State v. Grisby, 62074
| Decision Date | 14 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 62074,62074 |
| Citation | 867 S.W.2d 270 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Curtis GRISBY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Christine Milligan-Ciha, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Stacy L. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
Defendant, Curtis Grisby, Jr., appeals from a judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, for forgery. § 570.090.1(4), RSMo (1986). He was sentenced as a persistent offender to imprisonment for five years. We affirm.
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Our review of the record discloses substantial evidence to support defendant's conviction.
Following the jury's verdict, a date was set for sentencing and defendant was permitted to remain on bond. When defendant failed to appear on the sentencing date, his bond was revoked and a capias was issued for his arrest. Sometime thereafter, defendant was returned to custody; and the trial court subsequently sentenced him.
Before discussing the substantive issues on appeal, we address State's contention that the appeal should be dismissed on the basis of the "escape rule." In State v. Woods, 861 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App.S.D.1993), the court noted that Missouri courts previously dismissed the appeals of defendants who escaped after being convicted. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 830 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Mo.App.E.D.1992). The court, however, adopted the holding in Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1199, 1208, 122 L.Ed.2d 581, 597 (1993). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that the "escape rule" should not be applied automatically by appellate courts when the escape occurred before sentencing and had no impact on the appellate process. Ortega-Rodriguez, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1208. Because the sentencing court is usually the tribunal most directly affected by the escape, the Supreme Court delegated to that court the responsibility to consider the application of the "escape rule." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1209. In light of this holding, we decline to dismiss the appeal and address the issues.
In his first point, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge and in sustaining the State's use of its peremptory strikes against three African-American venirepersons. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, a defendant must demonstrate that specific venirepersons struck by the State are members of a cognizable racial group, and that this fact and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor excluded the venirepersons from the petit jury on the basis of race. State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014, 113 S.Ct. 636, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). Once a defendant establishes a prima facie case under Batson, the State must furnish race-neutral reasons for the challenged peremptory strikes. State v. Chandler, 860 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Mo.App.E.D.1993). To be sufficient, the State's explanations must be race-neutral, be reasonably specific and clear, and be related to the particular case to be tried. Id. Assuming the State is able to articulate acceptable reasons for the strikes, the defendant will then need to show that the State's reasons for the strikes were merely pretextual and that the strikes were racially motivated. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939.
Trial judges are vested with considerable discretion in determining whether the defendant established purposeful discrimination. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 934. Much of their determination turns upon evaluation of intangibles, such as credibility and demeanor. Id. The trial court's determination regarding purposeful discrimination is a finding of fact that will not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Chandler, 860 S.W.2d at 824.
Here, the trial court exacted explanations from the prosecutor for the challenged peremptory strikes. An experienced trial judge found the prosecutor's explanations to be valid and race-neutral. We defer to the trial court's assessment of the prosecutor's credibility and his explanations for striking the venirepersons. See Chandler, 860 S.W.2d at 824.
In addition, after the trial court found that the State's reasons were race-neutral, defendant never argued that the explanations were pretextual. If the trial court and defendant were satisfied with the State's proffered reasons at trial, the appellate court is hardly in a position to disagree. See State v. Prowell, 834 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Mo.App.E.D.1992). Defendant's first point is denied.
Defendant's second point claims that the trial court erred in sentencing him, as a matter of evidence, as a persistent offender. We have reviewed...
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State v. Cummings
...Defendant had to lie, including the severity of punishment she faced if convicted. This was a proper argument. See State v. Grisby, 867 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Mo.App.1993) (prosecutor's argument that defendant was not credible because he was a twice-convicted felon who would do anything to avo......
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...analysis and reviewed the merits of an appeal despite an escape. See State v. Akers, 877 S.W.2d 147 (Mo.App.1994); State v. Grisby, 867 S.W.2d 270 (Mo.App.1993); State v. Woods, 861 S.W.2d 326 (Mo.App.1993). The Supreme Court decided Ortega-Rodriguez in the exercise of its supervisory power......
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