State v. Gaffney

• Decision Date: 17 December 1946
• Docket Number: 46927.
• Citation: 25 N.W.2d 352,237 Iowa 1399
• Parties: STATE v. GAFFNEY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

25 N.W.2d 352

237 Iowa 1399

STATE v. GAFFNEY.

No. 46927.

Supreme Court of Iowa

December 17, 1946

John M. Rankin, Atty. Gen., Robert L. Larson Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack C. White, County Atty., of Iowa City, for petitioner.

Edward L. O'Connor and Swisher & Swisher, all of Iowa City for respondent.

MULRONEY Justice.

On September 20, 1945, Maurice Ricker was indicted in Johnson County for assault with intent to commit murder and a bench warrant for his arrest issued. On the next day Ricker was arrested and arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty. His attorney then orally requested that he be committed to the State Psychopathic Hospital in Iowa City for observation and treatment. On September 21, Judge Gaffney, respondent herein granted this request and directed the sheriff to deliver Ricker 'to said hospital and return him therefrom upon completion of the investigation.' On September 28, the director of the psychopathic hospital wrote Judge Gaffney a letter saying, 'We find him (Ricker) suffering from a severe and chronic mental disease * * *. Our recommendation is that he be cared for in a hospital for the mentally ill.'

While Ricker was still in the psychopathic hospital, the special commission of insanity at the hospital, presumably constituted as provided by section 225.37, Code 1946, found him insane and issued its warrant committing him to the Mt. Pleasant State Hospital where Ricker was received on October 8, 1945. At the oral request of Ricker's attorneys, on October 16, Judge Gaffney ordered the criminal case continued until Ricker's 'reason is restored and he becomes sane.' The order of continuance plainly shows and in effect states it is based on the written report of September 28 (the letter above mentioned) and Ricker's commitment by the special commission to the hospital at Mt. Pleasant.

On April 25, 1946, an assistant attorney general and the county attorney of Johnson County 'on behalf of the State of Iowa' filed a motion asking the court to withdraw or revoke its order of continuance and issue an order setting a day for trial 'upon this matter,' in which it is stated the finding of insanity and commitment of Ricker were void and if the court had so known it would not have continued the case. Ricker's attorneys filed resistance to the motion in which they assert the numerous contentions now relied upon by them. On May 24, 1946, Judge Gaffney overruled the motion filed on April 25. Plaintiff then filed in this court its petition for writ of certiorari and it was ordered the writ issue.

Petitioner contends that when, after Ricker was indicted, a reasonable doubt arose as to his sanity the procedure defendant was required to follow is that prescribed by chapter 783, Code 1946, which reads:

'783.1 Doubt as to sanity--procedure. If a defendant appears in any stage of the trial of a criminal prosecution, and a reasonable doubt arises as to his sanity, further proceedings must be suspended and a trial had upon that question.

'783.2 Method of trial. Such trial shall be conducted in all respects, so far as may be, as the prosecution itself would be, except the defendant shall hold the burden of proof, and the first offer his evidence and have the opening and closing argument.

'783.3 Finding of insanity--discharge. If the accused shall be found insane, no further proceedings shall be taken under the indictment until his reason is restored, and, if his discharge will endanger the public peace or safety, the court must order him committed to the department for the criminal insane at Anamosa until he becomes sane; but if found sane, the trial upon the indictment shall proceed, and the question of the then insanity of the accused cannot be raised therein.

'783.4 Restored to reason--returned to custody. If the accused is committed to the department for the criminal insane, as soon as he becomes mentally restored, the person in charge shall at once give notice to the sheriff and county attorney of the proper county of such fact, and the sheriff, without delay, must receive and hold him in custody until he is brought to trial or judgment, as the case may be, or is legally discharged, * * *.

'783.5 Insanity after commitment to jail. If, after conviction for a misdemeanor and judgment of imprisonment in jail, the defendant is suspected of being insane, the same proceedings shall be taken as is provided in chapters 228, 229, and 230, and, if found insane, he shall be committed to the department for the criminal insane at Anamosa, and all subsequent proceedings shall be as provided in section 783.4.'

