State v. Gerrier

• Decision Date: 06 December 2018
• Docket Number: Docket: Ken-17-526
• Citation: 197 A.3d 1083
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Travis R. GERRIER
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

197 A.3d 1083

STATE of Maine

v.Travis R. GERRIER

Docket: Ken-17-526

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: July 18, 2018

Reargued: October 25, 2018

Decided: December 6, 2018

Revised: January 8, 2019

Harold J. Hainke, Esq. (orally), Hainke & Tash, Whitefield, for appellant Travis R. Gerrier

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Kristin Murray-James, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta; and Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Leanne Robbin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

HUMPHREY, J.

[¶ 1] Travis R. Gerrier appeals from a judgment of conviction of gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(C) (2017), unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1) (2017), and furnishing liquor to a minor (Class D), 28-A M.R.S. § 2081(1)(A)(1) (2017), entered by the court (Kennebec County, Mullen, J. ) after conditional guilty pleas. Gerrier primarily challenges the court's determination that he was competent to stand trial.¹ We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] The following facts are drawn from the docket entries and the court's findings set out in its competency order, which are supported by the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. See State v. Gurney , 2012 ME 14, ¶ 2, 36 A.3d 893.

[¶ 3] On June 12, 2015, Gerrier was charged by complaint with (1) gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(C) ; (2) unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.RS. § 255-A(1)(E-1) ; and (3) furnishing liquor to a minor (Class D), 28-A M.R.S. § 2081(1)(A)(1). He was arrested that day and released on bail with conditions. Gerrier was indicted on those charges on September 23, 2016.²

[¶ 4] Gerrier has had a long history of mental health issues and treatment, and has limited cognitive and intellectual abilities. At Gerrier's request, a competency evaluation was conducted in October 2016. During the pendency of this case, Gerrier also underwent psychological, psychosexual, and neuropsychological evaluations. A competency hearing was held on December 5, 2016, and on December 14, the court (Mullen, J. ) issued an order in which it determined that Gerrier was competent to stand trial.

[¶ 5] Gerrier ultimately entered conditional guilty pleas on all three charges, preserving his right to appeal from the order finding him to be competent and the order denying his motion to suppress. See supra n.1. The court (Marden, J. ) sentenced Gerrier to a term of seven years for the gross sexual assault charge followed by twenty years of supervised release with conditions, and concurrent terms of five years for the unlawful sexual contact charge and 364 days for the charge of furnishing liquor to a minor. Gerrier timely appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 6] Gerrier argues that the court (Mullen, J. ) erred when it determined that he was competent to stand trial. Before addressing Gerrier's arguments, we take this opportunity to clarify Maine law regarding the burden of proof and the evidentiary standard that attends a pretrial competency determination.

[¶ 7] Whether a person is competent to stand trial implicates his or her due process rights. See Thursby v. State , 223 A.2d 61, 66 (Me. 1966). Article 1, section 6 of the Constitution of Maine provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and his counsel, or either, at the election of the accused." See also State v. Dyer , 371 A.2d 1079, 1085 (Me. 1977). In order to safeguard this constitutional right, the defendant must be "capable of understanding the nature and object of the charges and proceedings against him, of comprehending his own condition in reference thereto, and of conducting in cooperation with his counsel his defense in a rational and reasonable manner." Thursby , 223 A.2d at 66 ; see also Dusky v. United States , 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) ; Haraden v. State, 2011 ME 113, ¶ 7, 32 A.3d 448.

