State v. Gatcomb

• Decision Date: 26 July 1978
• Citation: 389 A.2d 22
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. George F. GATCOMB, Jr.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 22

389 A.2d 22

STATE of Maine v. George F. GATCOMB, Jr.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 26, 1978.

David M. Cox, Dist. Atty., Gary F. Thorne (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Bangor, for plaintiff.

Paine & Lynch by Errol K. Paine, Bangor (orally), for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and NICHOLS, JJ.

ARCHIBALD, Justice.

George F. Gatcomb, Jr., was indicted for violating 17 M.R.S.A. § 2656 (Assault with Intent to Kill). ¹

On May 6, 1976 (after the effective date of the Maine Criminal Code), Gatcomb is alleged in a three-count indictment to have violated 17-A M.R.S.A. § 401 (Burglary), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353 (Theft), and 17-A M.R.S.A. § 209 (Criminal Threatening with a Dangerous Weapon). Ultimately the four criminal charges were consolidated, Gatcomb waived trial by jury, and after pleading "not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect" to each of the charges, trial was had before a single Justice of the Superior Court. Gatcomb was found guilty on all four charges and sentenced to terms of imprisonment totaling a minimum of twenty years in the Maine State Prison. He has appealed from each of these convictions. We deny each appeal.

Appellant filed no statement of points to be relied upon on appeal but, since we have the benefit of the full record, he is not deemed to have waived any points properly saved on the record for appellate review. Rule 39(d), M.R.Crim.P.

As set forth in appellant's brief, issues 2 through 5 challenged the sufficiency of the evidence relating to each offense. Appellant also argues that it was error to have found him guilty of these crimes rather than not guilty by reason of mental disease

or defect. Finally, Defendant contends it was manifest error for Justice below to have allowed the State to introduce into evidence "incriminating statements made during an examination by a psychiatrist affiliated with the hospital in which (he) was committed."

FACTS

On March 9, 1976, a patient at the Bangor Mental Health Institute was found by attendants on the bed of a room assigned to and occupied by the appellant, bleeding from a five to six-inch laceration of the neck, which had been inflicted by a piece of broken glass which was found in the room. One witness described the victim as "beaten pretty badly," and also testified:

"Well, his face was all distorted, of course. He was propped up on his right arm, and the right side of his face was so puffed out and swollen that from the doorway I couldn't really be sure who it was. I had suspicions who it was but I couldn't really say it was him from his appearance at that distance until I got in there."

Chemical tests of the appellant's hands indicated the presence of blood. A psychiatrist who was on duty that evening had this incident called to his attention. After first observing the wounded patient and ordering him transferred to the Eastern Maine Medical Center, he then met the appellant who, in response to questions, made certain inculpatory statements which will be discussed in detail at a later point herein.

A police officer, after preliminarily satisfying the Justice presiding that the statement was properly admissible, testified that the appellant said to him when asked why he had been involved in this assault,

"I don't know, I just did it, I want to go to jail, I don't belong here, I'm not crazy," and "I cut his throat."

The three other offenses arose from completely independent and unrelated acts. On May 6, 1976, appellant, accompanied by a fellow patient, escaped from the Bangor Mental Health Institute. Subsequently, Gatcomb burglarized the home of one George D. Fallon, Jr., and took therefrom a rifle and a box of ammunition. Later on that same evening one Steven N. McDonough observed what appeared to be an attempt to steal his truck. When the appellant and his companion refused to desist, McDonough fired a shot in the air. Almost immediately the shot was returned from the area of the vehicle. Asked whether he was being shot at, he testified, "Well, at first I didn't but the second time I heard the bullet go over my head, so I had a good idea that they wasn't fooling." He then said, "I think I kind of pulled my neck in." The police were called and it was determined that the shots had been fired by the appellant from the rifle taken from the Fallon home.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Since the trial was "jury waived," the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence may be considered on appeal even though motions for judgment of acquittal were not made. State v. Morgan, Me., 379 A.2d 728, 730 (1977).

