State v. Gomez

• Citation: 136 Idaho 480,36 P.3d 832
• Decision Date: 20 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 26814.,26814.
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Baldemar GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Idaho

36 P.3d 832

136 Idaho 480

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Baldemar GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 26814.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

November 20, 2001.

Wiebe & Fouser, Canyon County Public Defenders, Caldwell, for appellant. Jayme Beaber argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Karen A. Hudelson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Karen A. Hudelson argued.

SCHWARTZMAN, Chief Judge.

Baldemar Gomez appeals from the district court's order affirming the magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We reverse.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 14, 1998, Caldwell Police Detective Baltizar Garza observed a man using a pay telephone. Garza recognized the man from his prior police contacts as Gomez. Believing that he had seen Gomez's name on a list of outstanding arrest warrants three or four months earlier, Garza pulled into an adjacent parking lot and approached Gomez. Garza ordered Gomez to "hang up the phone ... I need to talk to you about a warrant." Knowing that Gomez sometimes carried weapons, Garza asked Gomez if he had any weapons on him. Gomez said that he did. Garza then had Gomez place his hands on the hood of Garza's car, frisked him, and recovered a folded five-inch butterfly knife. Gomez was arrested for and charged with carrying a concealed weapon.

Gomez filed a motion to suppress the knife, arguing that Garza's command to hang up the phone and speak to him about a warrant constituted a seizure without reasonable suspicion in violation of Gomez's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. At the hearing on Gomez's motion to suppress, Garza testified to the facts as set forth above. Garza testified that he did not confirm that there was an outstanding warrant for Gomez before ordering Gomez to hang up the telephone and come talk to him. He also testified that after arresting Gomez he searched for an outstanding warrant, but was unable to locate one.

Gomez's counsel argued that Garza's belief in the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant was based upon stale information. He contended that when Garza commanded Gomez to hang up the phone and talk to him about a warrant, Gomez did not feel free to leave and was thus seized without reasonable suspicion. The state argued that Garza reasonably believed there was a warrant for Gomez and wanted to talk to him about it. The magistrate orally ruled that Gomez was not seized and that the frisk for weapons, which uncovered the knife that became the basis for the concealed weapons charge, was reasonable in light of Gomez's admission to having a weapon. The magistrate then denied Gomez's motion to suppress. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Gomez pled guilty preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Gomez's sentence of ninety days in jail, with eighty days suspended, together with a fine and two years probation, was stayed pending appeal to the district court.

Gomez appealed. The district court affirmed the magistrate's denial of Gomez's motion to suppress, explaining that:

Detective Garza reasonably believed that a warrant for Gomez's arrest existed based upon a warrant sheet Garza had seen three to four months prior. The Court finds no evidence to contradict the magistrate's finding that Garza's belief was reasonable. While no actual warrant existed, and a less confrontational tone should have been used by the detective, the seizure was part of a valid investigatory stop. Detective Garza's question whether Gomez was carrying weapons was a limited intrusion, based upon Garza's knowledge of Gomez's history with weapons and for purposes of officer safety.

Upon Gomez's admission of a weapon, Detective Garza had the requisite probable cause to arrest for the crime of carrying a concealed weapon under Idaho Code 18-3302. Therefore, the arrest was valid and the evidence should not be suppressed.

Gomez appeals again.

II. GENERAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, we examine the record of the trial court independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision. State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 585 n. 1, 798 P.2d 43, 44 n. 1 (1990); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 478, 988 P.2d 700, 704 (Ct. App.1999); State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 939, 866 P.2d 193, 196 (Ct.App.1993).

III. BASIS FOR THE STOP AND FRISK OF GOMEZ

The state concedes that Gomez was seized when Garza ordered him to hang up the phone and come over to talk, but argues that Garza made a reasonable mistake about whether there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Gomez. Gomez argues that Garza lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop based upon Garza's belief that he saw Gomez's name on a warrant list three to four months earlier, and thus Gomez was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.¹ It is undisputed that the sole basis for this detention was Garza's subjective belief that he had seen Gomez's name on a warrant list three or four months earlier.

Under the stop-and-frisk exception created in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a stop and a frisk constitute two independent actions, each requiring a distinct and separate justification. State v. Babb, 133 Idaho 890, 892, 994 P.2d 633, 635 (Ct.App.2000); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 556, 989 P.2d 784, 788 (Ct.App. 1999). An officer is justified in stopping a person to investigate possible criminal behavior if articulable facts known to the officer give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Brignoni Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 618 (1975); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-81, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905-06; State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992). Whether a reasonable suspicion existed is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances and the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure. Id.

In Fourth Amendment applications, the reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective standard. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 291, 900 P.2d 196, 199 (1995); State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 727, 905 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Ct.App.1995). Although this standard allows room for some factual mistakes on the part of police officers, constitutional standards require that the mistakes must be those of reasonable men. Id. Subjective good faith on the part of the officer is not enough. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be `secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,' only at the discretion of the police." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed. 2d at 906.

No evidence of an outstanding warrant list was ever submitted to demonstrate that Gomez's name had actually appeared on such a list. Garza testified that Gomez had been the subject of numerous...