[¶ 8] In the majority of states, a defendant in a criminal case is presumed competent to stand trial.³ Although Maine's competency statutes do not state the presumption outright, we infer its existence from our case law and the procedures established by the Legislature through which a defendant's competency may be challenged. See Thursby , 223 A.2d at 69 ("When counsel at no time suggests to the trial court the probability of the accused's incompetence to stand trial, a reviewing court is justified in assuming, unless the contrary appears, that counsel was satisfied that no such impairment existed."). See also 15 M.R.S. § 101-D (2017). Because "the initial responsibility of raising the question of incompetence of the accused to stand trial is on his counsel," it becomes his duty to "promptly bring the matter to the attention of the court." Thursby , 223 A.2d at 68. That responsibility is not limited to defense counsel, however, because the court also has a duty to order an inquiry into the defendant's ability to proceed with the case if it "learns from observation, reasonable claim or credible source that there is genuine doubt of defendant's mental condition to comprehend his situation or make his defense." Id. ; see also 15 M.R.S. § 101-D(1). Ultimately, if the defendant's competency is challenged, the court must determine whether the defendant is incompetent pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 101-D(5).

[¶ 9] Under section 101-D(5), the court is obligated to make a competency determination "upon the motion of the attorney for the defendant or upon the court's own motion." If, after conducting a hearing, the court determines that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, it "shall continue the case until such time as the defendant is determined by the court to be competent." Id. The statute is therefore framed in terms of a finding of incompetency , further demonstrating a legislative approach that in Maine an accused is presumed to be competent. At the hearing, the burden of proof falls on the party seeking the determination of incompetency.

It is likely that in most cases that party will be the defendant. See Medina v. California , 505 U.S. 437, 446, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (stating that placing this burden on the defendant does not offend the principles of due process). In the event that the court raises the issue sua sponte, both parties have the opportunity to present evidence of the defendant's mental condition. If, for whatever reason, the defendant disagrees with the court's concerns, he is not obligated to present evidence of his own incompetence and may choose to present evidence showing the contrary, or may present no evidence at all. See State v. Nickerson , 2013 ME 45, ¶¶ 5-6, 66 A.3d 568. We recognize that a defendant may have reasons, tactical or otherwise, for choosing not to contest the presumption of his competence.

[¶ 10] The party seeking the determination of incompetence must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is incompetent to proceed. Although the Legislature did not articulate this burden in section 101-D(5), we determine that a preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate burden.⁴ The Supreme Court of the United States has reviewed the appropriate burden in pretrial competency proceedings on several occasions. First, in Medina v. California , the Court upheld a statute requiring the defendant to prove his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. 505 U.S. at 452-53, 112 S.Ct. 2572. The Court articulated that the burden of proof must be analyzed with regard to whether the practice "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Id. at 445-46, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (quoting Patterson v. New York , 432 U.S. 197, 202, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) ). The Medina Court reviewed the historical treatment of the burden of proof in competency proceedings and concluded that allocating to the defendant the burden to prove incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence does not offend the principle of fundamental fairness. Medina , 505 U.S. at 452, 112 S.Ct. 2572.

[¶ 11] Second, in Cooper v. Oklahoma , 517 U.S. 348, 369, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996), the Supreme Court struck down a statute requiring the defendant to prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. In that case, the Court relied on the analytical test affirmed in Medina, and concluded that imposing a higher evidentiary burden on the defendant—one that would, in effect, allow a state to prosecute a defendant who has shown that he is more likely than not incompetent—is contrary to the historical treatment of incompetent defendants, offends principles of justice and fundamental fairness, and is unnecessary to strike an appropriate balance between the "State's interest in prompt and orderly disposition of criminal cases" and the defendant's due process right not to be tried while incompetent. Id. at 360-62, 116 S.Ct. 1373. In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that the use of the standard of clear and convincing evidence represented a decidedly minority view—only four of fifty states at that time imposed the heightened burden—and that use of such a burden of proof was unnecessary, even given the "inexactness and uncertainty that characterize competency proceedings."⁵

Id. at 361, 361 n.17, 365, 116 S.Ct. 1373. "For the defendant, the consequences of an erroneous determination of competence are dire.... By comparison to the defendant's interest, the injury to the State of the opposite error—a conclusion that the defendant is incompetent when he is in fact malingering—is modest." Id. at 364-65, 116 S.Ct. 1373. The Court made clear the risk associated with competency determinations: "[b]ecause he lacks the ability to communicate effectively with counsel, he may be unable...