Dealing with the alleged violation of 17 M.R.S.A. § 2656, the appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to indicate that when he committed the assault he then had the specific intent to kill the victim. Appellant is correct when he argues that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he harbored a specific intent, i. e., a subjective state of mind of intent or design to kill. Bessey v. State, Me., 297 A.2d 373, 376 (1972). This specific intent may be inferred, however, from the circumstances surrounding the act itself, which may show by its very nature of the requisite intention. State v. Pinnette, Me., 340 A.2d 17, 21 (1975). The single Justice made a general finding of guilt but he did not "find the facts specially," nor was he requested to do so. Rule 23(c), M.R.Crim.P. As was the case in State v. Gagne, Me., 362 A.2d 166, 174 (1976), our review of the evidence leads us firmly to the conclusion that this finding must stand.

Relating to the other three charges, appellant argues primarily that the State failed to prove the necessary intent which must accompany each of the alleged offenses. Extended discussion is unnecessary. Appellant had absolutely no right to enter the Fallon home. He obviously removed the rifle therefrom. The intent to steal must exist at the time of the entry and there was ample evidence to support the factfinder in his general finding of guilt in this connection. This same observation is appropriate to the charge of theft.

With reference to the criminal threatening charge, the appellant himself, through his own testimony, supplied ample evidence of the necessary intent, although the same could well have been inferred from the testimony of Mr. McDonough. He testified as follows:

"Did I shoot him? No, I shot in the general direction towards where his trailer was but I could not see him because it was dark from where I was and there was tree lines and bushes and stuff, I couldn't really see."

Dealing with the sufficiency of the evidence argument, we very recently said:

"Acting as an appellate court to review the sufficiency of the evidence, we are not to act as fact-finders in the first instance; it is the (fact-finder's) judgment, so long as it is a rational judgment, which must govern."

State v. Clark, Me., 386 A.2d 317, 323 (1978)

. Such is the case here. DID THE EVIDENCE REQUIRE

A FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT

GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED

BY REASON OF MENTAL

DISEASE OR DEFECT?

The Justice presiding heard the competing testimony of two psychiatrists. Dr. Epiphanes K. Balian, a qualified psychiatrist, testified for the defense. He had spent approximately twenty hours with the appellant in an effort to diagnose his condition. He expressed an opinion that Gatcomb suffered from "an organic brain disease which has affected his thinking, his feelings, and his behavior." This condition was compared to that which "individuals manifest when they're having an episode of a seizure." He was of the opinion that "this condition would substantially affect his mental and emotional processes and substantially impair his ability to conform his conduct to that which the law expects."

The State, in rebuttal, offered the testimony of Dr. Ulrich B. Jacobsohn who, it was agreed, was a qualified psychiatrist. In disagreeing with the testimony of Dr. Balian, he testified:

"I think personality disorders would be very close to my own findings of what I think may be the difficulty here.

I think the important thing is that at no time was there any evidence to show that Mr. Gatcomb was laboring under what we would call a psychotic disturbance or, for that matter, an organic brain disease."

Whether the appellant had a mental disease or mental defect sufficient to excuse his otherwise criminal conduct pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 102, ² or whether he suffered from either mental disease or defect and thus "lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, or lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the lawfulness of his conduct," under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(1), ³ were questions of fact which the single Justice must resolve.

Defendant's commitment to the Bangor Mental Health Institute does not give rise to any presumption of a mental incapacity excusing him from responsibility for criminal conduct. State v. Beauchene, Me., 382 A.2d 329, 330 (1978). It is the responsibility of the factfinder to resolve questions of fact and determine whether or not the defendant has established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he, in fact, lacked the requisite mental capacity to make him criminally responsible for his conduct. State v. Durgin, Me., 311 A.2d 266, 268 (1973). See State v. Armstrong, Me., 344 A.2d 42, 47 (1975). See also State v. Buzynski, Me., 330 A.2d 422, 428 (1974). 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(3). ⁴ It was not error for the Justice below to have rejected the testimony of Dr. Balian and to have accepted the competing testimony of Dr. Jacobsohn.

ALTHOUGH ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION, WAS IT MANIFEST ERROR

TO ADMIT INCULPATORY STATEMENTS OF THE APPELLANT

MADE TO DR. GEORGE CLOUTIER?

A psychiatrist, Dr. George Cloutier, served in some unexplained capacity at the Bangor Mental Health Institute one day each week. On March 9, 1976, he was in the institution and was called to attend the victim when he was discovered in...