State v. Grays
| Docket Number | 111600 |
| Decision Date | 20 July 2023 |
| Citation | 2023 Ohio 2482 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATRON GRAYS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-21-663463-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Carl M. Felice and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
The Law Office of Jaye M. Schlachet and Eric M. Levy, for appellant.
EN BANC
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
{¶ 1} Pursuant to App.R. 26, LocApp.R. 26, and McFadden v. Cleveland State Univ., 120 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-4914, 896 N.E.2d 672, this court sua sponte determined that State v. Grays, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111600, 2023-Ohio-221 conflicts with State v. Bobo, 2022-Ohio-3555, 198 N.E.3d 580 (8th Dist.), on a dispositive point of controlling authority. En banc review is necessary to maintain harmony in the law of this district. See, e.g., Midland Funding L.L.C. v. Hottenroth, 2014-Ohio-5680, 26 N.E.3d 269 ¶ 1 (8th Dist.) ().
{¶ 2} It is well established that "[a] criminal defendant's choice to enter a plea of guilty or no contest is a serious decision." State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25. Thus, due process requires that a defendant's plea be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. State v Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 10 (lead opinion), citing Clark at ¶ 25. "'Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.'" State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996).
{¶ 3} Crim.R. 11 was adopted in 1973 in order to facilitate a more accurate determination of the voluntariness of a defendant's plea by ensuring an adequate record for review. State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 167-168, 331 N.E.2d 411 (1975); State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92-93, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). The rule prescribes the procedure for accepting pleas of guilty or no contest and requires the trial court to engage the defendant in a detailed colloquy to ensure the "criminal defendant is fully informed of his or her rights and understands the consequences of his or her guilty plea." Barker at ¶ 10.
State v. Ealom, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91455, 2009-Ohio-1365, ¶ 19. Thus, whether the trial court made an erroneous statement of law during its Crim.R. 11 colloquy is relevant to the determination of whether a criminal defendant's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 104078 and 104849, 2017-Ohio-2650, ¶ 15, State v. Silvers, 181 Ohio App.3d 26, 2009-Ohio-687, 907 N.E.2d 805 (2d Dist.); State v. Byrd, 178 Ohio App.3d 646, 2008-Ohio-5515, 899 N.E.2d 1033 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 5} Since the adoption of the Reagan Tokes Law, effective March 22, 2019, common pleas courts have routinely addressed the implications of the new sentencing scheme prior to accepting a criminal defendant's plea. Upon explaining the nature of the indefinite-sentencing calculation and its relevance to the defendant's understanding of the "maximum penalty involved," courts have consistently gone on to describe the offender's ability to reduce his or her minimum prison term by exhibiting "exceptional conduct while incarcerated" or demonstrating an "adjustment to incarceration." Relevant to this en banc decision, such an advisement was provided to the criminal defendants in Bobo and Grays.
{¶ 6} The criminal defendants in Bobo and Grays were each convicted of second-degree felonies that were subject to the Reagan Tokes Law and carried mandatory prison terms pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(4) and (5), respectively. During each Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the defendants were sufficiently advised of the effects of their guilty pleas, the rights they would be waiving by entering a guilty plea, and the maximum penalties associated with their individual felony offenses. In each instance, the court clarified that Bobo and Grays were required to serve a mandatory term of imprisonment based on the nature of their offenses. Bobo and Grays were also provided a detailed explanation of the indefinite-sentencing scheme implemented by the Reagan Tokes Law, including the rebuttable presumption that they would be released upon the expiration of the minimum term. Finally, Bobo and Grays were advised that they were entitled to earn a reduction on the minimum term in increments of 5 to 15 percent if they demonstrated exceptional conduct or an adjustment to incarceration.
{¶ 7} Following sentencing in each case, Bobo and Grays filed direct appeals, arguing, among other things, that their pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made because the trial court inaccurately advised them that they were entitled to a reduction of their mandatory prison terms for exceptional conduct or an adjustment to incarceration. Each defendant maintained that but for the trial court's erroneous advisement, they would not have entered their guilty pleas.
{¶ 8} Following a careful examination of the record in each case, this court affirmed Bobo's and Grays' convictions, generally finding that their pleas were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Significantly, however, the panels reached opposing legal conclusions regarding the novel issue of whether the trial court erroneously advised the defendants that they were eligible for certain sentencing reductions on their mandatory terms of imprisonment. In Bobo, for instance, this court found the trial court erred "when it advised Bobo that he could earn credit for good behavior to reduce his mandatory prison term * * *." Bobo at ¶ 24. Nevertheless, the Bobo panel concluded that Bobo was not prejudiced by the trial court's incorrect statement of law under the specific circumstances presented in that case.
{¶ 9} In contrast, the Grays panel concluded that the identical advisement did not constitute a misstatement of law. The panel clarified that a defendant who is subject to an indefinite sentence is eligible for the sentencing reductions contemplated under the Reagan Tokes statute, R.C. 2967.271(F)(1), so long as the offender has committed a nonlife, first- or second-degree felony that is not a sexually-oriented offense. The panel determined that this is true even though the defendant is subject to a mandatory prison term, and therefore, is not eligible for judicial release, earned credit, "or any other provision of R.C. Chapter 2967." Grays at ¶ 27, 32.
{¶10} As previously discussed, the advisement debated in Bobo and Grays has been commonly given to criminal defendants during Crim.R. 11 colloquies involving first- or second-degree felony offenses since the enactment of the Reagan Tokes Law. The legality of such an advisement, if given, is undoubtedly a repeatable legal issue that has significant liberty implications on those defendants who are pleading or have already pleaded guilty to first- or second-degree felony offenses that carry mandatory prison terms since March 22, 2019. It is therefore paramount to resolve any ambiguity created by the opposing legal conclusions reached in Bobo and Grays. Accordingly, we must resolve the following straightforward question of law in this en banc decision:
Does a trial court err during a Crim.R. 11 colloquy by advising a defendant, who is subject to an indefinite prison term under the Reagan Tokes Law, that he or she may earn a reduction on his or her minimum prison term for exceptional conduct or an adjustment to incarceration when the defendant is required to serve a mandatory prison term pursuant to RC. 2929.13(F)?
{¶11} To answer this dispositive issue of law, we must carefully examine the relevant statutory provisions governing the Reagan Tokes Law and mandatory prison terms.
De novo review applies to questions of statutory interpretation. Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 N.E.2d 342, ¶ 8. A court's main objective is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent. State ex rel Solomon v. Police & Firemen's Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486 (1995). "The question is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact." Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of...
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