State v. Goodman

• Decision Date: 04 September 1979
• Docket Number: No. 46,46
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Buck Junior GOODMAN.

Page 569

257 S.E.2d 569

298 N.C. 1

STATE of North Carolina v. Buck Junior GOODMAN.

No. 46.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 4, 1979.

Harold D. Downing, Fayetteville, for defendant-appellant.

BRITT, Justice.

Pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000 et seq., this case was tried in two phases: (1) to determine

the guilt or innocence of defendant and (2) to determine his sentence for first-degree murder following his conviction of that charge. We will discuss the errors assigned under each phase.

PHASE I GUILT DETERMINATION

By his first assignment of error defendant contends that, in connection with the charge of first-degree murder, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury concerning the effect of voluntary intoxication upon the elements of intent, premeditation and deliberation. We find no merit in this assignment.

"It is well settled that voluntary drunkenness is not a legal excuse for crime; but where a specific intent, or premeditation and deliberation, is essential to constitute a crime or a degree of a crime, the fact of intoxication may negative its existence. Thus, while voluntary drunkenness is not, per se, an excuse for a criminal act, it may be sufficient in degree to prevent and, therefore, disprove the existence of a specific intent, such as the intent to kill." 4 Strong's N.C. Index 3d, Criminal Law § 6, p. 43, and cases cited therein. To reduce first-degree murder to second-degree murder the defendant's intoxication must be so great that he is "utterly unable" to form a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill. State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 72, 161 S.E.2d 560, 567 (1968); See also, State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 213 S.E.2d 238 (1975), Death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 903, 96 S.Ct. 3206, 49 L.Ed.2d 1208 (1976); State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 196 S.E.2d 777 (1973); State v. Wilson, 280 N.C. 674, 187 S.E.2d 22 (1972).

Whether intoxication and premeditation can coexist depends upon the degree of inebriety and its effect upon the mind and passions; no inference of the absence of deliberation and premeditation arises as a matter of law from intoxication. State v. Hamby, 276 N.C. 674, 174 S.E.2d 385 (1970), Vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S.Ct. 2862, 33 L.Ed.2d 754 (1972). Ordinarily, then, the degree of intoxication and its effect upon the elements of premeditation and deliberation is an issue for the jury unless the evidence is insufficient to warrant submission of the issue to them. Id. The evidence offered at the first phase of the trial in this case was, however, insufficient to raise the issue of intoxication to a degree precluding premeditation and deliberation, and the trial court did not err in refusing to charge thereon. State v. McLaughlin, Supra ; State v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803 (1974), Vacated on other grounds, 428 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 3212, 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976); State v. Cureton, 218 N.C. 491, 11 S.E.2d 469 (1940).

In McLaughlin there was ample evidence that the defendant had been drinking, but four witnesses who testified that defendant had been drinking prior to and at the time of the incident in question also testified that defendant was not drunk. In upholding the trial court's refusal to instruct on intoxication as a defense, the court said that there was no "evidence that defendant's mind was so intoxicated and his reason so overthrown that defendant could not form a specific intent to kill." 286 N.C. 597 at 609, 213 S.E.2d at 245.

In Fowler the court again upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct on the defense of intoxication, noting that there was evidence of defendant's drinking but that the only evidence of drunkenness was his own exculpatory statement.

In Cureton there was evidence that defendant was drinking at the time of the incident, but the record was "devoid of any suggestion that defendant's mental processes were deranged." 218 N.C. 491 at 496, 11 S.E.2d at 471. Holding that absent such testimony there was no duty to instruct on the defense of intoxication, the court said, "there must be some evidence tending to show that the defendant's mental processes were so overcome by the excessive use of liquor or other intoxicants that he had temporarily, at least, lost the capacity to think and plan." Id. at 495, 11 S.E.2d at 471.

