State v. Grindles
| Citation | 777 P.2d 1187,70 Haw. 528 |
| Decision Date | 27 July 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 13322,13322 |
| Parties | STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifton B. GRINDLES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Hawai'i |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291-4(a), which prohibits driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, describes a single offense provable in two ways, and not two separate offenses.
2. In a trial for violation of HRS § 291-4(a), the trial court's action in bifurcating the trial into separate hearings on the two methods of proving driving while under the influence and compelling Appellant to present his testimony under § 291-4(a)(1) before the State had presented its entire case against him under HRS § 291-4(a)(2), violated Appellant's constitutional due process right to a fair trial and his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
3. HRS § 291C-32(a)(2)(A) entitled "Steady Yellow Indication" prohibits entering an intersection when the light exhibits a red signal, therefore, the statute contains a prohibition which can be violated and does not constitute merely a warning.
Earle A. Partington, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.
Dean T. Kauka (Wallace W. Weatherwax with him on the brief), Deputy Pros. Attys., Dept. of Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ.
Appellant Clifton B. Grindles appeals from his conviction of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor (DUI) in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291-4(a)(1). Appellant claims that the district court erred in "bifurcating" the trial into separate hearings on the two methods of committing DUI described in § 291-4(a). We agree and therefore reverse the DUI conviction and remand for a new trial. Appellant also appeals his conviction of Disregarding a Traffic Control Signal in violation of HRS § 291C-32(a)(2)(A) on the grounds that (1) he was charged under a different statute; and (2) § 291C-32(a)(2)(A) contains no prohibitions which can be violated. We find no error and therefore affirm.
The arresting officer observed Appellant enter an intersection against a red light in the early morning hours of February 15, 1987. The light had turned from yellow to red just as Appellant crossed over the stop line, before the crosswalk. When he entered the intersection, however, the light was red. The officer pulled Appellant over, administered the field sobriety test, and placed Appellant under arrest.
Appellant was charged with DUI in violation of HRS § 291-4(a) and Disregarding a Traffic-Control Signal in violation of HRS § 291C-32. Trial commenced in district court on September 7, 1988 at which time Appellant waived oral reading of the charges.
After the State's direct examination of the arresting officer, the court announced its intention to bifurcate the hearing and take all testimony based on § 291-4(a)(1). Then, if the State made a case under § 291-4(a)(1) (), the court would not take evidence under § 291-4(a)(2) (). Appellant objected and cross-examination of the officer proceeded.
After the State finished putting on its case, the trial judge asked Appellant if he had any evidence to present in his defense under § 291-4(a)(1). The judge indicated that if he determined that the State proved its case under the § 291-4(a)(1) standard, he would not permit the State to proceed under § 291-4(a)(2). Appellant refused to present any testimony until the State had presented its entire case against him. He objected on the ground that bifurcation would violate his federal and state guarantees against self-incrimination. The court then pronounced Appellant guilty of violating HRS § 291-4(a)(1) and HRS § 291C-32(a)(2)(A). This appeal followed.
Appellant maintains that HRS § 291-4(a) creates the single offense of "driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor" which is provable in two ways, and that the trial court erred in bifurcating the two methods of proof. The State agrees that the statute describes one offense, but argues that the trial court was within the bounds of its discretion in bifurcating the trial. Because of conflicting dicta in our prior decisions, 1 we briefly address the question of whether HRS § 291-4(a) creates separate offenses or one offense provable in two ways. We conclude that the statute sets forth one offense with alternative methods of proof, and that the trial court's action in compelling Appellant to put on his evidence prior to the conclusion of the State's evidence violated his due process right to a fair trial.
Although Appellant did not raise on appeal any due process claim, "the power to sua sponte notice 'plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights' clearly resides in this court." State v. Hernandez, 61 Haw. 475, 482, 605 P.2d 75, 79 (1980).
HRS § 291-4(a) provides:
§ 291-4 Driving under influence of intoxicating liquor. (a) A person commits the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor if:
(1) The person operates or assumes actual physical control of the operation of any vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; or
(2) the person operates or assumes actual physical control of the operation of any vehicle with 0.10 percent or more, by weight of alcohol in the person's blood.
(Emphasis added).
A plain reading of the statute convinces us that the legislature sought to prohibit one offense--driving while one is influenced by alcohol. The statute provides that a person commits the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor if the person's conduct falls into one of two categories: (1) driving while under the influence or (2) driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.10 or more. A blood alcohol content of at least .10 percent is one method of proving the influence of alcohol. See State v. Brown, 109 Idaho 981, 712 P.2d 682 (Ct.App.1985); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 339 Pa.Super. 32, 488 A.2d 293 (1985); State v. Franco, 96 Wash.2d 816, 639 P.2d 1320 (1982).
Subsections (1) and (2) were created when the legislature amended HRS § 291-4(a) in 1983 to add the provision that DUI could be proven by blood alcohol content. According to the legislative history, the bill provides that "[t]he defendant shall be deemed under the influence of intoxicating liquor if he has ten-hundredths per cent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood." Hse.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 591, in 1983 House Journal, at 1105. Subsection 291-4(a)(2) simply sets out an alternative method of proving the offense established by the DUI statute.
We conclude, therefore, based on the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, that HRS § 291-4(a) provides two alternative means of proving the single offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 2
We next consider Appellant's claim that the trial court erred in "bifurcating" the DUI trial, thus compelling him to present his testimony before the conclusion of the State's evidence. We agree and conclude that the trial court's action in bifurcating the two methods of proof provided in § 291-4(a) into separate trials violated Appellant's due process right to a fair trial.
The concept of fairness is inherent in the requirement of due process of law. "As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice." Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166, 180 (1941). In our legal system, the entire burden of proving criminal activity rests on the State. Due process guarantees the defendant an absolute, unqualified right to require the State to prove its case against him. "[The burden of proof] is on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial, and applies to every element necessary to constitute the crime." State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 113, 488 P.2d 322, 324 (1971).
While we have recognized that the trial court has wide discretion to control the order of proof at trial, State v. Alfonso, 65 Haw. 95, 99, 648 P.2d 696, 700 (1982), such discretion does not extend to the action taken by the trial judge in this case. The judge ordered Appellant to present his defense to the DUI charge before hearing all of the State's evidence against him. We find that such a departure from the well-established order of proof in criminal cases is fundamentally unfair and is not a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Therefore, we hold that in a trial for violation of HRS § 291-4(a), where the State intends to present proof under both subsection 291-4(a)(1) and subsection 291-4(a)(2), the defendant has an absolute right to hear all of the State's evidence against him prior to putting on his defense.
We further find that the trial court's actions in this case improperly burdened Appellant's right against self-incrimination in violation of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Hawaii Constitution. In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 92 S.Ct. 1891, 32 L.Ed.2d 358 (1972), the United States Supreme Court recognized a defendant's constitutional interest in controlling the timing and sequence of evidence in his defense:
It must often be a very serious question with the accused and his counsel whether he shall be placed upon the stand as a witness, and subjected to the hazard of cross-examination, a question that he is not required to decide until, upon a proper survey of all the case as developed by the state, and met by witnesses on his own behalf, he may intelligently weigh the advantages and disadvantages of his situation, and, thus advised, determine how to act. Whether he shall testify or not; if so, at what stage in the progress of his defense, are equally submitted to the free and unrestricted choice of one...
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