach, the K-9 alert made it "reasonable to believe the vehicle contain[ed] evidence of the offense of arrest." 556 U.S. at 351, 129 S.Ct. 1710. Moreover, Gant is consistent with longstanding United States Supreme Court precedent holding once probable cause exists that a vehicle contains contraband, the police may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. We address each basis in turn.
a. Gant applies here, but in the state’s favor, because regardless of the fact the driver was out of the vehicle’s reach, the K-9 alert made it reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest.
In Gant , the police arrested the defendant for driving with a suspended license. Id. at 336, 129 S.Ct. 1710. The police handcuffed the defendant and secured him in a patrol car. Id. The police then searched the defendant’s vehicle incident to the arrest, and found a jacket with a bag of cocaine in the pocket. Id.
The defendant was charged with two drug offenses. Id. He moved to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle. Id. He argued the warrantless search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle. Id.
The trial court denied his motion, apparently based on New York v. Belton , 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), which was understood at the time to hold the police may search a vehicle’s interior areas incident to an occupant’s arrest. 556 U.S. at 337, 129 S.Ct. 1710.
The state supreme court reversed, concluding that although Belton addressed a search incident to arrest, Belton did not address whether the police may search a defendant’s vehicle as an incident to arrest once the police have secured the defendant in a patrol car. Id. The state supreme court instead relied on the earlier case of Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), which requires a search incident to arrest be justified by either officer safety or preserving evidence. 556 U.S. at 337, 129 S.Ct. 1710. According to the state supreme court, because neither of those interests existed once the police secured the defendant in the patrol car, the search of his vehicle was unreasonable. Id . at 337-38, 129 S.Ct. 1710.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the state supreme court’s decision. Id. at 351, 129 S.Ct. 1710. The Court first concluded the police...
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...methamphetamine was found, and then proceeded to alert again to both the driver’s side door and center console. State v. Fredericks, 293 So. 3d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) The good faith exception applies to vehicle searches conducted incident to arrest prior to the issuance of Arizona v. Gant.......