We believe that the decision on this point in this case is controlled by the cases which The other state's witness who made reference to defendant's drinking clearly stated that defendant was "not in a drunken condition." Defendant himself presented no evidence at the first phase of the trial which tended to show that he was intoxicated. The only witness presented in his behalf testified that he did not see defendant on the day which the murder occurred. On this evidence we hold that the court was not required to charge the jury upon the defense of intoxication. There was no evidence which showed that defendant's capacity to think and plan was affected by drunkenness.

we have cited and discussed. Admittedly, there is evidence in this record which tends to establish that defendant had been drinking. Lois testified that defendant had been drinking when he came home from work, but that she did not know how much, that he shared a six-pack of beer with two [298 N.C. 14] other men on the afternoon of the murder, and that he had "some beer" at a bar at which they stopped for less than thirty minutes before decedent got into the car with them. She also testified that there was beer in the car when she, her brother, defendant and the victim were riding together, but that she did "not remember if Buck (defendant) was drinking while he was driving." Her testimony fails to show that defendant's mental capacities were affected in any way by the beer which he consumed. To the contrary, her testimony shows that defendant was capable of driving, gave her directions when she drove, led the group on a search through a neighborhood looking for a CB and scanner stolen from his car, and participated in planning a scheme for disposing of the victim's body. Her testimony tends to show that defendant, despite the fact that he had been drinking, was capable of premeditation and deliberation and could form the specific intent to kill which is an essential element of first-degree murder.

By his second assignment of error defendant contends the court improperly required the jury to specify in its verdict the legal theory upon which they found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. He argues that the trial judge, by the manner in which he explained this procedure to the jury, inadvertently expressed an opinion as to defendant's guilt. Further, he argues that instructing on both the theory of premeditation and deliberation and the theory of felony-murder was confusing to the jury.

Before examining the specific charge given the jury, we think it appropriate to restate two principles which clarify the rationale underlying the trial court's decision to require that the jury specify in its verdict the theory upon which they found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. (1) Where the conviction of a defendant for first-degree murder is based upon the felony-murder rule and there is no proof of malice, premeditation and deliberation, proof that the murder was committed in the perpetration of the felony is an "essential and indispensable element in the state's proof," and a verdict of guilty on the underlying felony Cannot provide a basis for additional punishment. State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972). (2) Where the conviction of a defendant for first-degree murder is based upon proof of malice, premeditation and deliberation, proof of an underlying felony although that felony be part of the same continuous transaction is Not an essential element of the state's homicide case, and the defendant May therefore be sentenced upon both the murder conviction and the felony conviction. State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976).

In the case at hand defendant was indicted for murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping. The murder indictment was drawn in the manner prescribed by G.S. 15-144 and would support a guilty verdict based upon the theory of premeditation and deliberation or upon the application of the felony-murder rule. State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E.2d 333, Death sentence vacated, 429 U.S. 809, 97 S.Ct. 46, 50 L.Ed.2d 69 (1976); State v. Moore, 284 N.C. 485, 202 S.E.2d 169 (1974); State v. Thompson, Supra. The evidence at trial was sufficient to justify submission of the charge of first-degree murder under either theory.

There was also sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence of the armed robbery and kidnapping charges. If defendant were found guilty of first-degree murder solely by virtue of the felony-murder rule, the court would be precluded from imposing upon him additional punishment for the underlying felony; if defendant were found guilty of first-degree murder pursuant to premeditation and deliberation, and if the jury also found him guilty on one or more other felony charges, the court would not be so precluded. Thus, it was appropriate that the court determine the basis of the jury's verdict so that defendant might be properly sentenced.

In addition, G.S. 15A-1237 authorizes the use of a written verdict. The jury's verdict "must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and made a part of the record of the case." G.S. 15A-1237(a). This section is intended to aid the trial court in avoiding the taking of verdicts which are flawed by the inadvertent omission of some essential element of the verdict itself. "It is contemplated that the jury will be given a verdict form setting out the permissible verdicts recited by the judge in his instructions." Official Commentary, G.S. 15A-1237. As the court in this case explained to the jury, there were two permissible guilty verdicts to the charge of first-degree murder, guilty by reason of the felony-murder rule or...