State v. Giles

• Decision Date: 22 April 2019
• Docket Number: A18-0803
• Parties: State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jeremy Allen Giles, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jeremy Allen Giles, Appellant.

A18-0803

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

April 22, 2019

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed

Bratvold, Judge

McLeod County District Court

File No. 43-CR-17-1776

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael K. Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Daniel R. Provencher, Assistant County Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lauren F. Schoeberl, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm and argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argues that (1) police lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when an officer stopped the car in which Giles was riding; and (2) law enforcement was not authorized to search the car after arresting the driver for driving while impaired (DWI). We conclude that police had reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop and that the search incident to arrest was lawful under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 334, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1712 (2009). Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

On November 5, 2017, at approximately 12:25 a.m., Officer Fiebelkorn patrolled downtown Glencoe, and saw a silver car driving northbound "on Pryor Avenue across the intersection of 16th Street." Fiebelkorn was driving westbound on 16th Street and "recognized this travel to be strange" because this street only led to a school, which was not open due to the late hour. Fiebelkorn watched the car, ran its plates, and determined that the registered owner was J.R. from Buffalo, Minnesota. Fiebelkorn turned his squad car around and "attempt[ed] to follow the car," but realized that he had "actually passed" the car where it was parked on the 1500 block of Stevens Avenue. Fiebelkorn eventually "relocated the vehicle going westbound" on Pryor, and followed it. Fiebelkorn "observed on two separate occasions that the vehicle did not emit a turn signal prior to 100 feet before the turn. The vehicle would stop, indicate its turn by signaling, and then make the turn." After observing these two separate violations, Fiebelkorn activated his emergency lights to stop the car.

Fiebelkorn approached the car and spoke to the driver, J.R., and "recognized [her] behavior to be strange or abnormal, because while she was looking at me, she had reached"into the center console. Fiebelkorn also noticed that J.R. had "rapid speech, she was excited, her eyes were sensitive to light, she was unable to sit still, and had rigid arms." Accordingly, Fiebelkorn believed that J.R. was under the influence of a stimulant. Fiebelkorn called for backup, and then asked J.R. to exit her car and perform field sobriety tests.¹ During the tests, Fiebelkorn saw that J.R. had "eyelid tremors," her pupils were dilated, and she had "heat bumps" on her mouth or tongue, which are "consistent with smoking from a glass pipe." J.R. then attempted to get by Fiebelkorn and return to her car. Fiebelkorn stopped and arrested J.R., and brought her to his squad car.

Fiebelkorn returned to the car and asked appellant Jeremy Allen Giles, who was seated in the front passenger seat, to get out of the car. Fiebelkorn then conducted a search of the driver's area and found a hypodermic needle inside the driver's side door and a clear baggie "with a crystal-like substance in it that [he] recognized to be methamphetamine" near the center console. Next, Fiebelkorn searched the entire car and found a backpack in the backseat, "which contained a box of ammunition with six rounds of .38 caliber missing," men's cologne, men's deodorant, and a receipt. Later, Fiebelkorn returned to the 1500 block of Stevens Avenue where the car had been parked earlier, and found a loaded ".38 long barreled revolver" on the ground near the street.

The state charged Giles with being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). Giles filed a motion to suppress the ammunition and firearm evidence, arguing that the search was unlawful becauseFiebelkorn did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when he stopped J.R., and Fiebelkorn lacked probable cause to search the vehicle after J.R.'s arrest. The state opposed Giles's motion, arguing that the stop was legal and that "there was independent probable cause, outside of the driver's arrest, which gave law enforcement the right to search the vehicle."

At a contested omnibus hearing, Fiebelkorn testified to the facts described above. Giles testified that J.R. and he were unfamiliar with Glencoe and had gotten lost. Giles also testified that a man that he did not know was in the backseat of J.R.'s car. After they noticed the squad car following them, the man was concerned because he had outstanding warrants. J.R. parked briefly at "Stevens and 15th," the man exited the car and he ran away. Giles denied that the gun or backpack belonged to him. Fiebelkorn testified that he did not see a third person in J.R.'s car.

The district court denied Giles's motion to suppress, concluding that J.R. "turned twice without signaling" before reaching the intersection, and therefore, "the stop of the vehicle was proper." The district court also determined that J.R. was arrested for driving under the influence, Fiebelkorn reasonably believed she was "under the influence of a stimulant," and, therefore, Fiebelkorn was "permitted to search the driver's area for evidence of a controlled substance." After he found a needle in "the driver's side door pocket and a baggie containing crystal like substance believed to be methamphetamine, [Fiebelkorn] then had probable cause under the vehicle exception to expand the search to the entire vehicle including the passenger compartment, trunk and any containers or bags."

The parties stipulated to facts under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to preserve the suppression issue for appellate review. Based on the stipulated facts, the district court found Giles guilty of being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm and imposed sentence, committing Giles to the Commissioner of Corrections for 45 months. Giles appeals.

DECISION

I. The district court did not err in determining that Fiebelkorn had reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop.

Giles argues that there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to support Fiebelkorn's stop of J.R.'s car and that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop. This court reviews a district court's pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence using a mixed standard of review. See State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). A district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Id.

Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The United States Supreme Court has determined that the "[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning of this provision." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996) (citations omitted). When making an investigatory stop of a vehicle, a police officer must have specific and articulable facts that establish "'reasonable suspicion' of a motor vehicleviolation or criminal activity." State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 1981) (citation omitted). An officer must also "have a particularized and objective basis" to suspect that the person is engaged in criminal activity. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). If an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, even one that is insignificant, there is an objective basis for an investigatory stop. Id.

Minnesota law provides that, "A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 5 (2016). At the omnibus hearing, Fiebelkorn testified that, on two occasions, he observed J.R. "stop" at an intersection before indicating her intent to turn with a turn signal, "and then make the turn." Accordingly, the district court determined that J.R. "turned twice without signaling at least 100 feet before doing so" and, therefore, she violated section 169.19. Because Fiebelkorn saw J.R. violate a traffic law, the district court concluded that the stop was proper.

On appeal, Giles concedes that J.R. failed to signal 100 feet before she turned, but argues that J.R. was unfamiliar with the area and did not decide to turn until she had reached the intersection. Giles argues that, because the statute requires a "signal of intention to turn," and J.R. did not form her intention to turn until she reached the intersection, she did not violate any traffic law. See Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 5 (emphasis added).

When determining whether a driver has committed a traffic violation, the legality of the driver's conduct is determined objectively. See State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 822-23 (Minn. 2004). The driver's subjective understanding, or misunderstanding, of the law is not relevant to determining whether an officer has acted lawfully in conducting atraffic stop. See, e.g., State v. Wendorf, 814 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. App. 2012) (holding that an officer's traffic stop was valid, and that it was irrelevant that driver was subjectively confused as to whether statute...