State v. Gilliam

• Decision Date: 20 June 1903
• Citation: 45 S.E. 6,66 S.C. 419
• Parties: STATE v. GILLIAM.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

45 S.E. 6

66 S.C. 419

STATE v. GILLIAM.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 20, 1903

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Newberry County Aldrich, Judge.

Indictment against Henry Gilliam for murder. From sentence to life imprisonment, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Cole L Blease, for appellant. T. S. Sease, for the State.

JONES J.

The defendant was indicted and tried at Newberry, February term 1903, for the murder of his wife, Rachael Gilliam. The jury found him guilty, with a recommendation to mercy, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment, from which judgment he now appeals upon exceptions to rulings as to the admissibility of testimony, to the charge to the jury, and to the refusal of motion for new trial.

The first exception assigns error in allowing the witness Will Hill to testify to a conversation which took place between the defendant and the deceased some time before the homicide. The conversation was had about a week before the homicide between the witness and the deceased, in the presence of the defendant, and was to the following effect, as stated in the "case": "Q. Tell what conversation took place? A. We was just laughing and talking as people usually do--talking about men whipping their wives--and she said, 'Henry is scared to whip me unless he gets his pistol every time.' Said, 'If me and Henry gets into a dispute on the back side of the field, he turns the plow loose and makes for the house to get his pistol, and puts it in his pocket and comes back, for a common thing.' Q. What did Henry say to that? A. Henry spoke and said: 'Yes; you done told that much. Now, who is going to whip me for doing it?' It seems like he got offended at her speaking that way." The testimony was competent to show the relation between the defendant and the deceased. State v. Bodie, 33 S.C. 129, 11 S.E. 624.

The second exception imputes error in not allowing Coroner Lindsay to state how many jurors signed the verdict of the coroner's inquest. The ruling was proper, as it was entirely irrelevant how many jurors signed the verdict of the coroner's inquest.

The third exception alleges error in not allowing defendant to introduce the testimony taken at the coroner's inquest, in order to corroborate the testimony of Susan Gilliam, a witness for the defendant, and to show a contradiction on the part of other witnesses. This exception cannot be sustained. The case does not show that the testimony at the coroner's inquest was sought to be introduced for the purposes named, but, on the contrary, it appears that the object of the attempt to introduce the inquest papers was to show whether the defendant was released on his own recognizance, and what was the verdict of the coroner's jury. These matters were irrelevant to any issue before the court. Besides this, it was not competent to corroborate the testimony of defendant's witness at the trial by showing that she made similar statements at the coroner's inquest, and no ground had been laid to impeach the testimony of other witnesses testifying at the trial by showing contradictory statements by them at the coroner's inquest.

The fourth exception states that the presiding judge erred in charging the jury that a sufficient legal provocation involves the idea of assault and battery. The exception does not fully represent the charge, which was in these words: "A sufficient legal provocation involves the idea of an assault and battery, or at least some indignity offered which is calculated to throw the average man in sudden heat and passion." The judge had previously in his charge correctly defined "murder" and "manslaughter." In the sentence above quoted, the explanation as to what would constitute a sufficient legal provocation to reduce an intentional homicide from murder to manslaughter was rather too favorable to the appellant, as it is not true that any indignity which is calculated to throw the average man in sudden heat and passion is "a sufficient legal provocation." For example, provocation by words only, however opprobrious, would not be sufficient to reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter, when death was caused by a deadly weapon, as in this case. State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 129, 13 S.E. 319, 27 Am. St. Rep. 799.

The defendant, in his testimony and that of his daughter Susan sought to explain the killing by showing that it happened unintentionally, in a playful tussle between him and his wife, the deceased,...