State v. Golden

• Decision Date: 01 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 68279,68279
• Citation: 171 Ga.App. 27,318 S.E.2d 693
• Parties: The STATE v. GOLDEN.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 693

318 S.E.2d 693

171 Ga.App. 27

The STATE v. GOLDEN.

No. 68279.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 1, 1984.

Rehearing Denied May 17, 1984.

Certiorari Denied June 20, 1984.

Herbert A. Rivers, Sol., William D. Cooper, Asst. Sol., for appellant.

Larry W. Yarbrough, Marietta, for appellee.

BANKE, Presiding Judge.

Based on the results of several "field sobriety tests" administered to him when his automobile was stopped at a roadblock set up by the Marietta-Cobb County DUI Task Force, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. The trial court granted his motion to suppress the results of these tests, ruling that his detention at the roadblock constituted a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The state appeals.

The Marietta-Cobb County DUI Task Force is comprised of officers from various police jurisdictions within Cobb County. Each such officer is deputized to act as an agent of the sheriff's department, in an effort to give him or her county-wide arrest powers. The roadblock at issue in this case was implemented by seven task force officers, on a state highway within the city limits of Powder Springs, between the hours of midnight and 3:00 a.m. A supervisory officer charged with overall responsibility for the operation and described as the "project coordinator" testified that he chose this time period because traffic was light and a greater incidence of DUI offenses could normally be expected during such hours.

Reflecting signs were placed at each approach to the roadblock, identifying the operation as a driver's license checkpoint and requesting motorists to produce their driver's licenses and insurance cards for inspection. The checkpoint was also identified by orange, iridescent traffic cones placed in the roadway and by a patrol car stationed beside the road with its emergency lights flashing. A "chase vehicle" was present to apprehend any drivers who might attempt to avoid stopping.

As each passing motorist reached the checkpoint, one of two designated "screening officers" checked his drivers' license, insurance card, and automobile tag for possible irregularities. The screening officers were also instructed to observe each driver for signs of intoxication. If a possible offense was observed, the screening officer noted it on a pre-printed form and asked the driver to pull into an adjacent parking lot, where a "receiving officer" made a determination as to whether the driver should be charged with the offense. In the case of suspected intoxication, this involved ordering the driver out of the vehicle and asking him to submit to a series of "field sobriety tests." Based on the results of these tests, the suspect was then either placed under formal arrest for DUI or allowed to continue on his way. If placed under arrest for DUI, he was transferred to the custody of other officers and asked to consent to a breathalyzer test under the "implied consent" law.

The field sobriety tests were five in number. The suspect was asked to state the time and date, recite the alphabet, touch the index finger of each hand to his nose with eyes closed, follow the movement of an object with his eyes while holding his head still, and blow into an "alco-sensor," which was described as a miniature, "pre-screening" breathalyzer.

The screening officer who confronted the defendant in this case testified that it appeared the defendant might be intoxicated because he was slow to locate his driver's license and insurance card, he eminated a strong odor of alcoholic beverage, his eyes were red and watery, and he admitted having had something to drink. However, both the screening officer and the receiving officer testified that they did not consider their initial observations of the defendant sufficient to establish probable cause for his arrest for DUI. Although the receiving officer testified that the defendant "agreed" to take the field tests, it is clear from other evidence that any driver who declined to take the tests upon request would have been arrested for DUI immediately. Held:

1. The state initially enumerates as error the trial court's alleged finding that the task force officers lacked authority to operate a roadblock within the city limits of Powder Springs. However, the order granting the motion to suppress contains no such finding but is instead based solely on Fourth Amendment considerations. Consequently, we do not address this enumeration of error.

2. The trial court concluded that because no specific guidelines existed for use in deciding which motorists should be evaluated for intoxication, the screening officers were allowed to exercise an unconstitutionally excessive amount of discretion in this regard. This determination was evidently based on Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that patrolmen may not stop motorists at random to inspect their driver's licenses and vehicle registration papers, absent some specific, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. It is clear, however, that the holding in Prouse was not intended as a prohibition against the utilization of highway roadblocks to conduct such inspections, for the Supreme Court specifically indicated in that opinion that roadblocks could be considered a valid alternative to random vehicle stops. Id. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401. The Supreme Court has also indicated on other occasions that checkpoint stops are to be viewed differently from isolated vehicle stops "because the subjective intrusion--the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers--is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3083, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). See also United States v. Ortiz, 442 U.S. 891, 894-895, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 2587-88, 45 L.Ed.2d 623, 628 (1975). The use of highway roadblocks for the purpose of checking driver's licenses and vehicle registrations has also been upheld by the appellate courts of this state. See State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535(1), 207 S.E.2d 459 (1974); State v. Roberson, 165 Ga.App. 727(1), 302 S.E.2d 591 (1983).

The decision to implement the roadblock at issue in this case was made by supervisory personnel rather than by the officers in the field, and the operation was carried out pursuant to specific, pre-arranged procedures requiring all passing vehicles to be stopped at the checkpoint and leaving no discretion to the officers in this regard. It is clear that the delay experienced by passing motorists was minimal, lasting only a minute or two unless a violation was noted, and that the operation was well identified as a police checkpoint. Taking all of these factors into consideration, we hold that the initial detention of the defendant at the roadblock was reasonable and resulted in no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. ¹ In addition, we find that the screening officer's experience and training, which included 2 1/2 years of police service and attendance at a DUI enforcement school operated by the North Georgia Police Academy, were amply sufficient to enable him to make an initial determination as to which motorists should be given the field tests for intoxication. Indeed, it is the rule in Georgia that any person may testify, on the basis of personal observation, as to whether another person did or did not appear to be intoxicated on a given occasion. See Jones v. State, 168...