State v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 22 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 99,997.,99,997. |
| Citation | 207 P.3d 251 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Ray F. GARCIA, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Meryl Carver-Allmond, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
This court affirmed Ray Garcia's conviction for felony murder with rape or attempted rape as the underlying felony, but reversed his separate rape conviction and remanded with directions to vacate his rape sentence. State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 169 P.3d 1069 (2007). Garcia essentially argues that on remand the district court inappropriately determined that the felony murder was "sexually motivated," which required his registration as a sexual offender pursuant to K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq. Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1), a maximum sentence of life imprisonment imposed.
Garcia makes three specific arguments in his appellate brief:
1. The district court had no jurisdiction on remand to reopen sentencing on Garcia's felony-murder conviction, i.e., to make a "sexually motivated" finding which required his registration under the Kansas Offender Registration Act, K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq.
2. The district court failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Garcia's crime was sexually motivated.
3. The district court violated Garcia's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it increased his punishment by requiring him to register as a sex offender without proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because we hold that the district court's action on remand was to clarify, not change, its holding at the original sentencing hearing, we reject Garcia's arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
The basic facts are set forth in Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 169 P.3d 1069. In November 1995, Wichita police found P.E., a 73-year-old woman, dead in her apartment. The coroner concluded that her genital injuries resulted from an assault that occurred hours before her death. He could not, however, state the specific cause of death or the mechanism of death: suffocation or heart attack from the stress of a physical assault.
P.E.'s death eventually became a "cold case." Additional leads were later developed which led to charges being filed against Garcia in January 2004, more than 8 years after the crimes were committed. The jury found him guilty of both rape and felony first-degree murder, with rape or attempted rape as the underlying felony.
Garcia's sentencing occurred on January 20, 2005. The court imposed consecutive sentences: life in prison for the felony murder, which the court found was the primary offense, and 408 months' imprisonment for the rape. The following colloquy occurred at the end of the hearing:
The proceedings then ended.
The journal entry of judgment was filed that same day. Its Section III, captioned "Current Conviction Information," states that first-degree murder is the "most serious offense of conviction." That section further provides that the offense is contained in K.S.A. 21-3401(b); that the severity level for first-degree murder is "off grid"; that Garcia's sentence for this offense is "Life 15"; and that he is subject to "life parole." Finally, under the printed question "Was the crime sexually motivated?", the journal entry states, "Yes."
The next page of the journal entry of judgment provides that the high figure in the presumptive sentencing range for the rape conviction was 408 months and that the sentence actually imposed on the rape conviction was 408 months. Section VI, captioned "Recap of Sentence," provided "life imprisonment (Life 15) plus 408 months."
The last page of the journal entry provides in Section VI, captioned "Additional Comments," that among other things "[t]he court has certified the defendant as a sex offender and has informed the offender of the duty to register as provided by the sex offender registration act."
On October 26, 2007, this court issued its opinion in Garcia. We held that Garcia's prosecution for rape violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution and consequently reversed that conviction. However, we held that sufficient evidence supported his conviction for felony murder, even though it was based upon either rape or attempted rape as the underlying felony. We concluded: "The felony-murder conviction is affirmed, the rape conviction is reversed, and we remand to the district court with directions to vacate the rape sentence." Garcia, 285 Kan. at 23, 169 P.3d 1069.
The transcript reveals that the court then did simply vacate the rape sentence and left untouched the sentence on the felony-murder conviction. The judge stated, (Emphasis added.)
From the transcript it appears that the prosecutor then requested a reaffirmation of the court's purported January 2005 finding that the felony murder was sexually motivated, which would mandate Garcia's registration as a sex offender under K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq.
Garcia essentially argues that the judge nevertheless proceeded to make a finding— for the first time—that the felony murder was sexually motivated. The judge first observed that the Supreme Court had rejected Garcia's claim of insufficient evidence to support the felony-murder conviction based upon attempted rape. However, the judge then stated:
"Certainly, that [the rejection] would extend to making a finding at this time by me ... that there are factual circumstances sufficient for me to make a finding that `the crime' was sexually motivated." (Emphasis added.)
Garcia argues that on remand the court was limited to simply vacating the rape conviction and had no jurisdiction to make this purportedly additional finding. He cites State v. Dumars, 37 Kan.App.2d 600, 603, 154 P.3d 1120 (2007), where the Court of Appeals held:
"When an appellate court has remanded a case for further proceedings consistent with its mandate, a district court is obligated to effectuate the mandate and may consider only those matters essential to the implementation of the ruling of the appellate court."
Garcia further argues that the district court's finding of sexual motivation from the original sentencing—as evidenced by the court's reference there to the registration requirement—referred exclusively to the rape, which conviction has been reversed and its accompanying sentence vacated. As a result, he contends, there currently is no valid finding of sexual motivation and his registration requirement no longer exists.
The State generally responds that on remand there was no additional factual finding of sexual motivation for the felony-murder conviction. Rather, the court was simply explaining why the reversal of the rape conviction and vacation of the accompanying sentence had no effect upon its previous sexual motivation finding. The State argues that even if an inappropriate new finding had been made, it was...
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