State v. Gladney
| Decision Date | 15 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-0304-CR-339.,49A02-0304-CR-339. |
| Citation | 793 N.E.2d 264 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Donteau GLADNEY, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Hilary Bowe Ricks, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Appellant-Plaintiff the State of Indiana ("State") appeals the trial court's grant of Donteau Gladney's motion to suppress evidence. We reverse and remand.
The State raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court's order granting Gladney's motion to suppress the handgun was contrary to law.
The relevant facts are undisputed. On October 8, 2002, at approximately 1:39 a.m., Indianapolis Police Officer Brian Allen ("Officer Allen") was on routine patrol in the east district of Indianapolis and observed a car parked on the side of the street with its interior dome light illuminated. Officer Allen noticed a male, later identified as Gladney, sitting in the front passenger seat and leaning across the center console of the car underneath the steering wheel. Concerned that an attempted theft might be in progress, Officer Allen slowed his vehicle to a stop and reversed toward the car. When Officer Allen approached the car the second time, he saw Gladney sitting in the passenger seat and a female sitting in the driver's seat of the car. Because he had never lost sight of the car after first observing it, and because the car doors had remained closed, Officer Allen believed that the female was in the car when he had first observed it, but that she was either "ducking" down or lying down in the seats. Appellant's App. at 49. Officer Allen suspected that the two individuals might be involved in a drug deal, prostitution, or both. During his tenure with the Indianapolis Police Department, Officer Allen had made several arrests in the east district for drugs and prostitution. Officer Allen parked his vehicle and began walking toward the car. When Officer Allen approached the car, the driver started the car and the car began slowly moving. Officer Allen observed Gladney "fumbling with a sweatshirt and what appeared to be some kind of object in the sweatshirt." Id. at 51. Officer Allen ordered the driver of the car to stop, and she complied. Because Officer Allen could not see Gladney's hands, and because Gladney continued to fidget with an object in the sweatshirt, Officer Allen became concerned that Gladney was hiding a weapon in the sweatshirt. Officer Allen drew his weapon and ordered Gladney to put down the sweatshirt and show his hands. Gladney "placed the sweatshirt down upon the center console and what appeared to be a semi-automatic handgun ... fell out from an opening in the sweatshirt." Id. at 54. Officer Allen immediately requested backup. Once backup arrived, Officer Allen ordered the driver and Gladney out of the car and retrieved the handgun from the passenger console.
On October 9, 2002, the State charged Gladney with Carrying a Handgun Without a License as both a Class A misdemeanor and a Class C felony.1 On October 16, 2002, Gladney filed a Motion to Suppress the handgun, which the trial court granted after conducting a hearing. The State then dismissed the charges against Gladney and initiated this appeal.
The State challenges the trial court's order granting Gladney's motion to suppress. At the suppression hearing, the State had the burden of demonstrating the constitutionality of the measures it used to secure evidence. State v. Ashley, 661 N.E.2d 1208, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). To prevail on appeal, the State must show that the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion is contrary to law. State v. Smith, 638 N.E.2d 1353, 1355 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994). We accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Williams v. State, 745 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we consider the evidence most favorable to the ruling together with any adverse evidence that is uncontradicted. State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d 639, 641 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied.
The State argues that the trial court's order granting Gladney's motion to suppress was contrary to law because Officer Allen seized the handgun during a lawful investigatory stop. Gladney counters that Officer Allen did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop and, thus, the seizure of the handgun violated his constitutional rights. At the conclusion of the hearing on Gladney's Motion to Suppress, the trial court found as follows:
The [trial court's] just not convinced [Officer Allen] has articulated enough facts to equate to a reasonable and justifiable suspicion of criminal activity that would have caused him to not only order them to stop but to draw his weapon when the driver was complying. There's just not enough here so the [trial court's] going to grant [Gladney's] motion to suppress.
First, we recognize that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 464-65 (Ind.1998)
. As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless search. Id. Consequently, when a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that the search falls into one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 465.
One exception to the warrant requirement was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court established the rule that a police officer may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes if, based upon specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, "official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests" of private citizens is reasonably warranted, and the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot." Id. at 21-22, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citations omitted). Rather, in evaluating the legality of a Terry stop, we must consider "the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Therefore, the reasonable-suspicion inquiry is fact-sensitive and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind.1997), modified on reh'g on other grounds, 685 N.E.2d 698. The reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied where the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Lyons v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1179, 1183-1184 (Ind.Ct. App.2000); see also Gipson v. State, 459 N.E.2d 366, 368 (Ind.1984)
. Thus, reasonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. Luster v. State, 578 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). We review a trial court's determination regarding reasonable suspicion de novo. Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).
Here, the State contends that the totality of circumstances presented in this case provided Officer Allen with the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a valid Terry stop. We agree. The undisputed facts reveal that, at approximately 1:39 a.m., Officer Allen observed a car parked on the side of the street with its interior dome light illuminated. Officer Allen saw Gladney sitting in the front passenger seat, but leaning across the center console of the car underneath the steering wheel. Initially, because of Gladney's posture in the car, Officer Allen was concerned that an attempted theft was in progress. Accordingly, Officer Allen slowed his patrol vehicle to a stop and reversed toward the car. When Officer Allen approached the car, he saw Gladney "hunched over" in the passenger seat and a female in the driver's seat of the car. Appellant's App. at 47. Because of his experience in patrolling this particular area of town, which includes making several arrests for drugs and prostitution, Officer Allen suspected that the two individuals might be involved in a drug deal, prostitution, or both. For purposes of our analysis here, we will assume that when Officer Allen stopped the car, he commenced an investigatory stop. As previously mentioned, under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27,88 S.Ct. 1868. Thus, the question before us becomes whether Officer Allen had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. Reasonable suspicion exists where the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from those facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has or is about to occur. See id. When taken together, all...
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Coleman v. State
...would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur." State v. Gladney, 793 N.E.2d 264, 268 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), reh'g denied, trans. denied. In addition to stopping the individual, the officer can conduct a reasonable search for weapon......