State v. Gendreau

• Decision Date: 08 December 1969
• Docket Number: No. 381-E,381-E
• Citation: 106 R.I. 332,259 A.2d 855
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. Stanley Robert GENDREAU. x. &c.

Page 855

259 A.2d 855

106 R.I. 332

STATE v. Stanley Robert GENDREAU.

No. 381-Ex. &c.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 8, 1969.

Reargument Denied Jan. 15, 1970.

Herbert F. DeSimone, Atty. Gen., Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Luc R. LaBrosse, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

James Cardono, Public Defender, William F. Reilly, Moses Kando, Asst. Public Defenders, for defendant.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is an indictment which charges the defendant with the April 21, 1965 murder in Little Compton of 18-year-old Anne C. Brownell. The defendant was taken into custody by the state police and interrogated on April 23, 1965. On the next day he was brought before the First District Court in Newport to answer a charge of murder. The district court judge appointed counsel to represent the defendant and a not guilty plea was entered at this time. The Newport County grand jury was then reconvened by the presiding justice of the Superior Court at the specific request of the then attorney general. The grand jury returned the instant indictment on April 30, 1965. Trial began on October 3, 1966 and concluded on November 25, 1966 when the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. Thereafter, the trial justice denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The defendant is before us on his bill of exceptions. He has briefed and argued but two points. One is to the admission into evidence of certain statements he gave the police during his 1965 in-custody interrogation. The gist of the second point is that there is in this record competent evidence which would warrant this court to reject the M'Naghten rule as a guide for determining criminal responsibility and in its place adopt the Durham rule or a modification thereof.

We need only discuss defendant's first contention because, although defendant's interrogation took place prior to the mandates enumerated in Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 438, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, his trial did not begin until October 1966. We have set forth the chronological highlights of the travel of this case inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, ruled that any defendant whose trial commenced after June 13, 1966 would be afforded the protection of the rules promulgated in Miranda. In State v. Gannites, R.I. 221 A.2d 620, we pointed out that any exculpatory or inculpatory statement elicited by the police during an in-custody interrogation could not be used at trial unless prior to questioning an accused has been given the four Miranda warnings. They are: (1) the accused must be told that he has a right to remain silent; (2) he must be informed that if he does say anything to the officers, such may be used as evidence against him in a court of law; (3) he must be informed that he has a right to consult a lawyer and that he may have the lawyer present with him during the interrogation; and (4) finally, the police must inform him that if he cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for him free of charge.

The admissibility of certain oral and written incriminating statements made by defendant to the police was determined by the trial justice in a preliminary hearing held in the absence of the jury. The police testified that prior to questioning defendant, they informed him that he was a suspect in the Brownell murder; that they wanted to question him; that he had a right to remain silent; that he was not required to make any statement of any kind; that any statement he made could be used against him in a court of law; and that he had a right to have an attorney. The police also declared that they asked defendant if he understood what they had told him, and that when replying in the affirmative, defendant said he did not wish counsel.

The defendant at the time of his interrogation was 22 years old. On December 31, 1964, he had received a medical discharge from the United States Navy because in the opinion of the Navy's psychiatrists he was suffering 'from a personality disorder of a schizoid type' whch rendered him unsuitable for further military service. At the preliminary hearing defendant's testimony was in direct conflict with that offered by the state. He told the court that he was never advised of any constitutional rights, that he was threatened by the police and that the barracks interrogation took place after he was forced to strip to his underwear. This last action, he claimed, amounted to a type of psychological coercion which was disapproved in Miranda.

In holding that the statements were admissible, the trial justice recognized the applicability of Miranda to the case at bar and found that the police gave defendant the first three warnings. It is conceded that no one informed defendant of his right to free counsel. The trial justice recognized this deficiency but went on to say:

'* * * while in every respect the guide lines of Miranda should be compiled with strictness once they are known, that in determining a case which occurred prior, that is the interrogation, prior to Miranda, it becomes the duty of the Court to determine whether substantial compliance with the principles enunciated was had.' (Emphasis ours.)

The trial court, just prior to his invoking the substantial-compliance doctrine, observed that at the time of his arrest, defendant was known to the police to be employed as a carpenter and therefore the court found that the question of defendant's so-called indigency never arose. In making this finding, the court observed: '* * * the ability to engage an attorney to represent one in a charge of murder and the ability to obtain an attorney who might come to a police station for an hour or two while the individual is being interrogated, are two entirely different things.' We believe that the distinction delineated by the trial justice is truly a distinction without a difference. Miranda does not define who is an indigent; neither does it provide a measuring stick for determining when a person's funds are sufficiently 'ample' ¹ to excuse the need of advising him of his right to be supplied with an attorney. The lack of a measuring stick, however, is not significant. Miranda as not a narrow decision. It gives depth and meaning to the Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution which states: 'No person * * * shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself.' In order to insure against any curtailment of the privilege against self incrimination, Miranda prescribes certain rights as the entitlement of a person in custody who is about to undergo interrogation. It specifies how, when, and in what manner that person is required to be apprised of those rights. Indeed, a decision of this far-reaching thrust does not contemplate a narrow and technical definition of 'indigency;' neither does it intend that a person facing a possible murder charge need not be advised of his right to appointed counsel solely because he had the financial ability to pay for an hour or two of legal services. The sweep of Miranda goes far beyond that. It rejects a principle which requires an assessment of the accused's finances at each initial stage of a criminal prosecution; and it does not tolerate a concept which makes the right to be supplied with counsel at successive stages of a prosecution turn upon whether or not the accused has exhausted his funds and is without the wherewithal to pay counsel to represent him for whatever remains of the case. A rule so narrowly conceived fragments the right to counsel and strikes at the Sixth Amendment right of an indigent accused in a criminal prosecution 'to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.'

The differences of opinion ² which have been expressed by the various courts which have been confronted with the problem involved in the admissibility of a pre-Miranda confession in a post-Miranda trial stem from the fact that in Johnson the Supreme Court selected the date of trial rather than the date of interrogation as the effective date when the principles in Miranda would be applied. Many thought this choice was pure happenstance. However, on June 2, 1969, in Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 89 S.Ct. 1677, 23 L.Ed.2d 253, former Chief Justice Warren put this notion to rest. In Jenkins, the court, in deciding that the Miranda standards for determining the admissibility of in-custody statement would not be applied in a post-Miranda retrial of a case which had been originally tried prior to that decision, went on to discuss the difficulties involved in making a choice between a prospective or retrospective application of a new constitutional doctrine. Some defendants, it pointed out, would benefit from a new rule while others would not, simply because of the fortuitous circumstances which determine the progress of their cases from initial investigation and arrest to final judgment. In applying criteria for resolving the question of the effective date for a new constitutional rule affecting a criminal trial, the court said that in the recent cases of Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248, and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, it had considered the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on old standards and the effect a retroactive application of the new standards would have on the administration of justice. The court, both in Desist and Stovall, made certain new constitutional rules prospective in their operation. The court talked of the day of the event rather than the date of trial. Accordingly, in Desist it was held that evidence obtained by the use of non-trespassory electronic surveillance devices would be barred only if the surveillance was conducted after December 18, 1967-the date that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 was...