State v. Goldberg
| Citation | 72 P.3d 1083,149 Wn.2d 888,149 Wash.2d 888 |
| Decision Date | 24 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 72956-5.,72956-5. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Morris H. GOLDBERG, Petitioner. |
Susan Gasch, Spokane, for petitioner.
Steven Tucker, Spokane County Prosecutor, Kevin Korsmo, Deputy, Spokane, for respondent.
Morris Goldberg seeks reversal of an unpublished Court of Appeals opinion affirming his conviction of aggravated first degree murder. Goldberg primarily claims the aggravating circumstance, that the victim was to be a witness in an adjudicative proceeding, should not apply in this case because he was not a party to those proceedings. He also argues that the trial court improperly coerced the jury into finding the aggravating circumstance was proved when the trial judge ordered the jury to continue deliberations after it had answered the special verdict instruction given in this case. We vacate the verdict on the aggravating factor and remand for further proceedings.
A jury in Spokane County Superior Court convicted Morris H. Goldberg of premeditated murder in the first degree (with an aggravating circumstance). Goldberg admits his participation in the death of his son-in-law, Peter Zeihen, who was involved in a contested marriage dissolution proceeding with Goldberg's daughter. Zeihen had requested custody of their two-year-old child and was expected to testify in a dissolution trial scheduled for December 2, 1991. On November 18, 1991, Goldberg and his wife shot Zeihen in the parking lot of his apartment building. Goldberg believed Zeihen was molesting his granddaughter and killing him was the only way to prevent access to the child as neither the court system nor law enforcement agencies would address the molestation problem. The sole statutory aggravating factor alleged in the information was that Zeihen was killed because of his role as a witness in the dissolution proceeding.
Goldberg argued justifiable homicide, in that he only committed the murder to prevent further alleged sexual abuse of his granddaughter, rather than to prevent the victim from gaining child custody in the dissolution proceedings. The trial court twice denied Goldberg's motions to strike the statutory aggravating factor, concluding the evidence permitted the jury to find Zeihen was killed because of the pending dissolution trial.
The jury announced its verdict the same afternoon it began deliberations: guilty of first degree murder. Yet, the jury answered "no" on the special verdict form asking whether the crime was committed because of the victim's role as a witness in an adjudicative proceeding. The court then polled the jury by a show of hands on how many had voted "no" on the aggravating factor. Three jurors had actually voted no; however, only one juror raised a hand. Thereafter, the trial judge sent the jury out of the courtroom and spoke with the attorneys about what had just happened. After much discussion, it was agreed that there may have been some confusion on the jury's part because the jury had informed the bailiff that it had reached agreement. The trial judge then brought the jury back into the courtroom and asked the presiding juror if a unanimous decision could be reached on the aggravating circumstance. The presiding juror informed the court there was no reasonable probability of the jury reaching a unanimous agreement on the special verdict within a reasonable time. Upon hearing this, defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial on the aggravating factor. Rather than grant the motion, the trial judge sent the jury home for the night with instructions to resume deliberations in the morning to see if unanimity could be reached. At this point it was close to 5 p.m. and the jury had been in deliberations since 11 a.m. that morning.
The next morning, after an additional three hours of deliberations, the jury returned a unanimous finding that the State had proved the aggravating factor. The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole was later imposed. The Court of Appeals affirmed Goldberg's conviction and dismissed his three consolidated personal restraint petitions. In his appeal, Goldberg argues the aggravating circumstance does not apply because he was not a party to the dissolution proceedings and the trial court coerced the jury's verdict on the aggravating circumstance.
The primary issues in this case deal with (1) whether the trial court properly ordered the jury to continue deliberations after the jury indicated that it could not come to a unanimous decision on the special verdict, and (2) whether the statutory aggravating factor of killing a prospective witness applies when the defendant is not a party to the proceedings in which the witness is going to testify. We answer the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative.
Goldberg asserts the trial court improperly and coercively influenced the jury's deliberations when, after polling each individual juror at the time the verdict was returned, the court ordered them to return and continue deliberations the next day. This claim focuses on (1) the special verdict form given in this case, (2) the fact that three jurors indicated they had voted "no" on this issue, and (3) the trial court's ordering the jury to return and continue deliberations toward unanimity on this point.
The right to a jury trial includes the right to have each juror reach his or her own verdict uninfluenced by factors outside the evidence, the court's proper instructions, and the arguments of counsel. State v. Boogaard, 90 Wash.2d 733, 736, 585 P.2d 789 (1978). Washington requires unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases. Const. art. I, § 21; State v. Stephens, 93 Wash.2d 186, 190, 607 P.2d 304 (1980). As for aggravating factors, jurors must be unanimous to find that the State has proved the existence of the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Goldberg was charged in this case with premeditated murder in the first degree, with aggravating circumstances. This charge implicates two statutes: RCW 9A.32.030, and RCW 10.95.020. In order to be subject to the increased punishment provided for under RCW 10.95.030, the jury must separately make findings that the defendant is guilty of the substantive crime of premeditated murder in the first degree, and also that the State has proved the existence of the aggravating factor. The jury in this case was separately instructed on each of these inquiries.
As indicated, when the jury returned with a finding of guilty to the charge of first degree murder, it answered, "no" on the special verdict regarding the aggravating factor.1 Instruction 16, the special verdict form given in this case, reads as follows:
In order to answer the special verdict form "yes", you must unanimously be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that "yes" is the correct answer. If you have a reasonable doubt as to the question, you must answer "no".
Clerk's Papers at 391 (emphasis added).
The parties frame the issue by focusing on cases that discuss under what circumstances a...
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State v. Nava (In re Pers. Restraint Petition Nava)
...on the nonunanimity rule for such verdicts articulated in State v. Bashaw, 169 Wash.2d 133, 234 P.3d 195 (2010) and State v. Goldberg, 149 Wash.2d 888, 72 P.3d 1083 (2003). The Washington Supreme Court overruled Bashaw and Goldberg in State v. Guzman Nuñez, 174 Wash.2d 707, 285 P.3d 21 (201......
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State v. Grimes
...v. Goldberg, our Supreme Court held that unanimity was not required to return a “no” answer to a special verdict form. 149 Wash.2d 888, 893–94, 72 P.3d 1083 (2003). In Goldberg, the jury first returned a “no” special verdict finding, but the trial court then required the jury to deliberate ......
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In re Monschke
...and not the section that defines aggravated murder and lists aggravating circumstances, RCW 10.95.020. See State v. Goldberg , 149 Wash.2d 888, 894, 72 P.3d 1083 (2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Guzman Nuñez , 174 Wash.2d 707, 713, 285 P.3d 21 (2012) (" RCW 10.95.020 defines t......
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State v. Pineda-Pineda
...that "yes" is the correct answer. If you have a reasonable doubt as to the question, you must answer "no".'" 149 Wash.2d 888, 893, 72 P.3d 1083 (2003) (alteration in original). The court examined the instruction in a context where the jury returned a special verdict in the negative, and the......