State v. Garcia
Decision Date | 10 August 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 23513.,23513. |
Citation | 29 P.3d 919,96 Haw. 200 |
Parties | STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wilfred Lowell GARCIA, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Deborah L. Kim, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, for defendant-appellant.
Alexa D.M. Fujise, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellee.
We hold that Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai`i (the prosecution) has not demonstrated any compelling justification for overruling Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court, State of Hawai`i, 84 Hawai`i 138, 931 P.2d 580 (1997), and State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai`i 45, 987 P.2d 268 (1999), especially in light of the legislative adoption in Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 286-261(b) (Supp. 2000) of the Gray rationale. We hold, further, that the holding in Wilson must be applied retroactively to all other similarly situated defendants whose cases were not final at the time Wilson was decided. The May 19, 2000 findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of the district court of the first circuit (the court) in the instant case1 were consistent with the foregoing propositions. We therefore affirm its grant of the motion to suppress the intoxilyzer result filed by Defendant-Appellee Wilfred Lowell Garcia (Defendant).
At around 12:50 a.m. on September 5, 1999, Defendant was stopped and arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), HRS § 291-4(a)(2) (Supp.1999).2 The arresting officer read Defendant the following excerpt from Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Form 396B:
Defendant placed his initials next to the foregoing statement and next to the words "AGREED TO TAKE BREATH TEST" on the form. The arresting officer signed the form. Subsequently, a HPD officer administered a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test using a sample of Defendant's breath.
On January 28, 2000, Defendant moved to suppress the test result. In his supporting memorandum, Defendant argued that the informational statement read to him from HPD Form 396B was identical to the one found faulty in Wilson and, based on the holding in that case, the court should suppress the test result. On February 9, 2000, the prosecution filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion to suppress.
At a February 25, 2000 hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, the court granted Defendant's motion. On May 19, 2000, the court filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. The conclusions stated as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Before the breath alcohol concentration test was administered, Defendant was not accurately informed by a police officer of the sanctions under HRS [c]hapter 286 ". . . Part XIV and HRS § 286-151.5 and 286-157.3" as required by HRS § 286-151(b).
2. The Hawai`i Supreme Court's holding in State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai`i 45, 987 P.2d 268 (1999), is applicable to this case (i.e., ". . . that the information conveyed to Wilson regarding his rights under chapter 286 was inaccurate and misleading, Wilson was precluded from knowingly and intelligently consenting to the blood alcohol test in violation of HRS chapter 286.") Id. [a]t 22-23.
3. Here, as in Wilson, before the alcohol concentration test was administered, the defendant was not accurately informed by a police officer of the sanctions under HRS [c]hapter 286 ". . . Part XIV and HRS § 286-151.5 and 286-157.3" as required by HRS § 286-151(b).
4. Here, as in Wilson, the information concerning the sanctions under HRS [c]hapter 286 ". . . Part XIV and HRS § 286-151.5 and 286-157.3" that [was] conveyed to the defendant was inaccurate and misleading, and the defendant was precluded from knowingly and intelligently consenting to the alcohol concentration test in violation of HRS chapter 286.
5. Here, as in Wilson, the failure to comply with the requirements of HRS § 286-151(b) constitutes a "per se violation" and it is not necessary for the defendant to prove that the defendant was mislead [sic] regarding his rights under chapter 286.
6. The [c]ourt has considered the three-prong test for fairness described by the Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Ikezawa, 75 Haw. 210, 857 P.2d 593 (1993), and will give retroactive effect to those cases which are presently pending.
7. This case was "pending" at the time the Wilson decision was issued because it was in the pretrial stage of the proceedings (as opposed to a "nonpending" case in which the defendant had already been convicted, and in which the time for the filing of an appeal from the judgment of conviction had already elapsed).
On May 31, 2000, the prosecution filed its notice of appeal.
The prosecution raises the following arguments: (1) Wilson was based on a misinterpretation of HRS § 286-261 by Gray;3 (2) assuming arguendo Gray is not overruled, Wilson was wrongly decided; and (3) if Wilson is not overruled, it should not be retroactively applied.
The relevant issue in Gray was whether and to what extent the Administrative Director of the Court, State of Hawai`i (the Director) was authorized to determine the periods of administrative driver's license revocation under HRS § 286-261 (1993).4 See 84 Hawai`i at 148, 931 P.2d at 590. This version of the statute provided in pertinent part as follows:
931 P.2d at 590-92, and, in light of legislative history, concluded that (1) "[p]ursuant to HRS § 286-261(b),. . . the Director is accorded the discretionary authority to increase the minimum periods of administrative revocation for `non-refusing' arrestees [(those arrestees who have consented to a BAC test and failed it)], as enumerated in subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3)," id. at 159-60, 931 P.2d at 601-02, and (2) "the Director's discretion[ ] . . . to increase [such] periods . . . pursuant to HRS § 286-261(b) [was] `capped' by the mandatory and nondiscretionary periods enumerated in HRS § 286-261(c)." Id. at 160-61, 931 P.2d at 602-03 (footnote omitted).
987 P.2d at 272. Gray was a unanimous opinion of this court. The State did not move for reconsideration of the opinion.
In Wilson, this court applied its holding in Gray to the advice given by police officers in requesting a driver's consent to a BAC test. In that case, Wilson was informed that "if [he] refuse[d] to take any [BAC] tests[,] . . . [his] driving privileges will be revoked for one year instead of the three month revocation that would apply if [he] chose to take the test and failed it." 92 Hawai`i at 47,987 P.2d at 270 (some emphasis added and some deleted). Since under Gray's interpretation of HRS § 286-261(b), "Wilson was subject to revocation for three months to a year by consenting to and failing [the test]," id. (emphasis added), this court concluded that the officer's advice "was inaccurate and misleading and did not fully inform Wilson of the legal consequences of submitting to a blood test." Id. at 46, 987 P.2d at 269 (footnote omitted). Viewing the misleading information as "relevant to his decision whether to agree to or refuse the blood alcohol test[,]" a majority of this court—Chief Justice Moon and Justices Klein and Levinson—concluded that Wilson "did not make a knowing and intelligent decision whether to exercise his statutory right of consent or refusal." Id. at 51, 987 P.2d at 274.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Jess
...nor to those others against or by whom it might be applied to conduct or events occurring before that decision,'" State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai`i 200, 208, 29 P.3d 919, 927 (2001) (quoting James B. Beam Distilling, 501 U.S. at 536, 111 S.Ct. 2439 ); (2) limited or "pipeline" retroactive effect......
-
State v. Acker
...946 P.2d at 56. Moreover, Maryann does not provide a compelling reason or legal basis to overrule Fukusaku. See State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai‘i 200, 207, 29 P.3d 919, 926 (2001) (holding that the prosecution failed to provide a "compelling justification" for departing from the doctrine of stare......
-
Bynum v. Magno
...n. 3 (2002). "[We] should `not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justification.'" State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai'i 200, 206, 29 P.3d 919, 925 (2001) (citing Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202, 112 S.Ct. 560, 116 L.Ed.2d 560 (1991); Dairy R......
-
State v. McKnight
...court should ‘not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justification.’ " State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai‘i 200, 206, 29 P.3d 919, 925 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also State v. Romano, 114 Hawai‘i 1, 11, 155 P.3d 1102, 1112 (2007) ( "[A......