State v. Goulette

• Decision Date: 09 September 1977
• Docket Number: No. 45831,45831
• Citation: 258 N.W.2d 758
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Dale GOULETTE, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 758

258 N.W.2d 758

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Dale GOULETTE, Appellant.

No. 45831.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 9, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

A trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused denies his guilt if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that the evidence would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Robert E. Oliphant, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, John O. Sonsteng, County Atty., H. Richard Hopper, Asst. County Atty., Hastings, for respondent.

Heard before SHERAN, C. J., and ROGOSHESKE, PETERSON, KELLY, SCOTT and PLUNKETT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

ROGOSHESKE, Justice.

Defendant, under indictment for first-degree murder, entered a negotiated plea of guilty to a reduced charge of second-degree murder and was sentenced by the trial court to a maximum term of 25 years in prison. The central issue on this appeal by defendant from judgment of conviction is under what circumstances a trial court properly may accept a guilty plea when the plea is accompanied by a claim of innocence. Relying upon North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), we hold that a trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused claims he is innocent if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered. In this case, we believe that the record shows there was enough evidence to support a finding that defendant was guilty of at least second-degree murder, and that defendant's decision to make that plea rather than face trial on the first-degree murder charge was an intelligent and voluntary choice based upon the advice of counsel and a full understanding of the options. Accordingly, we affirm.

This case had its genesis on July 28, 1974, when Michael Riskin, while in defendant's presence, shot and killed a mutual acquaintance of theirs, Glyn Hobbs, in Apple Valley, Dakota County. Following the arrest of Riskin and defendant, the grand jury of Dakota County indicted Riskin for first-degree murder and defendant as an accessory to first-degree murder. The precise issue with which we are concerned arose when defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to a reduced charge of second-degree murder. At the hearing on the acceptance of that plea, defendant denied any foreknowledge of the shooting and denied any intent to assist Riskin in it, but nonetheless expressed a desire to plead guilty to second-degree murder because of the strength of the prosecution's case and the possibility that if he went to trial he might be convicted of first-degree murder and receive a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. The factual basis offered in support of defendant's plea consisted of a recitation by defense counsel, in summary form, of some of the key evidence which the prosecutor would have offered in an attempt to prove first-degree murder if the case had gone to trial.

In rejecting defendant's contention that the acceptance of his plea was inappropriate under the circumstances, we rely primarily on North Carolina v. Alford, supra, in which the Supreme Court held that a trial court did not commit Federal constitutional error in accepting a guilty plea to second-degree murder by a state criminal defendant indicted for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Even though defendant in that case professed his innocence when he entered his plea, there was a strong factual basis for the plea, and the defendant's plea was intelligent and voluntary and made with understanding of his rights and of the nature and elements of the charge.

As the court pointed out in Alford, a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea is normally justified by the defendant's admission of guilt and by the defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of a trial. Since an admission of guilt is central to the plea of guilty, the argument can be made that a trial court should not be permitted to accept a guilty plea when the accused accompanies his plea with a denial of guilt or with statements inconsistent with guilt. Perhaps the key consideration for a trial court faced with a decision whether to accept a guilty plea is whether the plea is intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily made. When a defendant pleads guilty but at the same time denies that he is in fact guilty, the rationality of the defendant's decision is immediately called into question, for we must assume that normally persons who believe they are innocent of criminal charges do not plead guilty to those charges.

Nevertheless, as the Alford case demonstrates, there are situations where an accused's decision to plead guilty is a rational decision even though the accused for some reason cannot bring himself to admit his guilt. Thus, in Alford the accused was faced with trial on a charge of first-degree murder, and the...