State v. Grinnell

• Decision Date: 27 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95APA10-1314,95APA10-1314
• Citation: 678 N.E.2d 231,112 Ohio App.3d 124
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. GRINNELL, Appellant. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 124

112 Ohio App.3d 124

678 N.E.2d 231

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. GRINNELL, Appellant. ^*

No. 95APA10-1314.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided June 27, 1996.

Mark E. Piepmeier and William E. Breyer, Cincinnati, for appellee.

Schottenstein, Treneff & Williams and Joseph D. Reed, Columbus, for appellant.

BOWMAN, Judge.

On April 11, 1993, a riot occurred at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility ("Lucasville") located in Lucasville, Ohio. The riot began in mid-afternoon when a group of prisoners, who were returning to their cells from a recreation area, attacked several guards.

The prison complex at Lucasville has three main residential areas designated J-Block, K-Block and L-Block. The residential area designated L-Block is entered by passing through two large gates to a main corridor with a large gym at the end. Between the second gate and the gym, cell block ranges run off the main corridor. There are eight such ranges in L-Block, numbered L-1 through L-8. Each cell block range contains eighty cells, with twenty cells located on a lower left-hand level, twenty cells located on a lower right-hand level, twenty cells located in an upper left-hand level, and twenty cells located in an upper right-hand level. At the front of each cell block range is a console which consists of two panels with electric switches to open and close all of the doors to the cells and showers. The console area can accommodate two to three people and is designed to give a view of the entire cell block area. From the console, the operator can see the area in front of each cell door, but not necessarily into each cell.

The riot was apparently planned and instigated by a group of Muslim prisoners. The rioting prisoners seized control of various cell ranges. The events which gave rise to the charges against appellant, Timothy Grinnell, occurred in the L-6 cell block.

The Muslims were in control of the L-6 cell block, while other groups were in control of the other cell blocks. At the time the riot began, a number of things occurred simultaneously. When the inmates first took control, all of the prisoners held in L-6 were ordered out of their cells and into the corridor. Then various other prisoners were locked into the cells, allegedly for their own safety and protection, by the Muslims. Thereafter, permission had to be obtained from the inmates in charge of L-6 to enter or leave the area.

At some time on April 11, another group of seven to ten prisoners, who were not Muslims and who were also known as "the death squad," entered L-6, apparently led by Keith Lamar ("Lamar group"), with the intent of killing some of the prisoners housed in the cells in L-6 who were thought to be snitches (informers). The Lamar group was allowed to enter the L-6 area by the Muslim leaders. As the Lamar group went from cell to cell, appellant operated the console and opened the cell doors as requested by the Lamar group. The opening of the cell doors allowed the Lamar group access to various inmates, who were then beaten. Two inmates, Darrell Depina and Albert Staiano, were beaten to death. At one point, the Lamar group approached a cell holding five inmates, ¹ and demanded that appellant open the cell door; however, appellant refused and the Lamar group moved on.

Eventually the inmates surrendered and the state regained control of L-Block on April 22, 1993. As a result of his participation in the riot, appellant was indicted and charged with two counts of aggravated murder in connection with the deaths of Depina and Staiano. After a trial in which the jury found appellant guilty of both counts, he was sentenced to twenty years to life on each charge. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and sets forth the following assignments of error:

"I. The trial court erred by overruling defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that defendant-appellant was denied his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the state of Ohio and Ohio Revised Code Section 2945.71.

"II. The trial court erred by overruling defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiff-appellee failed to establish the requisite jurisdiction of the court.

"III. The trial court erred by overruling defendant-appellant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure.

"IV. The trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of duress or coercion as requested by the defendant-appellant.

"V. The trial court erred by overruling the objection of the defendant-appellant to the introduction of an alleged statement of defendant-appellant in plaintiff-appellee['s] rebuttal.

"VI. The conviction of the defendant-appellant was against the manifest weight of the evidence and should have been set aside.

"VII. The court erred by overruling the defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that it was constitutionally deficient as a matter of law."

In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the United States and Ohio Constitutions and R.C. 2945.71. The speedy trial provisions set forth in R.C. 2945.71 are coextensive with the speedy trial rights guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions. State v. O'Brien (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 516 N.E.2d 218.

R.C. 2945.71 provides:

"(C) A person against whom a charge of felony is pending:

" * * *

"(2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after his arrest.

" * * *

"(E) For purposes of computing time under divisions (A), (B), (C)(2), and (D) of this section, each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three days. This division does not apply for purposes of computing time under division (C)(1) of this section."

Appellant first contends that he is entitled to the triple-time provision set forth in R.C. 2945.71(E). However, at the time of the events which gave rise to the pending charges, appellant was serving six to twenty-five years on a conviction of aggravated robbery in Montgomery County in November 1981. ² Therefore, inasmuch as appellant was being held on more than just the pending charges, he was not entitled to the benefit of the triple-count provisions of the statute.

Appellant next contends that he was not brought to trial within the time period set forth in R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), as he was taken into administrative custody by the prison officials on May 6, 1993, as the result of his participation in the prison riot. Appellant contends that this administrative detention was the equivalent of an arrest and that the computation of time for speedy trial should begin on that date. We reject this argument.

The record does not reflect, and there is nothing before this court other than appellant's assertions, that he was placed in administrative custody for his participation in the riot. Nor is there any evidence as to when this administrative detention was alleged to have occurred. In addition, while the issue of administrative detention has not been addressed by the Ohio or United States Supreme Courts, a number of federal appellate courts have considered and rejected appellant's argument that the time for speedy trial, for a defendant already serving time, begins to run when the defendant is placed in some form of administrative detention, and we find those arguments persuasive.

In United States v. Clardy (C.A.9, 1976), 540 F.2d 439, the appellants contended that their speedy trial rights pursuant to the Sixth Amendment began to run when they were segregated from the general prison population as the result of stabbing another inmate in a fight over repayment of a loan. The court stated, at 441:

"Both appellants contend that the failure to commence trial sooner deprived them of their speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment. That right assertedly attached when appellants were de facto arrested by being placed in segregated confinement after the attack. However, such discipline is not an 'arrest' for speedy trial purposes. * * * The identifying indicia of a de facto arrest sketched in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, at 320, 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 [478-479] (1971), are for the most part absent here. The prison discipline did not focus public obloquy upon appellants, did not disrupt their 'employment' or drain appellants' financial resources. In short, it was not a public act with public ramifications, but a private act. Actual physical restraint may have increased and free association diminished, but unless we were to say that imprisonment ipso facto is a continuing arrest, these criteria bear little weight in the peculiar context of a penal institution where the curtailment of liberty is the general rule not the exception. Thus, speedy trial rights did not come into play until April 1, 1975, when appellants were indicted, and therefore, for purposes of such rights, the delay was only two months and 28 days." See, also, United States v. Daniels (C.A.4, 1983), 698 F.2d 221; United States v. Blevins (C.A.5, 1979), 593 F.2d 646.

Thus, we conclude that appellant's speedy trial rights did not accrue on May 6, 1993, but, rather, began on May 19, 1994, when appellant was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder. Inasmuch as appellant was already in prison, he was not arrested and taken into custody in the usual manner but was served with a summons on May 26, 1994. Regardless, for purposes of this opinion, we will assume appellant was arrested on the date his indictment was issued, May 19, 1994.

Appellant further contends that, assuming that a date later than May 6, 1993 is used, he still was not brought to trial within two hundred seventy days as set forth in R.C. 2945.71(C)(2)....