State v. Davis

• Decision Date: 30 December 1940
• Docket Number: 28075.
• Citation: 108 P.2d 641,6 Wn.2d 696
• Parties: STATE v. DAVIS.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

108 P.2d 641

6 Wn.2d 696

STATE v. DAVIS.

No. 28075.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

December 30, 1940

Denzel Davis, alias W. A. Redding, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

BLAKE C.J., dissenting.

In first degree murder prosecution, evidence afforded ample basis for finding by jury, beyond reasonable doubt, that the killing was premeditated and constituted murder in first degree, and justified trial court's refusal to withdraw from jury charge of first degree murder.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; William J. Wilkins, judge.

Jacob Kalina, of Seattle, for appellant.

B. Gray Warner, Charles C. Ralls, and John A. Burns, all of Seattle for respondent.

BEALS Justice.

For some time prior to the month of March, 1940 Denzel Davis had been living with his mother, Harriet Redding, in her home on Stone avenue, just north of the limits of the city of Seattle. He was married, but for two months or so had been separated from his wife, and was living with his mother, who supported him. Davis was not employed, and had no income save what his mother gave him. Mrs. Redding was employed at a department store in Seattle, and supplemented her income by dressmaking.

In 1931, Davis, because of minor offenses, including petty thieving, was sent to an institution for delinquent boys. Later he enlisted in the army, and deserted. It is evident that Davis and his mother had several arguments over money and concerning Denzel's wife, of whom Mrs. Redding disapproved, in the course of which arguments Davis used extremely bad language, his attitude causing his mother much sorrow. March 1, 1940, Davis induced a merchant to cash a check for twenty dollars, to which he had forged his mother's name. Mrs. Redding later made this check good, but told her son that she would not again help out of such a situation. The evening of Sunday, March 17th, Davis and his mother had some disagreement, which continued over until Monday morning, when the argument was continued. In the course of the dispute, Davis picked up a hammer and struck his mother a hard blow on the back of her head. Mrs. Redding fell on her back, groaning. Davis then picked up an ice pick and stabbed her. Mrs. Redding continued groaning, and davis stabbed her seventeen times with the ice pick. Mrs. Redding continued to groan, and Davis tied two wire cords and a chain around her neck. He then placed his mother in a recess under a drain board, nailing the door shut. He then, with his shirt, cleaned up the blood from the floor, putting the garment in the soiled clothes basket in the bedroom closet. He left the apartment, after taking what money he found in his mother's purse, together with her watch and a ring which he took from her finger. He went down town and joined his wife at the quarters she was occupying.

During the day he pawned his mother's ring with one pawnbroker and her watch with another. During the afternoon Davis and his wife engaged a room at a down town hotel, and later went to a theater and visited a beer parlor. On Tuesday he told his wife that he had killed his mother, and that he would surrender himself to the police. By this time the murder had been discovered, and Davis knew that he was wanted as a suspect. Instead of surrendering himself, he slept Tuesday night in a basement in a vacant house. Wednesday morning he secreted himself in the basement of a house next door, where he remained until Saturday morning, when he went upstairs to the room of a friend, who was then absent. While there, hearing footsteps approaching, he hid in a closet, where he was found by deputy sheriffs who were searching for him. Davis was taken to the sheriff's office, where he made a full confession.

An information was filed, charging Denzel Davis, alias W. A. Redding, with murder in the first degree, and when arraigned Davis entered a plea of guilty. The court appointed counsel for Davis, he having none, and his counsel, on Davis' behalf, entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and mental irresponsibility. It was also stated in the plea that the insanity and mental irresponsibility still existed. A trial was necessary under Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2116, which reads as follows: 'If, on the arraignment of anyperson, he shall plead guilty, if the offense charged be not murder, the court shall, in its discretion, hear testimony, and determine the amount and kind of punishment to be inflicted; but if the defendant plead guilty to a charge of murder, a jury shall be impaneled to hear testimony, and determine the degree of murder and the punishment therefor.'

