State v. Greenleaf
| Decision Date | 13 December 2004 |
| Citation | 863 A.2d 877,2004 ME 149 |
| Parties | STATE OF MAINE v. FRANK C. GREENLEAF. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, William Baghdoyan, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Matthew Pollack, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, ME, Attorneys for State.
Kevin W. Cuddy, Esq. (orally), Bangor, ME, Attorney for defendant.
Jonathan A. Block, Esq., Pierce Atwood, LLP, Portland, ME, Attorney for amicus curiae, Maine Maritime Alumni Ass'n.
Panel: CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
[¶1] Frank C. Greenleaf appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Warren, J.) convicting him, after a jury-waived trial of one count of income tax evasion (Class C), pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 5330 (1990); one count of income tax evasion (Class C), pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 184-A (Supp. 1997); and two counts of failure to make a return (Class D), pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 5332 (1990).1 Greenleaf asserts that the State did not demonstrate that he possessed the requisite criminal intent. He also contends that the trial court did not sufficiently respond to his request for findings of fact, and that the statutes under which he was prosecuted are void for vagueness. We affirm the judgment of conviction.
[¶2] Frank Greenleaf was born and raised in Old Town. He married in 1970, and in 1974, bought a home in Milford. There he and his wife raised two children and operated a tool rental business until they divorced in 1986. Greenleaf was a member of the Merchant Marine, and spent the majority of his time at sea.
[¶3] Soon after his divorce, Greenleaf decided that he no longer wished to be considered a Maine resident for tax purposes. He spoke with a certified public accountant, who advised him that he would have to break all legal ties with the State of Maine. The accountant advised Greenleaf that he could not spend more than 183 days per year in Maine, and that he had to give up his Maine voter registration, register to vote in another state, get a driver's license in another state, and establish a residence in another state.
[¶4] After this conversation, Greenleaf claimed an address in Goffstown, New Hampshire, as his residence. He used that address to obtain a New Hampshire driver's license, register his motorcycle, open a bank account, and register to vote in New Hampshire. He also cancelled his Maine voter registration, and after 1986, he did not spend more than 183 days per year in Maine.
[¶5] From 1988 to 1997, Greenleaf claimed an address in Rochester, New Hampshire as his residence. He used this address to renew his New Hampshire driver's license, his motorcycle registration, and to vote via absentee ballot. He stayed at the Rochester and Goffstown addresses, both of which were owned by friends of his, only a few nights over a period of ten years. When he received mail at either address, his friends forwarded it to him.
[¶6] In 1992, Greenleaf became engaged. His fiancé purchased Greenleaf's ex-wife's interest in the family house in Milford, and moved into the house. Greenleaf retained the other half-interest. Later that year, the property was reconveyed to Greenleaf and his fiancé as joint tenants. In 1994, it was reconveyed solely to his fiancé. The deeds list Greenleaf as a resident of Old Town and Milford, respectively.
[¶7] Greenleaf remarried in 1995. He continued to spend most of his time at sea, until he retired in 2000. His wife resided full time in the Milford house and worked in Bangor. During the years at issue, Greenleaf rented or owned a camp in Maine, continued to operate his tool rental business with two locations in Maine, and owned a timeshare and another parcel of real estate in Maine. He spent the majority of his time on breaks from sea duty in Maine at his home in Milford or at his camp, and he spent many days working in his rental business.
[¶8] In 1997, Greenleaf's wife retired from her job in Bangor. She and Greenleaf then began renting an apartment in Florida. They kept their home in Maine. They moved back to Maine in 2002, and reside in Milford.
[¶9] Between 1986 and 2002, Greenleaf did not file tax returns or pay income taxes in Maine. He was charged with evading income tax and failing to make and file Maine income tax returns for the years 1996 to 1999. Greenleaf waived his right to a trial by jury. M.R. Crim. P. 23(a). After trial, the court stated its findings on the record and found Greenleaf guilty of two counts of evasion of Maine income tax, and two counts of failure to make and file Maine income tax returns, covering the years 1996 and 1997. The trial court found him not guilty of the charges covering the years 1998 and 1999.
[¶10] Greenleaf filed a motion for additional findings of fact pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 23(c). The trial court stated its additional findings on the record at the sentencing hearing. Thereafter, the court sentenced Greenleaf to eighteen months incarceration, all but ninety days suspended, and two years probation. Greenleaf was also ordered to pay $26,891 in restitution, and fines totaling $2000. Greenleaf filed this appeal.
