State v. Gin, 2
Decision Date | 16 June 1988 |
Docket Number | CA-SA,No. 2,2 |
Citation | 158 Ariz. 202,761 P.2d 1106 |
Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Harry S. GIN, Judge of the Superior Court In and For the County of Pima, State of Arizona, Respondent, Alfredo Danny LUCERO, Real Party in Interest. 88-0061. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
The state brings this special action to challenge the trial court's order dismissing an indictment which charged the real party in interest, Alfredo Danny Lucero, with DUI on a suspended license, a class 5 felony in violation of A.R.S. § 28-692.02(A)(1). Because the state has no equally plain, speedy or adequate remedy by appeal, Ariz.R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a), 17A A.R.S.; Hinson v. Coulter, 150 Ariz. 306, 723 P.2d 655 (1986), and because we believe the trial court's ruling was in error, we assume jurisdiction and grant relief.
The question presented is whether a charge of DUI on a suspended license may be brought where the license suspension on which the charge is based was the result of a prior DUI conviction entered upon an uncounseled guilty plea.
On October 14, 1987, Lucero pled no contest to a charge that he violated A.R.S. § 28-692(A). Based upon that plea, the court entered a judgment of guilt which resulted in the suspension of Lucero's driver's license. Approximately one month later, on November 11, 1987, Lucero was again arrested and was issued a citation for violating A.R.S. §§ 28-692(A) ( ) and -692(B) (driving while there was .10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood). On December 22 an indictment issued charging appellant under A.R.S. § 28-692.02(A)(1) with violating A.R.S. § 28-692 while his license was suspended, a class 5 felony.
Following the indictment, Lucero filed a "Motion to Strike Allegation of Prior Conviction/Dismiss." Lucero argued that his prior conviction was constitutionally defective because at the time he pled no contest to that offense, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Lucero's prior DUI conviction was entered by a magistrate in the Marana Town Court. In the instant case, the respondent superior court judge conducted a hearing on Lucero's motion to strike at which the Marana court magistrate testified. Additionally, all the Marana court records of Lucero's plea and conviction were placed in the record.
Based upon the Marana Town Court documents and the testimony of Marana Court Magistrate George W. Kline, Lucero argued to the respondent court that the state could not use the suspension resulting from his prior uncounseled DUI conviction to "enhance" Lucero's current DUI offense under § 28-692.02(A)(1). The court granted Lucero's motion and dismissed the indictment with leave to the state to refile, and stated "[a]fter reviewing the evidence and the law, the court cannot find that the lower court could find that the defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his rights to counsel with regard to the prior DUI." Subsequently, the respondent judge entered an under-advisement ruling denying the state's motion to reconsider its dismissal but modifying its previous order to reinstate the charge as a violation of A.R.S. § 28-692(A) and -692(B), ordering that the matter proceed to trial on that lesser charge. In that minute entry, the respondent judge compared the instant case to a recent unpublished memorandum decision of this court, finding
The state first argues that the offense as charged, a violation of § 28-692.02(A)(1), does not involve the use of Lucero's prior conviction for enhancement purposes. Rather, the state contends, it is the license suspension and not the prior DUI conviction that is essential to the establishment of the felony charge. We agree.
A.R.S. § 28-692.02(A)(1) provides that "[a] person is guilty of a class 5 felony if the person ... [c]ommits a violation of § 28-692 while the person's, operator's or chauffeur's license is suspended...." Under that statute, the state must prove a violation of § 28-692(A) or (B) occurring while a defendant's driver's license is suspended, and that the defendant had notice of the suspension. Those are the elements of the substantive felony charge. Even if we were to find that Lucero's prior uncounseled DUI conviction is constitutionally infirm for enhancement purposes, such a determination would have no effect on the charge at issue here, DUI on a suspended license. It is the suspension which is a substantive element of the offense. That element is established by the state proving the fact of suspension and Lucero's notice of the suspension. The basis for the suspension is irrelevent and could have resulted from any number of circumstances. See A.R.S. § 28-441(A) ( ); A.R.S. § 28-1253(G) ( ); A.R.S. § 28-446(A)(3) ( ). See also State v. Gonzales, 27 Ariz.App. 308, 554 P.2d 904 (1976) (...
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