State v. Griffin

• Citation: 212 S.W. 877,278 Mo. 436
• Parties: THE STATE v. CARLISLE GRIFFIN, Appellant
• Decision Date: 03 June 1919
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

212 S.W. 877

278 Mo. 436

THE STATE v. CARLISLE GRIFFIN, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

June 3, 1919

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. John W. Calhoun Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Frank C. O'Malley for appellant.

(1) Instruction 3 is erroneous because there is no evidence whatever of intent in this case, and the intent is not to be presumed, but must be proved like any other issue in the case. (2) The verdict of the jury in this case is insufficient to support the conviction because it is a special verdict and fails to find all of the elements of the alleged crime, and is not responsive to the information. (a) It fails to find whether the defendant removed or concealed a Ford touring car, but finds him guilty of concealing "personal property." (b) It fails to find the value of the alleged personal property. (c) It fails to find that the removal and concealing was done with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud. (d) In failing to find the value of the property it fails to find whether defendant is guilty of a felony or misdemeanor. (e) It finds the defendant guilty of removing and concealing, whereas the statute does not define any such crime, but does define the crime of removing or concealing, and by this verdict defendant is convicted of either or both. Sec. 4570, R. S. 1909; State v DeWitt, 186 Mo. 61; State v. Cronin, 189 Mo 663; State v. Grossman, 214 Mo. 233; State v. Holland, 162 Mo.App. 678; State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92; Pinson v. Campbell, 124 Mo.App. 260; State v. Pierce, 136 Mo. 34; State v. Reeves, 208 S.W. 87; State v. Jones, 114, Mo.App. 343; State v. Pollock, 105 Mo.App. 273. (3) The court erred in not sustaining defendant's demurrer to the evidence. State v. Miller, 255 Mo. 223; State v. Fowler, 265 Mo. 190; State v. Miller, 234 Mo. 588; State v. Bass, 251, Mo. 107; State v. King, 174 Mo. 647; State v. Jones, 106 Mo. 302.

Frank W. McAllister, Attorney-General, and S.E. Skelley, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent.

(1) The evidence in this case is sufficient to establish the corpus delecti. (a) Full proof of the corpus delecti independent of corroborating circumstances thereof is not required. 16 C. J. 772; State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 712; State v. Coats, 174 Mo. 417; State v. Wooley, 215 Mo. 672; State v. Knowles, 185 Mo. 176; State v. Henderson, 186 Mo. 484; State v. Young, 237 Mo. 177; State v. Skibiski, 245 Mo. 463; State v. Vinton, 220 Mo. 98. (b) Admission, declarations and confessions may be considered in connection with other independent evidence in determining whether the corpus delecti is sufficient proved. 16 C. J. 772; State v. Cox, 264 Mo. 413; State v. Knowles, 185 Mo. 176; State v. Coats, 174 Mo. 417. (c) "Concealing" mortgaged property is an intentional handling and shifting of same in such a manner as to mislead or confuse the mortgagee in his efforts to find it. State v. Taylor, 90 Kan. 443; State v. Miller, 74 Kan. 667; Clement v. Dudley, 42 N.H. 367; State v. Ward, 49 Conn. 429; Polk v. State, 60 Tex. Crim. 150. (d) There is no invariable rule as to the quantity of proof necessary to establish the corpus delecti, and each case must depend in a measure on its own particular circumstances. 16 C. J. 773; People v. Goodwin, 263 Ill. 99. (e) Particular intent may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. 16 C. J. 774; Kelly, Crim. Law & Procedure, sec. 244. (f) It is for the jury to say whether the corroborating facts and the confession or admission taken together excludes from their minds all reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. State v. Skibiski, 245 Mo. 464; State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 713; State v. Coats, 174 Mo. 417; State v. Lamb, 28 Mo. 231.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, P. J.

In the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, defendant was tried and convicted of the crime of removing and concealing personal property covered by chattel mortgage. The punishment was fixed at six months' imprisonment in the city jail, and defendant has duly perfected an appeal.

The evidence upon the part of the State may be summarized as follows:

In May, 1916, the Weber Motor Car Company, a corporation located at 2217 Locust St., St. Louis, Mo., sold to the defendant for the sum of $ 300, one secondhand Ford automobile. Defendant paid $ 125 in cash and gave his notes for the balance, securing the same by a chattel mortgage on the automobile. By subsequent payments defendant reduced the mortgage indebtedness to the sum of $ 126.27. In May, 1917, after having written numerous letters to defendant concerning the payment of the balance then overdue, representatives of the mortgagee called upon and talked to defendant at his place of business on Delmar Avenue. They requested that defendant either pay the balance of the mortgage indebtedness or surrender the car. He replied that he could neither pay the notes nor deliver the car. He finally said that he would give up the car, and that it would be found at the back of his residence on Pendleton Avenue. The representatives of the mortgagee then went to defendant's residence and made a search of the premises, but were unable to find the car. A short time thereafter a representative of the mortgagee again called upon defendant, demanding either the money or the car, and in that conversation told the defendant that the mortgagee had been unable to find the car at defendant's residence, the place where defendant told them it could be found. Defendant then said: "I cannot tell you where the car is, I do not know."

Defendant did not offer any evidence. The jury returned the following verdict:

"We, the jury in the above entitled cause, find the defendant guilty of feloniously, willfully and unlawfully removing and concealing personal property, covered by a chattel mortgage, and assess the punishment at six months in the city jail."

I. Appellant contends that the verdict is insufficient to support the judgment, in that it is a special verdict and fails to find all of the elements of the alleged crime. The learned Attorney-General confesses error in this regard.

We are of the opinion that the point is well taken. The verdict is a special verdict. [State v. Modlin, 197 Mo 376, 95 S.W. 345.] Being a special verdict is should find all the essential elements of the offense. [State v. Bishop, 231 Mo. 411, 133...