[¶11] Greenleaf contends that the record contains insufficient evidence of intent to evade or intent to fail to make the returns. He also contends that in response to his motion for findings of fact, the trial court did not state findings that establish intent to evade or intent to fail to file. Finally, he argues that the statutes under which he was convicted are impermissibly vague in violation of the United States and Maine Constitutions.
[¶12] Upon a claim of insufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether the fact-finder "could rationally find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Kotredes, 2003 ME 142, ¶ 9, 838 A.2d 331, 335.
[¶13] We review trial court decisions on issues of law de novo, State v. Trott, 2004 ME 15, ¶ 7, 841 A.2d 789, 791, and any factual findings for clear error, State v. Bartlett, 661 A.2d 1107, 1108 (Me. 1995). Factual findings are clearly erroneous only when there is no competent evidence in the record to support them. State v. Seamen's Club, 1997 ME 70, ¶ 7, 691 A.2d 1248, 1251.
[¶14] Greenleaf was convicted of one count of evading taxes in 1996, pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 5330, which provides: "Any person who intentionally attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this Part or the payment thereof, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, is guilty of a Class C crime . . . ." 36 M.R.S.A. § 5330 (1990). He was also convicted of one count of evading taxes in 1997, pursuant to an amended version of that statute.2 The key element of each of these crimes, for purposes of our analysis, is the intentional attempt to evade or defeat any tax.
[¶15] Greenleaf was further convicted of two counts of failure to make returns pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 5332, which provides that "[a]ny person required under this Part to pay any tax . . . or required by this Part or regulation prescribed thereunder to make a return . . . who intentionally fails to pay that tax or . . . make the return . . . is guilty of a Class D crime. . . ." 36 M.R.S.A. § 5332 (1990).
[¶16] A tax is "imposed" pursuant to these statutes, on the "Maine taxable income of every resident individual of this State." 36 M.R.S.A. § 5111 (1990). "Resident individual" is defined as:
[¶17] An income tax return must be filed by "[e]very resident individual . . . who is required to file a federal income tax return," or who "has a Maine individual income tax liability for the taxable year." 36 M.R.S.A. § 5220(1) (1990).
[¶18] Greenleaf concedes that he was domiciled in Maine in the relevant tax years and that he did not file tax income returns or pay income taxes. He only challenges proof of the element of intent to violate the law.
[¶19] Greenleaf argues that although the State may have proved that he acted intentionally to avoid paying taxes, it did not carry its burden to prove that he acted with the intent to violate the tax laws. He asserts that there is a difference between the legal activity of intentionally avoiding taxes, and the illegal activity of intentionally evading taxes. While it is not criminal conduct to work within the tax code in an attempt to reduce the amount of taxes one is required to pay, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935), it is criminal conduct to intentionally evade a known legal duty to pay taxes, see Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991)
.
[¶20] In Cheek, the United States Supreme Court interpreted federal statutes similar to the statutes under which Greenleaf was convicted, except that the federal statutes required proof of the mental state "willful" rather than "intentional." Id., see 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 7201, 7203 (2002). The Court reviewed its precedents and interpreted the statutory willfulness requirement to mean the "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201. The Court held that to establish willfulness, the government had the burden to (1) prove that the defendant was aware that the law imposed a duty on him and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty; and (2) negate "a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax laws. . . . whether or not the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Nisbet
...we review for obvious error the trial court's failure to declare the statute unconstitutional.5 M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b) ; see State v. Greenleaf , 2004 ME 149, ¶ 34, 863 A.2d 877. [¶ 17] The due process clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions "require that criminal defendants be ......
-
State v. Falcone
...§ 5102(5)(B) (2005). As the Court has pointed out, what it means to be "domiciled" in Maine is not defined in the tax code. See State v. Greenleaf, 2004 ME 149, ¶ 34, 863 A.2d 877, 885 ("All of the relevant terms [of 36 M.R.S. §§ 5102, 5220, 5330 (2005)] are adequately defined within the ta......
-
State v. Gurney
...that the court applied a correct understanding of the controlling law. See U.C.D.R.P.-Cumberland County 23(c); see also State v. Greenleaf, 2004 ME 149, ¶ 29, 863 A.2d 877. The court is not required to address each piece of admitted evidence in its findings, see State v. Ricky G., 2000 ME 1......
-
State v. Hagar, Docket: Cum-18-369
...In doing so, the court made the following factual findings, which are supported by competent evidence in the record. See State v. Greenleaf , 2004 ME 149, ¶ 13, 863 A.2d 877 ; Reed , 676 A.2d at 482.[¶6] The baby was born on January 4, 1979; he was delivered several weeks early by C-section......