State v. Gabriel

• Citation: 314 So.3d 1243
• Decision Date: 08 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. SC19-2155,SC19-2155
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Ridge GABRIEL, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

314 So.3d 1243

STATE of Florida, Petitioner,

v.Ridge GABRIEL, Respondent.

No. SC19-2155

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 8, 2021

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Wesley Heidt, Bureau Chief, and Richard A. Pallas, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Petitioner

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, Kevin R. Holtz and Scott G. Hubbard, Assistant Public Defenders, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent

POLSTON, J.

We review the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Gabriel v. State , ––– So.3d ––––, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2913 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 6, 2019), in which the Fifth District certified the following question of great public importance:

IS THE LOWEST PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE AS DEFINED BY AND APPLIED IN SECTION 921.0024(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, AN INDIVIDUAL MINIMUM SENTENCE AND NOT A COLLECTIVE MINIMUM SENTENCE WHERE THERE ARE MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS SUBJECT TO SENTENCING ON A SINGLE SCORESHEET?

Id. at ––––, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D2913. In its decision, the Fifth District also certified conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Champagne v. State , 269 So. 3d 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).¹

For the reasons explained below, we answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash the Fifth District's decision in Gabriel , and approve the Second District's decision in Champagne to the extent that it is consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Ridge Gabriel was convicted of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm of a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence, attempted robbery with a firearm, and aggravated assault with a firearm. Gabriel , 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D2913, ––– So.3d at ––––. The Fifth District reversed the attempted first-degree murder conviction, which was stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. Id. at D2914 n.1, ––– So.3d at –––– n.1. On remand, Gabriel was resentenced for attempted robbery with a firearm (primary offense), aggravated assault with a firearm (additional offense), and resisting an officer with violence (additional offense). Id. at D2913, ––– So.3d at –––– ; see also Gabriel v. State , 248 So. 3d 265, 267 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018). The Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) Scoresheet indicated the lowest permissible sentence (LPS) was 107.25 months, and the trial court agreed with the State that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence that must be applied to each offense before the sentencing court if the LPS exceeds each individual statutory maximum sentence. Gabriel , 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D2913, ––– So.3d at ––––. On his second-degree felony of attempted robbery with a firearm, the trial court sentenced Gabriel to the statutory maximum sentence of 15 years with a 10-year mandatory minimum because the LPS of 107.25 months did not exceed the individual statutory maximum sentence. Id. On his third-degree felony of aggravated assault with a firearm, the trial court sentenced Gabriel to 107.25 months with a 3-year minimum mandatory because the LPS of 107.25 months exceeded the statutory maximum sentence of 5 years. Id. Similarly, on his third-degree felony of resisting an officer with violence, the trial court sentenced Gabriel to 107.25 months because the LPS of 107.25 months exceeded the statutory maximum sentence of 5 years. Id. Due to consecutive sentences, Gabriel's sentences totaled approximately 33 years. Id.

"On appeal, Gabriel argue[d] that his sentences for aggravated assault with a firearm and resisting an officer with violence are unlawful because they exceed the statutory maximum for those offenses." Id. The Fifth District applied the language in section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (2012), which provides that "[t]he permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing." Id. The Fifth District also applied this Court's decision in Moore v. State , 882 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2004), and concluded "that the sentencing range for Gabriel was 107.25 months, the LPS, to twenty-five years, the collective statutory maximum sentence." Gabriel , 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D2913, ––– So.3d at ––––. The Fifth District interpreted this Court's decision in Moore as standing for the proposition that "the LPS is the collective total minimum sentence for all offenses, but each has its own statutory maximum," and "[t]he LPS is not the sentence which must be applied to each offense at sentencing." Id. (quoting Dennard v. State , 157 So. 3d 1055, 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (Warner, J., dissenting)). The Fifth District explained, "[W]hen applying the provision of section 921.0024(2), which requires the trial court to impose the LPS if it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, the LPS must exceed the collective statutory maximum, not each individual statutory maximum, before such exception is triggered." Id. The Fifth District further explained:

In this case, the statutory maximum sentence is twenty-five years–fifteen plus five plus five. Because the LPS does not exceed twenty-five years, the trial court was not required to impose the LPS, and the sentences should have been capped by their individual statutory maximum sentences. Consequently, Gabriel's sentences for aggravated assault with a firearm and resisting an officer with violence are illegal because they exceed the statutory maximum sentence in contravention of section 921.0024(2).

Id.

Ultimately, the Fifth District reversed the trial court and certified that its decision conflicts with the Second District's decision in Champagne . In Champagne , the defendant "was convicted of robbery with a firearm, a first-degree felony punishable by life in prison, and false imprisonment, a third-degree felony." 269 So. 3d at 630 (citation omitted). The LPS was 240.15 months, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to a life sentence on the robbery count and "to twenty years (240 months) in prison on the false imprisonment count," an additional offense. Id. at 631. The trial court ruled that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence that applies to each offense even though the LPS did not exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the primary offense, which was a life sentence. See id.

On appeal, the defendant did not challenge the life sentence imposed on his primary offense but argued that the 240-month sentence imposed on his conviction for false imprisonment was illegal because it exceeded the 5-year statutory maximum sentence for that offense. Id. at 630. The Second District examined the statutory language in section 921.0024(2) and existing precedent and "conclude[d] that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence which must be imposed when the LPS exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for each offense and therefore [the defendant]’s sentence is legal." Id. at 630. Accordingly, the Second District affirmed the trial court and certified the same question of great public importance as the Fifth District's decision in Gabriel .

II. ANALYSIS

The State argues that, based on the plain language of section 921.0024(2), the LPS is an individual minimum sentence, and the trial court properly sentenced Gabriel to 107.25 months (the LPS) on both of his third-degree felony convictions because the LPS exceeded the 5-year individual statutory maximum sentence for each of his third-degree felony convictions. Gabriel counters that the LPS is a collective minimum sentence, and section 921.0024(2) is ambiguous with respect to the maximum permissible punishment for additional offenses when the LPS exceeds their respective statutory maximum sentences.² We agree with the State and answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash the Fifth District's decision in Gabriel , and approve the Second District's decision in Champagne to the extent it is consistent with this opinion. Based on our analysis of the text of the statute, we conclude that under section 921.0024(2), the LPS is an individual minimum sentence where there are multiple convictions subject to sentencing on a single scoresheet.

A court's determination of the meaning of a statute begins with the language of the statute. See Lopez v. Hall , 233 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018) (citing Holly v. Auld , 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) ). If that language is clear, the statute is given its plain meaning, and the court does "not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction." City of Parker v. State , 992 So. 2d 171, 176 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health , 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005) ).

A. Section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes

Section 921.0024(2) provides:

(2) The lowest permissible sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure. The lowest permissible sentence is any nonstate prison sanction in which the total sentence points equals or is less than 44 points, unless the court determines within its discretion that a prison sentence, which may be up to the statutory maximums for the offenses committed, is appropriate. When the total sentence points exceeds 44 points, the lowest permissible sentence in prison months shall be calculated by subtracting 28 points from the total sentence points and decreasing the remaining total by 25 percent. The total sentence points shall be calculated only as a means of determining the lowest permissible sentence. The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively. However, any sentence to state prison must exceed 1 year. If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s.

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