State v. McDonald

• Decision Date: 08 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 43919,43919
• Citation: 298 Minn. 449,215 N.W.2d 607
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert Lee McDONALD, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 607

215 N.W.2d 607

298 Minn. 449

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert Lee McDONALD, Appellant.

No. 43919.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 8, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

A defendant is not placed in double jeopardy when he is retried after the declaration of a mistrial on the motion of the prosecutor, to which defendant objects, even though a jury has been impaneled and sworn, where it appears that the judge could reasonably believe that, because of a newspaper article concerning the trial and other circumstances, it was manifestly necessary in the interests of public justice to declare a mistrial in order to preserve the impartiality of the jury.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Donald H. Nichols, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., William B. Randall, County Atty., Steven C. DeCoster, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and KELLY, MacLAUGHLIN, and MULALLY, JJ.

MacLAUGHLIN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of burglary, Minn.St. 609.58 subd. 2(2). The principal issue is defendant's contention that he was twice placed in jeopardy for the same crime in violation of the constitutions of the United States and the State of Minnesota.

On June 6, 1972, after plea negotiations in which it was agreed that his sentence would be limited to a maximum of 1 year, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of burglary before Ramsey County District Judge Hyam Segell. Upon examination by Judge Segell, defendant said that he was pleading guilty only because he did not believe that he could get a fair trial. Defendant indicated that he did not have faith in our system of justice; that he could not have committed the crime because he was intoxicated at the time; that even though he could procure witnesses who would testify that he could not have committed the crime the jury would not believe him or his witnesses; and that he had no choice but to accept the plea bargain because if he stood trial he would be convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison instead of the 1 year agreed upon. Based upon defendant's remarks, Judge Segell refused to accept the guilty plea. Later that same day, at defendant's request, he went to trial before Judge Harold W. Schultz. Prior to recessing for the day, a jury was impaneled and the prosecutor delivered his opening statement.

In its afternoon edition of that day, June 6, 1972, the St. Paul Dispatch printed an article recounting the events surrounding the refusal of defendant's guilty plea by Judge Segell. The published article contained the substance of defendant's comments before Judge Segell including information that the guilty plea was rejected because of defendant's protestations of innocence. It stated that the maximum penalty for the crime charged was 10 years and included defendant's allegation that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident and had witnesses who would testify that he could not have committed the crime. The following morning, prior to commencement of trial for that day, the prosecution moved for a mistrial, based upon the newspaper article. The motion was opposed by defendant's attorney, but Judge Schultz, without first polling the jury, granted the motion on the basis of adverse publicity which could result in an unfair trial.

While the record is not clear, it appears that many of the jurors sitting on the case before Judge Schultz had personally heard the colloquy between Judge Segell and defendant, which took place in an eighthfloor courtroom where prospective jurors in Ramsey County are occasional spectators while waiting to be called for actual jury service. It also appears, although again the record is understandably incomplete, that during the voir dire the jurors had been questioned about defendant's remarks to Judge Segell. Therefore, Judge Schultz, when discussing the reason for the mistrial with the jury, said:

'I think I can explain to you, many of you were questioned by counsel as to whether or not you were present in the courtroom on the eighth floor and heard some of the discussion between the Court and the defendant with respect to an attempted enter of a plea. None of us realized that there would be considerable publicity in last night's paper about it. But there have been a number of statements, all of which sort of create an atmosphere and a set of circumstances where there may be some doubt as to whether this defendant or the State can get a fair trial under all of these circumstances.'

Because of the mistrial, defendant was retried on June 27, 1972, and a jury verdict of guilty was returned.

1. The prohibition against being placed twice in jeopardy for a criminal offense is found in Minn.Const. art. 1, § 7, ¹ and in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ² Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have held that, generally, jeopardy attaches when a jury is impaneled and sworn. State v. Sommers, 60 Minn. 90, 61 N.W. 907 (1895); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). This is so because the prohibition of the double jeopardy clause is 'not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy.' United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1194, 41 L.Ed. 300, 302 (1896). Similarly, this court has noted that the prohibition against double jeopardy is not to protect the individual against the peril of a second punishment but to protect him against a second trial for the same offense. State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62 N.W.2d 512 (1954); State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937).

With this principle in mind, however, in Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949), the court said:

'* * * The double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment, however, does not mean that every time a defendant is put to trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to end in a final judgment. Such a rule would create an insuperable obstacle to the administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance of the type of oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibition is aimed. * * * What has been said is enough to show that a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.'

Thus, circumstances may arise even after the jury has been impaneled and sworn in which the trial court may abort the proceedings and retry the defendant without violating the double jeopardy clause. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), has been extensively cited as setting forth the standard of appellate review for testing the trial court's exercise of its discretion in declaring a mistrial without the defendant's consent. In discussing reprosecution after the declaration of a mistrial without the defendant's consent, the Perez court said (22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 580, 6 L.Ed. 165):

'* * * We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and in capital cases especially, courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life,...