The case was called for trial May 6th, and during argument between counsel, Davis again stated that he was guilty of the charge. Davis was put on trial Before a jury upon his own plea of guilty, and upon the plea of insanity interposed by his counsel. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, recommending that the death sentence be imposed. From a judgment of guilty and a sentence of death, an appeal has been taken to this court.

Error is assigned upon a portion of the opening statement of the prosecution attorney, to the effect that appellant had forged his mother's name to a check, appellant also assigning error upon the admission, over his objection, of testimony concerning this matter. Appellant also complains of the refusal of the trial court to admit in evidence, on appellant's offer, a written report made by an alienist who testified for the state, appellant having sought to introduce the report. Error is also assigned upon the denial by the trial court of appellant's motion, made at the conclusion of the state's case, to reduce the charge from first to second degree murder. Appellant also assigns error upon the giving of two instructions, to which he excepted, and upon the court's refusal to give several instructions which appellant requested. Finally, appellant assigns error upon the denial of his motions for a new trial and for arrest of judgment.

In his opening argument, the attorney for the state told the jury that appellant had forged his mother's name to a check and cashed the same, to which statement appellant excepted. In the course of the state's case, evidence was offered concerning this matter, which evidence was admitted over appellant's objections. The testimony was to the effect that, March 1st, appellant had signed his mother's name to a check for twenty dollars; that appellant had cashed the check with a neighboring merchant; and that his mother had later repaid the merchant and taken up the check. Appellant argues that this evidence was erroneously admitted over his objection, as constituting evidence of a separate crime having no bearing upon the murder charge. Appellant's assignments of error based upon the prosecuting attorney's opening statement, and the claim of error in permitting, over appellant's objection, the introduction of evidence concerning the check, will be discussed together. If the evidence was properly admitted, it was right for the attorney for the state to refer to the matter in his opening statement. In this connection, appellant cites several of our decisions.

In the case of State v. O'Donnell, 191 Wash. 511, 71 P.2d 571, the attorney for the state told the jury that the evidence would show that the defendants had previously been convicted of burglary and robbery. From the statement made it appeared that the prior convictions of the defendants were for offenses nowise connected with the pending charge. The statement was held reversible error.

In the case of State v. Barton, 198 Wash. 268, 88 P.2d 385, this court approved the general rule that in a criminal trial, evidence of other crimes should not be admitted as part of the state's case in chief, and in the case of State v. Devlin, 145 Wash. 44, 258 P. 826, the admission of testimony that the defendant's picture was in the 'rogue's gallery' was held erroneous.

In the case at bar, it was necessary that a trial be had, notwithstanding appellant's plea of guilty, in order that the degree of murder might be determined by a jury. Appellant had made a confession, and had pleaded guilty, but the state was bound by neither, nor limited in the method of proving its case. Maddox v. State, 108 Neb. 809, 189 N.W. 398; People v. Parisi, 190 Cal. 542, 213 P. 968; Reeves v. State, 116 Tex.Cr.R. 451, 32 S.W.2d 471; Curtis v. State, 119 Tex.Cr.R. 398, 46 S.W.2d 303.

In making its case, the state was entitled to introduce any evidence which was competent, relevant and material to the issue to be determined by jury. That a portion of the evidence so offered might incidentally tend to show that appellant had been guilty of some other and separate offense is unimportant if the evidence tended to support the state's contention in the case being tried, and was admissible under the general rules of evidence. State v. Thuna, 59 Wash. 689, 109 P. 331, 111 P. 768, 140 Am.St.Rep. 902; State v. Macleod, 78 Wash. 175, 138 P. 648.

In the case of State v. Gottfreedson, 24 Wash. 398, 64 P 523, 524, this court said: 'The general rule is well established that proof of the commission of a separate and distinct crime will not be admitted for the purpose of aiding the conviction of defendant for the crime charged. There are exceptions, however, to this general rule, as where the testimony shows a connection between the transaction under investigation and some other transaction, and where they are so interwoven that the omission of the testimony in relation to the other crime would detract something from the testimony which the state would have a right to introduce as tending to show the commission of the crime charged by the defendant, * * * or where the testimony tending to show...