State v. Fuller, C3-83-2002
Decision Date | 05 June 1984 |
Docket Number | No. C3-83-2002,C3-83-2002 |
Citation | 350 N.W.2d 382 |
Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Gary Curtis FULLER, Petitioner, |
Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The double jeopardy clause of the Minnesota Constitution precluded retrial by the State where defendant appeared for trial on a misdemeanor charge and two mistrials were called with the consent of defendant because of improper testimony by the State's witness.
David Malban, Duluth, for respondent.
Robert E. Lucas, Duluth, for petitioner.
Considered and decided by POPOVICH, C.J., and LANSING and HUSPENI, JJ., with oral argument waived.
Petitioner, Gary Fuller, petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition to test whether he can be tried on a third occasion for the same offense after the first two trials ended in mistrials. This court granted the petition for the temporary writ.
The writ is made absolute.
On March 14, 1983, petitioner Gary Fuller, currently a resident of the Twin Cities, was charged in Duluth, Minnesota, with the three misdemeanors: Assault IV, Criminal Damage to Property, and Driving After Suspension. The matter first came on for trial before the Honorable Thomas Bujold on October 12, 1983. Petitioner filed a Notice of Removal of the Judge and the matter was reset for hearing.
On November 7, 1983, the matter came on for trial before the Honorable Galen Wilson. Prior to trial, both parties made motions in limine to exclude certain evidence. The court accepted the stipulation of defendant-petitioner that, at the time of the incident, his license to drive had been suspended and that he was aware of the suspension. The stipulation was read to the jury impaneled to hear the trial. As a part of the stipulation, the court ruled that evidence regarding this information was inadmissible.
The State's first witness, Deborah Spears, was called and testified on the allegations. After several minutes of testimony, the witness and the prosecutor engaged in the following exchange:
Q. When did you have any other discussions about whether or not he had a license to drive?
A. I just asked how he could drive around the day he got out of jail or being locked up and--
Defendant-petitioner made a motion for a mistrial and it was granted.
The matter came on for trial again on November 21, 1983. A new jury was called and the motions made in limine were repeated. The court instructed the prosecutor as follows:
The impaneled and sworn jury was then instructed and the stipulation was read to them. Deborah Spears was again called as the State's first witness and, during her testimony, the following exchange occurred:
Q. Did you have an occasion to express any concern about Mr. Fuller transporting you that evening?
A. No.
Q. Did you suspect there might be some difficulty with him doing it legally?
A. Well, I knew he didn't have a driver's license. I thought he didn't have one and I know Gary always drives without one, you know.
Defendant-petitioner again requested a mistrial and the motion was granted.
On December 7, 1983, defendant moved the trial court to dismiss the case on the grounds of state and federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. This court then granted a temporary writ of prohibition.
Both the State and Federal Constitutions prohibit putting a person twice in jeopardy for the same offense. United States Constitution, Amendment V; Minnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 7. A person is in jeopardy, and the constitutional provisions attach, as soon as a jury is sworn. State v. McDonald, 298 Minn. 449, 452, 215 N.W.2d 607, 608-09 (1974) (citing State v. Sommers, 60 Minn. 90, 61 N.W. 907 (1895)). The Federal right applies to the State through the 14th Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2062, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969).
In 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether the double jeopardy protection applies after a mistrial. In State v. Gwara, 311 Minn. 106, 247 N.W.2d 417 (1976), the court outlined two standards:
If jeopardy attached and the declaration of mistrial was at defendant's request or with his consent, then the rule is that the state may retry defendant unless the mistrial was necessitated by bad-faith, intentional misconduct of the trial court or the prosecutor purposely designed to prejudice defendant's chances for an acquittal or to goad him into requesting a mistrial. On the other hand, if jeopardy attached but the mistrial was without defendant's consent, then the test is a different one--specifically, whether in the context of the trial the declaration was dictated by manifest necessity or the ends of public justice.
Id. at 108-09, 247 N.W.2d at 419.
These standards were based on federal constitutional law and upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976). In Dinitz, the court held that the double jeopardy clause protects a defendant against governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and to subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions. The court concluded the clause bars retrials where bad-faith conduct by a judge or prosecutor threatens harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant. Id. at 611, 96 S.Ct. at 1081 (citations omitted).
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court narrowed the right to invoke the bar of double jeopardy to "cases in which the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a...
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