State v. Goodwin

• Decision Date: 13 December 1923
• Docket Number: 11375.
• Citation: 120 S.E. 496,127 S.C. 107
• Parties: STATE v. GOODWIN.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

120 S.E. 496

127 S.C. 107

STATE v. GOODWIN.

No. 11375.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

December 13, 1923

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Bamberg County; Robert Lide, Special Judge.

E. L Goodwin was indicted for murder, convicted of manslaughter and he appeals. Reversed, and remanded for new trial.

The order of Circuit Judge S.W. G. Shipp, referred to in the opinion, was as follows:

"This is a motion to change the venue in the above cause from Bamberg county to some other county in the circuit, on the ground that defendant cannot obtain a fair trial in Bamberg county.

Upon considering the affidavits for and against the motion, I am of the opinion that I should overrule the motion.

The motion papers are general in terms, and amount to this That about ten citizens believe that the defendant cannot obtain a fair trial in Bamberg county, and are informed that there were threats of lynching at the time of the homicide some months since, while a much greater number of citizens believe that defendant can obtain a fair trial in said county.

I do not think that I would be justified in ordering a change of venue on the showing made in the face of the affidavits contra.

Ordered, that the motion be, and the same is, refused."

That part of the charge to the jury referred to in the opinion was as follows:

"Now, gentlemen, there may be a confession of a crime that is charged against a person, and if that confession is made voluntarily, and without offer of reward, or compulsion or under duress, it may be taken as evidence against him by the jury. There is also recognized such a thing as an implied confession or an acquiescence on the part of a person accused of crime, from which the jury may imply a confession. If a party hears a crime charged against himself, and made in his presence, and says nothing, it is for the jury to determine what force should be given to the silence of the accused. I do not charge you that there is evidence against the accused, but do charge you this is a circumstance which the jury may consider when they go into a consideration of the case or the charges with which the accused is confronted.

Now, I am going to give you the rule as laid down in law to govern your consideration of a matter of this kind, and to caution you as to the care that should be exercised by you in its consideration. The rule on the subject of acquiescence in the statements made by another in the presence of the defendant is thus stated; 'Admissions may also be implied from the acquiescence of the party. But acquiescence,

to have the effect of an admission, must exhibit some act of the mind, and amount to voluntary demeanor or conduct of the party. And whether it is acquiescence in the conduct or in the language of others, it must plainly appear that such conduct was fully known, or the language fully understood by the party, before any inference can be drawn from his passiveness or silence. The circumstances, too, must be not only such as afforded him an opportunity to act or speak, but such, also, as would properly and naturally call for some action or reply, from men similarly situated.'

Now, I charge you, gentlemen, that such testimony must be considered by you with caution. You must consider whether under the circumstances the accused would reasonably be expected to speak out. You must consider the attitude of his mind, and all of the circumstances surrounding a transaction of this kind, whether under all of the circumstances he would reasonably be expected to speak out and deny the charge, whether or not his act and conduct was a voluntary act of the mind, or would be calculated, or from which the jury might reasonably infer, an acquiescence and implied confession. It is only a circumstance, as I have stated, that may be considered by the jury. The weight of the testimony and the force you will give to testimony of this kind is a matter entirely for the consideration of the jury. The defendant in this case, as in all cases, must be measured by the rule of reason: What should reasonably be expected of him? What you would reasonably expect his actions and attitude to be." R. M. Jefferies, of Walterboro, for appellant.

Solicitor R. L. Gunter, of Aiken, and J. Wesley Crum, of Bamberg, for the State.

COTHRAN J.

The defendant was tried upon an indictment charging him with the murder of Jacob Carter, at the latter's home in Bamberg county, on June 24, 1921. The trial was had at Bamberg before Hon. Robert Lide, special judge, at a term not stated in the record for appeal, and resulted in a verdict of manslaughter, upon which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for 12 years.

The evidence for the state was largely, if not wholly, circumstantial. The defendant relied upon his plea of not guilty and upon the special plea of alibi.

The setting of the homicide is as follows:

The deceased, Jacob Carter, was an old man, over 70 years of age, a widower, living with his stepdaughter, Ella Goodwin, a first cousin of the defendant. The home of the deceased was some 300 yards from that of the defendant, who had married the widow of his only son. The families visited intimately, and were apparently upon friendly terms until shortly before the homicide, at which time there was a disagreement as to a sum of money which Goodwin claimed was due to his wife by Carter. Goodwin was familiar with the household surroundings and with the habits of Carter. The financial disagreement appears to have engendered at least unpleasant relations between Goodwin and Carter.

At some time in the afternoon of June 24, 1921, between the hours of 3 and 4 o'clock, the deceased was at his home alone; his stepdaughter, Ella Goodwin, being temporarily away from home. Two gunshots were heard in the direction of Carter's home by certain neighbors in hearing distance. The shots were some seconds apart, about long enough for a person with a single-barreled breech-loading shotgun to fire, extract the shell, insert another, and fire again. Shortly after the shots were fired, a neighbor by the name of Du Bois was passing through Carter's yard upon a personal mission. He saw the body of a man lying at the wood pile, but did not go near it, possibly associating the presence of the body with the shots that had been heard, and hurried off to give the alarm. When others arrived, it was discovered that the body was that of Carter and that two loads of buckshot had been fired into his back.

It will serve no useful purpose to review the evidence in the case which the state contends connects the defendant with the homicide. On the contrary, in the view which the court takes of the appeal, such review may prejudice the defendant upon a second trial. It is sufficient to say that the court...