State v. Griffith

• Decision Date: 09 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 86-994,86-994
• Citation: 500 So.2d 240,11 Fla. L. Weekly 2581
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2581 The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert Milton GRIFFITH, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 240

500 So.2d 240

11 Fla. L. Weekly 2581

The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert Milton GRIFFITH, Appellee.

No. 86-994.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Third District.

Dec. 9, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1987.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Richard L. Polin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Weiner, Robbins, Tunkey & Ross and Peter Raben, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and JORGENSON, JJ.

JORGENSON, Judge.

This is an appeal by the state from the trial court's order granting in part the motion of defendant Robert Milton Griffith to suppress evidence, statements, and witness testimony. For the reasons which follow, we reverse that portion of the trial court's order suppressing the testimony of Y.B., the juvenile victim/prosecutrix. ¹

A full description of the facts leading to this prosecution is essential to an understanding of the legal issue presented by this appeal. The events prompting Griffith's arrest were set into motion by a former employee of Griffith who advised the Miami Police that Griffith was actively involved in photographing young girls in the nude. According to his ex-employee, Griffith secreted a collection of lewd photographs of young girls in a file cabinet in his office. This tipster further revealed that Griffith would pay young girls to pose for sexually explicit pictures at his office and that he had personally observed at least three such girls arrive at the office at closing time. The employee referred police to a coworker for additional details.

The police initiated an investigation of Griffith which culminated in the procurement of a search warrant for Griffith's office. A search was conducted of Griffith's office, and numerous photographs of nude young girls were seized from a file cabinet. Y.B. was featured in some of these photographs. Also seized from Griffith's office was an address book which contained a listing for Y.B.'s mother [Mrs. B.]. Immediately following the office search, Griffith was arrested and advised of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

When the police requested his consent to a search of his home, Griffith expressed reluctance. The police responded by threatening to get a search warrant for the home and by suggesting that Griffith's dog would have to be destroyed if it interfered with their entry and search. Under these circumstances, Griffith signed a consent-to-search form. The ensuing search of Griffith's home yielded three photographs: two were of Y.B. and one was of an adult female. At the time the photographs were seized, the police were not aware of the identities of the subjects in the photographs.

Griffith was subsequently transported to the police station where he was again apprised of his Miranda rights. Griffith was then presented with a waiver-of-rights form for his consideration and approval. Griffith signed his initials by each paragraph on the form except the paragraph stating, "I am willing to answer questions asked of me." Despite Griffith's failure to approve the paragraph regarding questioning, police officers sought to interrogate him. Detectives Judith Turner and Oscar Callejas confronted Griffith with the photograph of the adult female seized from his home. Griffith identified the woman as his ex-wife, Terry Macannon. Next Griffith was shown one of the nude photographs of Y.B. taken from his office. He denied knowing the girl's identity. Finally, a photograph from Griffith's home was displayed. This picture represented a clothed Y.B. sitting on Griffith's lap in Griffith's home. Faced with the evidence contradicting his denial of knowing the girl, Griffith disclosed that he knew the girl's mother. At this juncture, Griffith refused to answer further questions.

Detective Callejas began an investigation to ascertain the identity of the young girl portrayed in the photographs. He first questioned Griffith's secretary, Iris Rodriguez, who gave him the name and occupation of Griffith's ex-wife, Terry Macannon. Ms. Rodriguez could not identify Y.B.; however, she did confirm that Griffith had a collection of pornographic photographs and a penchant for sexual activities with young girls. As the next step in his investigation, Callejas interviewed Terry Macannon. Like Iris Rodriguez, Terry Macannon was unable to identify the juvenile girl depicted in the photographs. She referred Callejas to Mrs. B. as an individual who might be able to place the girl. Callejas checked the listing for Mrs. B. in the address book secured from Griffith's office and contacted her. Mrs. B. identified the girl as her daughter, Y.B.

The police at this time interviewed Y.B., a fifteen-year-old girl who revealed that she had been the victim of sexual battery and abuse by Griffith between 1975 and 1982 when she was five-to-twelve years old. The state obtained an affidavit from Y.B. detailing the acts committed by Griffith. Griffith was then charged with eight counts of sexual battery and nine counts of lewd assaults or acts on a minor.

In his motion to suppress evidence, statements, and witness testimony, Griffith sought suppression of (1) items seized from his office; (2) items seized from his home; (3) statements made by Griffith at the police station; and (4) the testimony of Y.B. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a written order with detailed findings as to each of the four points asserted. The court ruled that the search of Griffith's office pursuant to the search warrant was valid, that the search of the house was unlawful, that Griffith's statements were elicited in violation of his Miranda right to silence, and that the testimony of Y.B. was "a derivative product of police illegalities." The trial court granted Griffith's suppression motion as to the evidence seized from his home, the statements made at the police station, and the testimony of Y.B. The court denied suppression of the materials taken from Griffith's office. The state appeals only the suppression order regarding the testimony of Y.B.

The narrow issue before this court is whether the trial court properly deemed the testimony of Y.B. a derivative fruit of police misconduct. ² The trial court erred in its determination that the discovery of Y.B. was inextricably tied to the police illegalities. We, therefore, reverse that portion of the trial court's order suppressing the testimony of Y.B.

In its order the trial court set forth its analysis of the relationship between the discovery of Y.B. and the police misconduct as follows:

Pictures found during the illegal search of Mr. Griffith's home were utilized to question Mr. Griffith. During that illegal questioning, Mr. Griffith made incriminating remarks concerning the identity of a person in a photo. The seizure of the photos from the home and the questioning of Mr. Griffith led the police to the discovery of [Y.B.] as a witness for the State. [Y.B.'s] existence and identity were undoubtedly direct products of the two illegalities. (Citations omitted.)

The trial court further found that the state did not meet its burden of showing either that Y.B. would have come forward to testify of her own volition in accordance with the standard of United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), ³ or that the identity of Y.B. would have been inevitably discovered by the police within the parameters of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). ⁴ A study of the exclusionary rule and its interrelated exceptions compels the conclusion that the testimony of Y.B. is admissible evidence against Griffith under the "independent source" doctrine.

The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained directly or indirectly from a violation of the fourth amendment is not admissible against an accused at trial. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The harsh consequences of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine are ameliorated by three crucial exceptions. A court may admit such evidence if the state can show that (1) an independent source existed for the discovery of the evidence, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) the evidence would have inevitably been discovered in the course of a legitimate investigation, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 77 (1984); or (3) sufficient attenuation existed between the challenged evidence and the illegal conduct, Wong Sun. A careful review of the record before us points to the applicability of the independent source exception to the facts of this case.

The independent source doctrine was first espoused by the Supreme Court in Silverthorne when the Court endorsed the exclusion of derivative evidence. The Court mandated suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a subpoena because the subpoena was premised on information obtained from an illegal search and seizure. The government had previously searched a corporation's office without a warrant and seized its documents. These papers were copied and the originals returned to their rightful owner. The defendant was then indicted based upon the knowledge the state acquired from these papers. The Court disapproved such a practice as violative of the fourth amendment. Accordingly, it held that the essence of the exclusionary rule was to bar the government from using evidence obtained in an unconstitutional manner. The Court tempered the penalty of this prohibition by recognizing that, if the government could have obtained the same knowledge through a source independent of the illegal action, the government could use such evidence. The Court summarized this concept:

The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this...