State v. Goff
| Decision Date | 08 July 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 786-E,786-E |
| Citation | 267 A.2d 686,107 R.I. 331 |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. Thomas GOFF, Jr. x.&c. |
This indictment charges Thomas Goff, Jr., hereinafter referred to as the defendant, with the murder of Anthony Ferrucci. The case was tried to a jury in the Superior Court, and the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree. His motion for new trial was denied, and the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. The defendant is now in this court prosecuting his bill of exceptions.
It does not appear to be disputed that on September 22, 1967, Janice C. Ferrucci, the mother of the deceased, Anthony Ferrucci, who was three and one half years old at the time, left her son in the care of defendant at his home on Sherman Street in Pawtucket while she did some errands. About three hours later she returned to defendant's home accompanied by defendant's brother and another woman named Maureen M. Farrell. Upon her arrival there, defendant emerged from the house carrying Anthony over his shoulder. The mother testified that he told her that Anthony had been in a fight with another small boy. The defendant said that he had stopped the fight, and that as a result he had gotten into a fight with the older brother of the youngster and had received an injury to his hand, which was swollen. According to the mother the child acted 'like there was something wrong with him.' She wanted to take him to a hospital but defendant dissuaded her from so doing.
The mother then took the boy to her own home on Central Street in Central Falls, arriving sometime between 8 and 8:30 p.m. When she attempted to feed him, the child would not eat, appeared to be drowsy and kept falling asleep. She started to undress him to put him to bed when she noticed bruises on his chest and decided, despite defendant's objection to take him t a hospital. She stopped at the home of her girl friend's mother, Mrs. Farrell, to ask her girl friend to go to the hospital with her, and the motor of this friend saw the child. When they gave the child some water he vomited, and Mrs. Farrell advised her to take the child to a hospital at once.
At the hospital the child was X-rayed and admitted. The mother went to see the child at the hospital the next day and saw him 'covered with bruises.' Subsequently, she went to defendant's house on Sherman Street and remained there for the night, returning to her own home on Central Street the following morning to prepare to go to the hospital. While there she was informed by the Central Falls police that the Providence police wanted to talk to her, and at the police station she learned that the child had died during the night. She testified that she saw defendant at the Pawtucket police station and that he admitted that 'he had killed my boy.'
The medical testimony, given principally by Dr. Salvatore Allegra, indicated that the child had suffered many severe internal injuries and that the death was caused by 'Multiple contusions with extensive injuries of internal organs.' The medical testimony further indicated that 'The injuries were inflicted through a series of violent blows to the body of this child' which could have resulted from 'punching as well as kicking in this particular case.' The opinion of the medical witness was that the condition of the body was the result of 'a very violent protracted ruthless beating' involving as many as 60 or 70 blows, that the injuries were not consistent with a fall down a flight of stairs and that there were '70 different ecchymoses' over all the body.
After being taken into custody by the police, defendant persisted, at the Pawtucket police station, in his assertion that a boy about seven years of age had beat up Anthony. However, upon being confronted by the mother, he orally admitted that he had punched him several times about the body. A written statement was taken which was subsequently admitted into evidence.
In the statement defendant admitted that he had been taking care of Anthony and that he had called him into the house to watch a TV program. He stated that Anthony had started to fool around and that he ahd hit the boy a couple of times in the chest with the back of his hand. He further stated that another youngster wanted Anthony to go out to play, and that he had refused to allow him to do so. At this, Anthony started to stamp his feet, ran around a table knocking over a kitchen chair, and 'I got mad.' He stated further that he grabbed him by the arm in the kitchen, took him into the parlor and sat him down on the couch. In answer to a question as to why he had punched Anthony, he replied: 'Because he had kicked me and wanted to go out.' In testifying at trial, however, he completely repudiated the statement given to the police and claimed that the mother had inflicted the bruises upon Anthony's body by hitting him with her pocketbook and knocking him down a flight of stairs.
The defendant contends that the trial justice erred prejudicially in instructing the jury concerning the return of a verdict of manslaughter. It is to be noted, first, that the record discloses that defendant had made no request for an instruction on manslaughter. This, however, does not relieve a trial court from giving whatever instruction may be made necessary by the state of the evidence. In this state a statute, G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 8-2-38, requires a trial justice in every civil or criminal case tried to a jury in the Superior Court to 'instruct the jury in the law relating to the same * * *.' We have held this statute to be mandatory and to contemplate that juries should be given correct instructions as to those rules of law that of necessity must be applied to the issues raised at trial. Macaruso v. Massart, 96 R.I. 168, 190 A.2d 14.
It has been long held in this state under our statute that a defendant is not entitled to a charge on a lower degree of homicide when the evidence would not sustain a finding of the lesser degree of the offense. However, where the evidence would support such a verdict, an instruction thereon must be given under the statute even though not requested. State v. Prescott, 70 R.I. 403, 40 A.2d 721; State v. Hathaway, 52 R.I. 492, 161 A. 366. This view appears to prevail more or less generally throughout the country. Mock v State, 2 Md.App. 771, 237 A.2d 811; State v. Crosby, 124 Vt. 294, 204 A.2d 123; People v. Morris, 90 Ill.App.2d 208, 234 N.E.2d 52.
In the instant case the contention of error made by defendant appears to rest on the fact that the trial justice instructed the jury, in effect, that it could not return a verdict of manslaughter on the evidence in this case. In the course of instructing the jury, the court discussed murder in both first and second degrees and talked about malice aforethought. In so doing, the court stated expressly: We are presented, then, with the question of whether the evidence in this record would support a verdict of manslaughter and, therefore, require an instruction thereon.
Manslaughter is unlawful homicide without malice aforethought, either express or implied, and the element of malice aforethought must be absent or a homicide will, by definition, be murder. The absence of malice in manslaughter distinguishes it from any degree of murder, and it is to be noted that manslaughter is a distinct offense and not a degree of murder. In 1 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, § 274, at 580, voluntary manslaughter is defined as follows: 'Voluntary manslaughter is generally the felonious and intentional killing of another without malice aforethought, in a sudden heat of passion caused by adequate legal provocation.'
We recently, in State v. Winston, R.I., 252 A.2d 354, citing State v. Smith, R.I., 93 A. 1, declared that whether a crime is to be classified as murder or manslaughter depends on whether the killing was done with malice aforethought, express or implied, which is an essential characteristic of murder, or whether it was committed under the influence of sudden passion produced by adequate provocation, which would reduce the crime to manslaughter. In shortThen, the controlling question, in our opinion, in this case is whether Anthony's conduct was sufficient to constitute...
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