State v. Gorgol, A14-0874
| Decision Date | 13 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | A14-0874 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Charles Edward Gorgol, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Affirmed
Clay County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Johnathan R. Judd, Assistant County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Bridget Sabo, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
W. Anders Folk, Ruth Shnider, Stinson Leonard Street, LLP, Special Assistant Public Defenders, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Smith, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
We affirm the district court's denial of appellant Charles Gorgol's suppression motion because the district court did not clearly err by finding that Gorgol voluntarily opened his door to talk to police. In addition, the district court did not plainly err by admitting the recording of Gorgol's statements to police in violation of Miranda when defense counsel failed to object. And Gorgol did not meet his burden on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because he did not demonstrate that the erroneously admitted statements affected the verdict.
On August 24, 2013, a toll-booth operator reported a possibly impaired driver to Moorhead police. The toll-booth operator stated that the driver almost fell out of his car while attempting to pay the toll, had slurred speech, and nearly hit a portable toilet as he drove away. The toll-booth operator gave a description of the driver and the car to police. Around 11:50 p.m., officers were dispatched to the toll bridge and took a statement from the operator, which included the make and license plate of the driver's car.
The officers proceeded to the address where the car was registered, arriving approximately 10 minutes later, around midnight. The address was an apartment complex, at which the officers found a car matching the description and plate information given by the toll-booth operator. One officer noted that he had been at the apartment complex before on a domestic-dispute call. As the officers approached the apartmentcomplex, they heard a male voice shouting inside the apartment. The man was loudly yelling, "[Y]ou're a stupid bitch," and "things of that nature" at another person inside.
An officer knocked on the door of the apartment. After a woman asked, "Who is it?," the officer responded, "Police Department." When there was no further response, the officer knocked and identified himself again. Then, a male asked, "What do you want?" The officer replied, "Open the door so we can talk with [you]." Following an inaudible reply, the officer repeated himself. Then, a person later identified as Gorgol opened the door.
The officers asked Gorgol if they could come in, if he would step outside the apartment, or if they could talk to other people in the home. Gorgol denied all the officers' requests. The officers immediately noticed indicia of intoxication, including the odor of alcoholic beverage on his breath, bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and poor balance. Gorgol also admitted that he was intoxicated. In addition, Gorgol matched the description given by the toll-booth operator and was the only male in the apartment. The officers arrested Gorgol on suspicion of driving while impaired.
After transporting Gorgol to the county jail, the arresting officer read him the implied-consent advisory. During the reading of the advisory, Gorgol admitted that he was drunk and that he had talked to the toll-booth operator earlier, but denied that he had been driving when he was drunk. Gorgol eventually agreed to take a breath test, so another officer administered the test. During the test, Gorgol complained that the arresting officer had arrested him when he was not actually driving. The testing officer then asked Gorgol to "tell [him] what happened" because he was the arresting officer'ssupervisor. Gorgol stated that he had been drinking at a friend's house with his girlfriend, who owned the car, but that she had driven him home. The breath test measured Gorgol's alcohol concentration at .19.
The state charged Gorgol with two counts of felony driving while impaired (DWI) for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and for having an alcohol concentration of at least .08 within two hours of operating a motor vehicle. At trial, the district court denied Gorgol's motion to suppress evidence resulting from an unreasonable search or seizure because it found, based on a recording of the interaction, that Gorgol voluntarily opened his door to talk to the police. In addition, the district court admitted a recording of Gorgol being read the implied-consent advisory and taking the breath test. Gorgol did not object to the admission of the implied-consent-advisory recording.
A jury found Gorgol guilty on both counts.
Gorgol first argues that he was seized when he opened the door to his home and that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress all evidence derived from his seizure. The district court found that Gorgol voluntarily opened his door when he knew the police were outside and wanted to talk to him. Gorgol argues that he was merely acquiescing to a police command.
When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error, State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 787(Minn. 2007), and its decision whether to suppress the evidence as a matter of law, State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A warrantless seizure in a home is per se unreasonable absent an exception to the warrant requirement. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 589-90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380, 1381-82 (1980). Any evidence acquired as a result of an unconstitutional seizure must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416 (1963); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 370 (Minn. 2004). A warrantless seizure that was "initiated at the threshold of a suspect's residence" is not prohibited "if the suspect voluntarily opens the door." State v. Howard, 373 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Minn. 1985). But an encounter is not voluntary if police command a suspect to talk with them in such a way that a reasonable person would feel that the command cannot be refused. State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1994) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-36, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991)).
"The test [for voluntary consent] is the totality of the circumstances." Id. "[W]e will defer to the findings of the district court on the voluntariness of the consent, unless those findings are clearly erroneous." State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 853 (Minn. 2011). "The district court's findings are clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred." Id. at 853-54. Although the officer phrased it as an imperative, the district court found that the officer did not issue a command under color of authority. We agree. Whileinvestigating a DWI report, it is expected that officers would approach people who are near the location where a reported car is found. In this instance, the officers did not approach with emergency lights on. Nor did they rouse the residents from sleep, given that the officers could hear yelling before they knocked. Rather, after briefly knocking on the door and responding to the occupants' questions about their intentions, the officer requested to speak with the people inside the apartment. Nothing in the record indicates that the request to open the door was made in a manner other than a calm tone or that it was louder than necessary to be heard through the apartment door.
Throughout the encounter, Gorgol's tone and demeanor were not that of a person acquiescing to authority. First, Gorgol waited until his questions about the officer's intentions were answered before opening the door, demonstrating that he did not feel an immediate need to comply with the officer's request. Second, he refused the officer's requests to come inside or to have him step outside, showing that he understood his right to refuse cooperation and intended to set limits on the encounter. Finally, his responses to questions and general demeanor did not support a finding of a willingness to submit to police authority.
The dissent states that circumstances after Gorgol opened the door "are not relevant to a determination of whether his initial consent was freely and voluntarily given." We disagree because Gorgol demonstrated no compulsion to comply with the officers' requests. The officers acted to arrest Gorgol only after they identified Gorgol as the driver of the vehicle observed at the toll booth and noticed indicia of intoxication. Itis only at that point that the officers acted under the color of authority. These additional factors are what justified Gorgol's arrest after he opened the door.
Given the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not clearly err, and we defer to its finding of consent. Because we affirm the district court's finding of consent, we do not reach the issue of whether exigent circumstances existed that would have justified a warrantless seizure.
Gorgol next argues that the district court erred by admitting the full implied-consent-advisory recording, including statements made during the breath test. Gorgol contends that the officers interrogated him at various points during the recording, arguing that the officers should have known that their...
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