State v. Graham
| Decision Date | 03 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | COA21-99 |
| Citation | 872 S.E.2d 573 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina, v. Marquis Julius GRAHAM, Defendant. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General John P. Barkley, for the State.
Dylan J.C. Buffum, for Defendant.
¶ 1 Defendant Marquis Julius Graham appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury's verdict finding him guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury that there was sufficient evidence to infer that Defendant intentionally injured the victim; (2) allowing the State to examine Defendant about privileged communications between Defendant and his counsel; and (3) denying Defendant's motion to compel the State to disclose the theory upon which it sought to convict Defendant of first-degree murder. After review, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
¶ 2 Defendant lived with his girlfriend, Ayanha Barnett, and her two sons at the time of the alleged murder. On the morning of 5 November 2017, Defendant woke up and travelled to a convenience store before returning home to smoke a cigar outside. Defendant returned to bed to lie down after he finished smoking. Meanwhile, Ms. Barnett was preparing to leave for an appointment in Charlotte. After Ms. Barnett informed Defendant that she was leaving for her appointment, Defendant walked her to the door before returning to bed and falling asleep. Ms. Barnett testified that at the time she left for her appointment, the two children were still asleep in their room.
¶ 3 Defendant testified that he slept for approximately two more hours after Ms. Barnett left for her appointment. After he woke up, Defendant watched some television before one of Ms. Barnett's sons, Cayden, asked Defendant to make him breakfast. Defendant prepared cereal for Cayden. After Cayden finished his breakfast, he returned to his room before telling Defendant that his brother, Kye, would not wake up to play with him. Defendant testified that he then entered the boys’ bedroom and found Kye lying on the bed "pale in his face." Defendant stated that when he attempted to speak to Kye, Kye "did not respond," causing Defendant to "panic" and call Ms. Barnett.
¶ 4 Defendant called Ms. Barnett, and she advised Defendant to give Kye his medicine. Defendant told Ms. Barnett that she needed to return home so that they could take Kye to the doctor. When Ms. Barnett returned home, Defendant met her outside with Kye and Cayden, and they all travelled to the hospital together. Kye remained unresponsive.
¶ 5 On 13 November 2017, a Gaston County grand jury returned a short form indictment charging Defendant with first-degree murder. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel, requesting that the court compel the State to disclose the theory by which it intended to convict Defendant of first-degree murder. Defendant's motion was denied.
¶ 6 During the jury charge conference, the State announced that it sought to convict Defendant under both a theory of premeditation and deliberation and felony murder. The trial court also instructed the jury that "[w]hen an adult has exclusive custody of a child for a period of time during which that child suffers injuries that are neither self-inflicted nor accidental, there is sufficient evidence to create an inference that the adult intentionally inflicted those injuries."
¶ 7 On 19 February 2020, the jury found Defendant guilty of felony murder but not guilty of premeditated and deliberate murder. Defendant provided oral notice of appeal in open court.
¶ 8 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury that there was sufficient evidence to infer that Defendant intentionally injured the victim; (2) allowing the State to examine Defendant about privileged communications between Defendant and his counsel; and (3) denying Defendant's motion to compel the State to disclose the theory upon which it sought to convict Defendant of first-degree murder. We conclude that Defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
¶ 9 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that "[w]hen an adult has exclusive custody of a child for a period of time during which that child suffers injuries that are neither self-inflicted nor accidental, there is sufficient evidence to create an inference that the adult intentionally inflicted those injuries." Defendant contends that this language impermissibly "created a ‘mandatory presumption’ " that Defendant intentionally injured Kye. We disagree.
¶ 10 We review "the trial court's decisions regarding jury instructions" de novo. State v. Osorio , 196 N.C. App. 458, 466, 675 S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009). "Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal."
State v. Williams , 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
[W]e review jury instructions contextually and in [their] entirety. The charge will be held to be sufficient if it presents the law of the case in such a manner as to leave no reasonable cause to believe the jury was misled or misinformed. Under such a standard of review, it is not enough for the appealing party to show that error occurred in the jury instructions; rather, it must be demonstrated that such error was likely, in light of the entire charge, to mislead the jury.
State v. Ballard , 193 N.C. App. 551, 559–60, 668 S.E.2d 78, 83 (2008) (citations omitted).
A presumption, or deductive device, is a legal mechanism that allows or requires the factfinder to assume the existence of a fact when proof of other facts is shown. The fact that must be proved is called the basic fact; the fact that may or must be assumed upon proof of the basic fact is the presumed fact. ... If the words of instruction describe an inference which must be drawn upon proof of basic facts, then the presumption is mandatory in nature. Mandatory presumptions which conclusively prejudge the existence of an elemental issue or actually shift to [the] defendant the burden to disprove the existence of an elemental fact violate the Due Process Clause.
State v. Reynolds , 307 N.C. 184, 188–89, 297 S.E.2d 532, 535 (1982) (citations omitted).
¶ 11 If, "in the absence of further elaboration by the trial judge, a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction as either ‘an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption’ or ‘a direction to find intent upon proof of the defendant's voluntary actions[,]’ " then the instruction provides a mandatory presumption. State v. White , 300 N.C. 494, 506, 268 S.E.2d 481, 488–89 (1980) (citation omitted).
¶ 12 Here, the trial judge instructed the jury that "[w]hen an adult has exclusive custody of a child for a period of time during which that child suffers injuries that are neither self-inflicted nor accidental, there is sufficient evidence to create an inference that the adult intentionally inflicted those injuries." However, this instruction must be viewed not in isolation, but "in light of the entire charge." Ballard , 193 N.C. App. at 559–60, 668 S.E.2d at 83 (citations omitted). The trial judge also instructed the jury that it was "the sole judge[ ] of the weight to be given to any evidence" and stated, "If you decide certain evidence is believable, you must determine the importance of that evidence in light of all other believable evidence."
¶ 13 The instruction was also provided in the greater context of the law regarding intent to inflict serious injury and the distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence. The court explained that "intent is a mental attitude that is seldom, if ever, provable by direct evidence." The trial judge then correctly instructed the jury that "[w]hen an adult has exclusive custody of a child for a period of time during which that child suffers injuries that are neither self-inflicted nor accidental, there is sufficient evidence to create an inference that the adult intentionally inflicted those injuries." Indeed, this is sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer intent to inflict serious injury, as demonstrated by numerous cases regarding the sufficiency of the State's evidence employing this exact same language. See, e.g., State v. Liberato , 156 N.C. App. 182, 186, 576 S.E.2d 118, 120–21 (2003) ( " ; State v. Perry , 229 N.C. App. 304, 319, 750 S.E.2d 521, 532–33 (2013) (citations omitted).
¶ 14 Lastly, the phrase "sufficient to create an inference" cannot reasonably be interpreted as meaning that the basic facts, if proven, "necessarily create an inference" of intent. Defendant has provided no basis to conclude that the lay members of the jury did not understand the meaning of the word "sufficient" as it is commonly understood. Viewing the jury instruction "contextually and in its entirety[,]" we hold that the instruction provides "no reasonable cause to believe the jury was misled or misinformed" by the instruction. Ballard , 193 N.C. App. at 559–60, 668 S.E.2d at 83 (citations omitted).
¶ 15 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred "when it allowed the State to examine [Defendant] about privileged communications with counsel." Although the trial court erred by allowing questions probing the substance of Defendant's communications with counsel, we hold that Defendant has not shown prejudice sufficient to warrant a new trial.
¶ 16 The following colloquy occurred during the...
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