State v. Great Northern Railway Company
| Decision Date | 11 June 1915 |
| Docket Number | 19,342 - (19) |
| Citation | 153 N.W. 247,130 Minn. 57 |
| Parties | STATE v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Petition on Rearguement Denied June 28, 1915
From an order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission requiring the Great Northern Railway Co. to operate and maintain its passenger trains Nos. 33 and 34 upon Sunday between Duluth and East Grand Forks, the Great Northern Railway Co. appealed to the district court for Ramsey county. The appeal was heard before Dickson, J., who made findings and set aside the order of the commission. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment, the state appealed. Affirmed.
Judicial question.
1. The question of whether an order of the State Railroad and Warehouse Commission is reasonable is a judicial question.
Order of railroad commission -- review by district court.
2. Under our statute the district court on appeal from an order of the commission does not put itself in the place of the commission and substitute its findings for those of the commission, nor does it set aside such an order on its own conception of its wisdom. The court reviews the order only so far as to determine whether or not it is unlawful and unreasonable.
Test of unreasonable order.
3. There is no test of reasonableness that will fit all cases but an order is unreasonable if contrary to Federal or state Constitution or laws, or if beyond the power of the commission, or if based on mistake of law, or if without evidence to support it, or if so arbitrary as to be beyond the exercise of reasonable discretion and judgment.
Test of unreasonable order.
4. Pecuniary loss or profit to the carrier is important, but not the only criterion. The question of reasonableness is to be determined by a consideration of the interests both of the carrier and of the public.
Operation of passenger trains on Sunday.
5. The order of the commission reviewed in this case is an order compelling the operation of a Sunday local day passenger train. The trial court declined to pass upon the question of pecuniary loss or profit. The order of the commission being by statute prima facie reasonable, and the burden being on the appellant upon all issues raised by the appeal, we are obliged to assume that the order did not impose a financial burden, but,
Operation of passenger trains on Sunday -- trial court sustained.
6. The compulsion of Sunday labor and of the operation of Sunday local passenger trains is contrary to the legislative policy of the state, and, while under some circumstances the operation of Sunday trains may be made compulsory, under the facts of this case the judgment of the trial court holding this order to be unreasonable and void must be sustained.
Lyndon A. Smith, Attorney General, and Alonzo J. Edgerton, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
M. L. Countryman and A. L. Janes, for respondent.
For some years past the defendant railroad company has operated a line of railroad between Grand Forks, North Dakota, and Duluth, Minnesota. Up to November 22, 1914, it operated upon that line, daily including Sunday, two trains each way, one a day train and the other a night train. On the day last mentioned the defendant discontinued the operation of its Sunday day trains on this line, leaving all week day trains and the Sunday night trains operated as theretofore. The state Railroad and Warehouse Commission, after hearing, ordered the Sunday day trains restored. Defendant appealed to the district court. That court, after trial, found that the order of the commission restoring the Sunday trains was "unlawful and unreasonable and not justified by public necessity or convenience," and adjudged that the same be vacated and set aside. The state appeals.
The statute provides that:
"Whenever, in the judgment of the commission * * * any * * * change (by a common carrier) in the mode of operating its road or conducting its business, will promote the security or convenience of the public, the commission, by a written order * * * shall require * * * the making of such * * * change." G.S. 1913, § 4178.
The statute further provides for an appeal from the order of the commission to the district court. G.S. 1913, § 4191. The appeal is "tried * * * according to the rules relating to the trial of civil actions, so far as the same are applicable." Upon such trial the commission's "findings of fact" are "prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated," and the order is "prima facie reasonable, and the burden of proof upon all issues raised by the appeal" is upon the appellant. If the court determines "that the order appealed from is lawful and reasonable," it is affirmed. If it determines "that the order is unlawful or unreasonable" it is "vacated and set aside." G.S. 1913, § 4192.
1. The statute in terms makes the reasonableness of the order of the commission a question for the court to determine on appeal. This is a valid statutory provision. The reasonableness of the order is properly a judicial question. Argument of that proposition was foreclosed by the decision of the Federal Supreme Court more than a quarter of a century ago. In the first case decided by that court involving the powers of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of this state, it was held that "the question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination." Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458, 10 S.Ct. 462, 467, 33 L.Ed. 970.
2. The principles on which the court acts in determining whether or not an order of the commission is reasonable, have been the subject of much controversy, but the law on that subject is now pretty well settled. The legislature never intended that the court should put itself in the place of the commission, try the matter anew as an administrative body, substituting its findings for those of the commission. A statute which so provided would be unconstitutional as a delegation to the judiciary of nonjudicial powers. Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 69 Minn. 353, 375, 72 N.W. 713; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 226, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150; Oregon R.R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 527, 32 S.Ct. 535, 56 L.Ed. 863; Bacon v. Rutland R.R. Co. 232 U.S. 134, 34 S.Ct. 283, 58 L.Ed. 538; Detroit & M. Ry. Co. v. Michigan R.R. Comm. 235 U.S. 402, 35 S.Ct. 126, 59 L.Ed. 288. The making of regulations which require a carrier to afford proper transportation facilities to the public, is legislative or administrative and not judicial in its nature. State v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 123 Minn. 463, 144 N.W. 155. The courts must not usurp legislative or administrative functions by setting aside a legislative or administrative order on their own conception of its wisdom. Interstate Comm. Commission v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 215 U.S. 452, 470, 30 S.Ct. 155, 54 L.Ed. 280. In Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 69 Minn. 353, 375, 72 N.W. 713, 716, a rate case, this court, in construing the statute then in force, which was broader than the one now in force, held that it was the intention of the legislature that the court on appeal should but that the district court can review the findings of the commission only so far as to determine whether or not the rates fixed by the commission are reasonable. This presents a situation somewhat anomalous in that the court may receive evidence in order to determine whether findings of fact are sustainable, but we can conceive of no other fair construction of this statute that will at the same time confine the court within its constitutional powers. The court, on appeal from the order of the commission, must distinguish, then, between the legislative power to establish regulations and the judicial power to determine upon the reasonableness of regulations already established.
3. We address ourselves, then, to this question: Can the decision of the trial court that the order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission was unreasonable be sustained? No court or commentator has yet undertaken to lay down a rule which shall furnish a test of what is reasonable that will fit every case. "Indeed," as said by Brewer, J., in Ames v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 64 F. 165, 177, "it is doubtful whether any single rule can be laid down applicable to all cases." 2 Elliott, Railroads, § 692. Some things, however, are definitely...
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