State v. Green

Decision Date17 February 2021
Docket Number53671-4-II
PartiesSTATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. TIMOTHY JOSHUA GREEN, Appellant.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

WORSWICK, J.

Following his Alford [1] plea to violation of a domestic violation no contact order, Timothy Joshua Green appeals his sentence and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider his request for an exceptional sentence downward based on compulsion and incapacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Green also argues that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately argue for the downward sentence. We disagree and affirm.

Facts

In September 2017, Christine Foley texted 911 around 3:00 a.m to report that Green was outside of her residence in violation of a no contact order protecting her from him. Foley told 911 that Green was in her shed in the back of her home. When law enforcement arrived at Foley's residence Green was in Foley's carport within 500 feet of the residence. The State charged Green with violation of a court order with a special allegation of domestic violence.

The trial court ordered Green to undergo a competency evaluation. The competency evaluation concluded that Green met the diagnostic criteria for unspecified bipolar disorder antisocial personality disorder, and substance use disorders. The evaluation concluded that Green had "the capacity to have a factual and rational understanding of his charges and court proceedings . . . [but lacked] the capacity to assist in his own defense with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 42. The trial court found Green incompetent to proceed and entered a competency restoration order. After restoration, the trial court entered an order finding Green competent to proceed to trial.

In September 2018, Green entered an Alford plea of guilty to violation of a court order- domestic violence.[2] The State recommended a standard range sentence of 60 months. Green requested an exceptional downward sentence of 18 months. In support of the exceptional downward sentence, defense counsel argued mitigating factors under RCW 9.94A.535(1)(a), (c), and (e). Defense counsel argued that Green suffered from severe mental health issues contending that Green had no memory of the incident and was not taking his medication at the time. Defense counsel also argued that Foley was an initiator and that Green committed the crime under compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete defense but which significantly affected his conduct.

Green addressed the trial court, recalling a difficult childhood and significant struggles with his mental health during adulthood. Green told the trial court that he had no recollection of committing the crime. After hearing argument from both parties, the trial court reserved ruling on sentencing, stated it wanted to look into the statute, and encouraged defense counsel to submit briefing on the issue.

Defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum reiterating his argument that an exceptional sentence was appropriate because (1) the protected party "was an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident," (2) Green committed the crime under compulsion insufficient to support a complete defense, and (3) Green's "capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of [his] conduct. . . was significantly impaired." CP at 109-10 (emphasis omitted) (citing RCW 9.94A.535(1)(a), (c), (e)). As to mitigating factors (c) and (e), the memorandum argued:
Mr. Green has stated that he has no recollection of this incident (see Dr. [Brett C] Trowbridge's attached evaluation). Further, [Green's mother] has stated that Mr. Green had not been taking his prescribed medication in the time leading up to this incident and was increasingly worried about his behavior and what it might lead to. And, per Officer [Jeff Schaefer's] report, Ms. Foley stated that Mr. Green was "acting strange."

CP at 111. Defense counsel also relayed Green's mother's recollection that Foley had contacted her twice in the week leading up to the incident attempting to get in contact with Green.

In support of Green's request for an exceptional downward sentence, defense counsel attached a copy of an evaluation completed by Dr. Trowbridge, a psychologist, to the sentencing memorandum. Dr. Trowbridge conducted an evaluation of Green and concluded that Green did not show evidence of serious mental illness such that he would not have been capable of knowing he was violating the no contact order at the time. Dr. Trowbridge acknowledged that Green "does have some documented mental health history." CP at 150. Dr. Trowbridge's diagnostic impression was that Green has bipolar disorder.

At a hearing in March 2019, the trial court stated that it had reviewed the materials submitted by defense counsel. The trial court focused on Green's argument that Foley had been the initiator. Green argued that Foley was a willing participant for a time and "[t]here was no affirmative ceasing of being a willing participant." Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Mar. 14, 2019) at 17. He pointed to Green's mother's recollection that Foley contacted her twice in the week leading up to the incident attempting to reach Green. The trial court commented:

[According to the [police] report, I see this as really two contacts. He calls her. She says, okay, I'll talk with you. And then he called her three times. So finally she says, okay, I'll meet with you. So he was acting strange.
So she goes back in the home. And an hour and a half later, he shows up and rings her doorbell.
So, you know if the incident ended when she walked back in the home, then I'm on board with your theory, I think.
But the incident didn't. An hour and a half later, he's back at her house ringing her doorbell, which I don't think is an invited contact.
So that's my problem, is that I think-he calls her three times. You know, I don't know that-he calls her three times. Hard to say why she decided to meet with him. That's kind of speculative. But she does. Okay. Maybe she's a willing participant at that point.
But then when she disengages an hour and a half later and he shows up at her house, I don't see that as being-her being a willful participant. At that point, it's 4:30 in the morning and he's at her house ringing her doorbell.

VRP (Mar. 14, 2019) at 19-20.

Defense counsel responded:

Here is where we go toward[] the compulsion and the ability to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct. I will say some crimes are much more hardwired into human DNA [(deoxyribonucleic acid)] than others. Don't steal. Don't hit people. Don't kill. You know, we know those are wrong.
Not having contact with somebody, that's not an innate evil. And given his mental health problems, I think he didn't really understand the wrongfulness.

VRP (Mar. 14, 2019) at 20-21. The trial court responded that Dr. Trowbridge's report did not support the argument that Green did not understand the wrongfulness of his actions. Defense counsel conceded that Dr. Trowbridge did not say Green was incapable of understanding.

Green addressed the trial court and explained that he did not remember going to meet Foley because he was under the influence and was off his medications at the time. "I had no idea being in my psychosis what was really going on at that time, plain and simple." VRP (Mar. 14, 2019) at 23. The trial court stated that it did not believe the record favored defense counsel's request for an exceptional downward sentence but offered the opportunity to subpoena Foley to present additional evidence.

The parties reconvened on April 1, 2019. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court stated that Green "is seeking an exceptional downward sentence under RCW 9.94A.535(1)(a), indicating that, to a significant degree, the victim was an initiator, willing participator, aggressor, or provoked the incident." VRP (Apr. 1, 2019) at 2. Defense counsel informed the trial court that he had spoken with Foley and would not be calling her as a witness. The trial court found that insufficient evidence supported a finding that Foley was a willing participant to a significant degree and denied Green's request for an exceptional downward sentence. The trial court stated:

I don't like the sentence. Easy for me to say. I'm not the one doing the time. Sixty months is a boatload of time, but that's-your issue is with the legislature. I don't really have discretion here because of your criminal history. I have to impose the 60 months unless I were to make the finding of the mitigating circumstances, and I just don't have sufficient evidence for that.

VRP (Apr. 1, 2019) at 13-14. Defense counsel did not mention the mitigating factors of compulsion or Green's mental health issues. When addressing the trial court himself, Green reminded the court that he suffers from mental health issues and asked if there was any kind of treatment that he could receive. The trial court acknowledged Green's mental health issues and encouraged Green to take advantage of whatever is available to him while incarcerated.

Green appeals his sentence.

Analysis
I. Abuse of Discretion

Green argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering his request for an exceptional downward sentence based on compulsion and underlying mental health issues. We disagree.

A standard range sentence cannot normally be appealed. RCW 9.94A.585; State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481, 139 P.3d 334 (2006). "However, a defendant may appeal the process by which a trial court imposes a sentence." In re Pers. Restraint of Marshall, 10 Wn.App. 2d 626, 635, 455 P.3d 1163 (2019) (emphasis omitted). By challenging the process, a defendant challenges the trial...

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