Respondent points to section 225.37, Code 1946, vesting the special commission (composed of the medical director, assistant medical director, and one other member of the medical staff of the state psychopathic hospital) 'with all the rights, powers, duties, and obligations of the commission of insanity.' But it is specifically provided in section 228.8, Code 1946, that the commission of insanity 'have jurisdiction of all applications for the commitment to the state hospitals for the insane, or for the otherwise safekeeping, of insane persons within its county, unless the application is filed with the commission at a time when the alleged insane person is being held in custody under an indictment returned by the grand jury or under a trial information filed by the county attorney.'

I. The respondent did not follow the procedure prescribed by law when the question of Ricker's sanity was raised after he had been indicted and arraigned and after he had pleaded. Section 783.1 and 783.2 provide for a jury trial on the issue of sanity. The special commission having only the powers of a commission of insanity, had no jurisdiction, since Ricker was 'being held in custody under an indictment.' Under section 228.8 the matter was outside the boundary of its jurisdiction. State v. Murphy, 205 Iowa 1130, 217 N.W. 225. Nor do we understand respondent seriously to argue that its procedure was correct. There is a rather frail argument in respondent's brief to the effect that sections 783.1 et seq. are not to be construed as a 'limitation upon the inherent implied power of the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction over insane persons but are supplements to said power.' But throughout respondent's filed ruling denying the motion for orders, there runs the theme that the proceedings taken were 'of a reasonable and humane nature * * * of an expeditious and economical character, and the ends of justice were adequately served' and his action was 'the efficient and human method.' The same thought is expressed in respondent's brief and argument filed in this court. The proceedings of the special commission, however much they be sanctioned by the trial court's conception of expediency, humanity, fitness, and economy, have no support in law. The proceedings that ultimately placed Ricker in the Mount Pleasant State Hospital for the insane violated the law that plainly states one who is indicted for crime shall be tried therefor and the prosecution shall not be discontinued or abandoned in any manner unless the indictment is dismissed, section 795.5, Code 1946, and if a reasonable doubt arises as to his insanity, the issue shall be tried to a jury and if found insane he shall be committed to the department for the criminal insane at Anamosa.

II. Is the remedy of certiorari available to the state, and if so, was the petition for the writ timely? Under rule 306, Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is available when the inferior tribunal exercising judicial functions exceeded its proper jurisdiction or 'otherwise acted illegally.' Certainly no other remedy would be available to the state. In State ex rel. Fletcher v. District Court, 213 Iowa 822, 238 N.W. 290, 294, 80 A.L.R. 339, we held that certiorari was available to the state in a criminal prosecution when the court refused the state's application for change of venue. There we stated: 'When on the undisputed facts the court exceeds its discretion, or takes action contrary to its mandatory duty, the party aggrieved, in the absence of other adequate remedy, is entitled to annulment on the statutory writ of certiorari. Davis v. District Court, 195 Iowa 688, 692, 192 N.W. 852; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Castle, 155 Iowa 124, 131, 135 N.W. 561; State v. District Court, 189 Iowa 1167, 1171, 179 N.W. 442; Dempsey v. Alber, 212 Iowa 1134, 236 N.W. 86, 88; Shearer v. Sayre, 207 Iowa 203, 222 N.W. 445.'

The alleged illegal act of the respondent was his refusal to go forward with the prosecution--his refusal to set the criminal case for trial which under the statute he was bound to do. We said in Tiedt v. Carstensen et al., 61 Iowa 334, 16 N.W. 214: 'The proceeding by certiorari is intended as a remedy whereby the superior court may inquire into the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal or officer and determine whether the tribunal or officer 'is acting illegally.' In this case, there is no question of jurisdiction. We are, therefore, only to inquire, when is a tribunal 'acting illegally' in the contemplation of the statute? When the law prescribes proceedings to be had by an officer or tribunal in cases pending before them, the omission of such proceedings [is] in violation of law, and the court or officer omitting them would, therefore, act illegally. In a word, if a tribunal, when determining matters before it which are within its jurisdiction, proceeds in a manner contrary to law, it acts illegally.'

There can be no question but that the trial court acted contrary to its mandatory duty in refusing to set the criminal case for trial. The trial court had no discretion in the matter. It had no choice between two ways to proceed. The law prescribed but one way...