State v. Goff

• Decision Date: 09 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. SC 85564.,SC 85564.
• Citation: 129 S.W.3d 857
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Marvin L. GOFF, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

129 S.W.3d 857

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Marvin L. GOFF, Appellant.

No. SC 85564.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

March 9, 2004.

Rehearing Denied April 13, 2004.

Kent Denzel, Office of the Public Defender, Columbia, MO, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Linda S. Lemke, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge.

Marvin Goff was convicted of the class C felony of stealing under section 570.040¹ and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment as a prior and persistent offender. Mr. Goff asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress certain incriminating evidence because the State did not show that police officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of his automobile or a subsequent frisk of his person under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ("Terry"). Finding that the collective information possessed by the two officers involved in the stop was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that Mr. Goff's other claims are without merit, this Court affirms the judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The evidence adduced at the motion to suppress hearing and at the subsequent jury trial was as follows. At about 3:00 a.m. on July 24, 2001, Marvin Goff and Patrick Trent drove into the Wal-Mart parking lot in Gladstone, Missouri. Although the Wal-Mart was open twenty-four hours, the north and south entrance doors were closed each night after 11:00 p.m., leaving only the middle doors available for use. Officer Mitzi Boydston entered the parking lot and saw Mr. Goff's vehicle parked illegally in the fire lane next to beverage vending machines located outside the locked south doors of the building. Both men were outside of the vehicle at this time. As Officer Boydston drove by, the men noticed the police vehicle. Mr. Trent then got inside the men's car, and Mr. Goff walked to the locked doors and pulled on their handle as if trying to open them.

While continuing to drive through the parking lot, Officer Boydston radioed her dispatcher. She stated that she saw a car with two men by the Wal-Mart vending machines and asked for a check on the car's license plate. The dispatcher ran the license number and the address of the registered owner and radioed back that the owner of the car had no warrants but "someone living at that address known to operate that car had several outstanding warrants."² Officer Boydston immediately returned to the area where Mr. Goff's car was parked, but the car and the two men had already left. She broadcast this information over her radio and began looking for the car.

Patrolling nearby, Officer Easley heard Officer Boydston's broadcast and began looking for the men's car also. Ten minutes later, he found the car in the parking lot of a twenty-four-hour Hy-Vee grocery store located across the street from Wal-Mart. It was parked in front of three vending machines, and the two men were standing by the machines. As soon as he saw Officer Easley drive by, Mr. Trent walked to the car and got in the driver's seat, while Mr. Goff went inside the Hy-Vee.

Officer Easley drove by again, and Mr. Trent moved the car to a parking space. Officer Easley then parked his squad car behind Hy-Vee, where he could see Mr. Trent but believed he could not be seen. He saw Mr. Trent exit the car, open its hood, look around quickly as if to check whether anyone was watching, place something in the engine compartment, which the officer later testified might have been a small bag, close the hood, and get back in the driver's seat. The officer was sure that Mr. Trent did not open the hood to work on or check the engine.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Goff returned from the store with a soda, and the two attempted to drive away. Officer Easley pulled his squad car up behind them and activated his lights. The men appeared nervous as he asked them for their identification and checked for outstanding warrants. Upon learning that Mr. Trent had an outstanding warrant, Officer Easley arrested him and asked the two to exit the car. He patted both down for weapons. The officer felt a large object in Mr. Goff's pants pocket and asked him what it was. Mr. Goff replied "I don't know" and gave Officer Easley permission to retrieve the object. The officer drew out a long, large metal object that he later testified "looked like one of those key locks on the vending machine," and "appeared to be, like, a master tool or a universal key of some sort."

Desiring to check whether the object was a key, Officer Easley placed it in the lock to one of the Hy-Vee vending machines and found that it fit. He noticed that the vending machine door was pried open one or two inches and its padlock was missing. He arrested Mr. Goff. He then looked inside the vehicle and saw a large number of quarters in plain view on the passenger seat floorboard where Mr. Goff had been seated.

Officer Easley then searched the remainder of the vehicle. He found a bag under Mr. Goff's seat containing quarters, other coins, and one-dollar bills totaling $60. Under the hood, he found a makeup bag containing two additional universal vending machine keys, as well as numerous other vending machine keys with codes on them. In the trunk, Officer Easley found a notebook that appeared to contain vending machine numbers corresponding with the keys found under the hood. Also in the trunk were rolling papers for coins, empty moneybags, and an unbroken padlock. Wire cutters, vice grips, pliers, and screwdrivers were in the back seat.

No one who could get into the vending machine money box to see what money was missing was present at the time of the arrest. But, once morning arrived, Hy-Vee store manager Steven Binseil found that someone had broken into the third machine and taken all of its coins. The dollar bills were still safe in a separate part of the machine.

Mr. Goff was charged with the class C felony of stealing, third offense. Sec. 570.040. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence found on his person and at the scene. This motion was overruled. At trial, the court again overruled his objection to admission of this evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court found Mr. Goff to be a prior and persistent offender under section 558.016 and sentenced him to fifteen years imprisonment. After opinion by the Court of Appeals, Western District, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Mr. Goff argues on appeal that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his person and car because the police lacked sufficient grounds to stop his car under Terry. Where, as here, a motion to suppress was overruled and the evidence was introduced at trial, an appellate court will consider the evidence presented both at the suppression hearing and at trial in determining whether the motion should have been granted. State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 530 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1999). The legal determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed is made de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). The Court defers to the trial court's determination of credibility and factual findings, inquiring only "whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, and it will be reversed only if clearly erroneous." Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 530. See also State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 845 (Mo. banc 1998).

A. OFFICERS' COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE MAY BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING REASONABLE SUSPICION.

The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, permits police officers to briefly stop an individual if the officer "observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot...." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Such a stop, often referred to as a "Terry stop," applies to stops of both individuals and automobiles. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Missouri courts have repeatedly applied the Terry rule, stating that to conduct a Terry stop, a police officer must have "a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that those stopped are engaged in criminal activity." State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Mo. banc 1995). Accord, State v. Franklin, 841 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo. banc 1992).

Here, however, Mr. Goff failed to properly preserve his claim of an improper Terry stop for review. At the motion to suppress hearing and at trial, he claimed only that: 1) the police lacked probable cause for his arrest and detention; 2) his arrest and the subsequent search of his person and vehicle was illegal; and 3) "the items searched for and seized" violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution. He did not assert that the initial Terry stop was not made based on reasonable suspicion. Because Mr. Goff's illegal stop claim must be raised at the earliest opportunity, State v. Galazin, 58 S.W.3d 500, 505 (Mo. banc 2001), he failed to preserve this claim for appellate review. As such, review is only for plain error. Rule 30.20. Plain error exists "where the alleged error `facially establishes substantial grounds for believing a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice occurred.'" State v. Baker, 103 S.W.3d 711, 723 (Mo. banc 2003), quoting, State v. Rhodes, 988 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Mo. banc 1999).

Mr. Goff claims that, normally, a police officer is entitled to rely only on his own observations and information specifically communicated to him by another officer in developing reasonable suspicion or probable cause. An exception exists, he admits, where an officer makes a special request for assistance in, for example, the case of...