State v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Yakima

• Decision Date: 25 April 1944
• Docket Number: 29231.
• Parties: STATE v. GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF YAKIMA.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

148 P.2d 323

20 Wn.2d 588

STATE v. GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF YAKIMA.

No. 29231.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 25, 1944

Department 1.

Action by the State of Washington against Guaranty Trust Company of Yakima, administrator of the estate of John Hall, deceased to recover a sum paid by the State to defray the funeral expenses of defendant's deceased, who up to time of his death had been the recipient of a senior citizens grant, and to secure a declaratory judgment directing that payment of funeral expenses of deceased recipients of senior citizens grants is not authorized when the estates of the deceased recipients are sufficient to defray funeral expenses. From a judgment dismissing the amended complaint, the plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; Robert J. Willis, judge.

Smith Troy, Phil H. Gallagher, and Pat Guimont, all of Olympia, for appellant.

R. W Greene, of Bellingham, and John B. adams, of Aberdeen, amici curiae.

Velikanje & Velikanje, of Yakima, for respondent.

GRADY Justice.

This action was brought by the state against the Guaranty Trust Company of Yakima, administrator of the estate of John Hall, deceased, to recover the sum of $100 paid by the state to defray the funeral expenses of the decedent, who, up to the time of his death, had been the recipient of a senior citizens grant, and, by a second cause of action, to secure a declaratory judgment directing that payment of funeral expenses of deceased recipients of senior citizens grants is not authorized when the estates of the deceased recipients are sufficient to defray funeral expenses.

The administrator filed a demurrer to the amended complaint, the ground being that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court entered an order sustaining the demurrer, and, plaintiff having refused to plead further, the two causes of action were dismissed. The state appeals from the judgment of dismissal.

The amended complaint, so far as is necessary to be considered here, alleged that John Hall, a senior citizen who had been the recipient of a grant, died leaving an estate sufficient to defray the costs of his funeral over and above the expenses of his last sickness and of the administration of his estate; that the state had paid the funeral director the sum of $100, and later filed an estate claim for its refund which the administrator rejected; that, when the payment was made, the state had not been informed that the estate of the decedent would be sufficient to pay the funeral expenses; and that such payment was unlawful in that it was in violation of § 5 of Art. VIII of the State Constitution.

There are two questions Before the court on this appeal: (1) Can the state recover what it has paid to defray the funeral expenses of a deceased senior citizen who leaves an estate sufficient therefor? (2) Can the state join a second cause of action for a declaratory judgment adjudging that it is not required to pay the funeral expenses of deceased senior citizens, as provided by § 13, p. 10, of chapter 1 of the Laws of 1941 (Rem.Supp. 1941, § 9998-46), if the decedents leave estates sufficient therefor?

The respondent contends that, inasmuch as the first cause of action is one for the recovery of money paid, and there are no facts pleaded upon which a constitutional question can be based, there is no such question Before the court. We think, however, that if a custodian of public funds pays them out in the face of a constitutional inhibition, it is sufficient, in an action to recover such funds, to plead the facts surrounding the payment; and, if it follows as a conclusion of law that the payment was unlawful, because by so doing there was a violation of the Constitution, a constitutional question is raised without specifically alleging such was the reason recovery was sought, or to allege, by way of a conclusion, that the payment was in violation of the constitution.

The first cause of action alleges that, at the time of his death, the senior citizen had property sufficient to defray his funeral expenses, and that the state paid such expenses to the extent of $100, for which a claim was filed against his estate and rejected. If such payment was contrary to the Constitution, it was not only the right but also the duty of the state to recover it by judicial proceedings, and a plea of the foregoing facts enabled the state to urge, as the legal reason for recovery, that the payment was made in violation of the Constitution.

Sometime prior to his death, the senior citizen had been awarded a grant pursuant to the Senior Citizens Grant Act of 1941, Rem.Supp. 1941, § 9998-34 et seq., and the grant was in effect at the time of his demise. We must presume that whatever property he had when the grant was made and he may have acquired subsequently were of such character as not to be deemed a resource or income as defined by the act, as, otherwise, the grant would not have been made or continued in force.

By § 13 of the act, upon the death of any recipient under it, funeral expenses in the sum of $100 shall be paid by the department of social security. Taking the act as it reads, it expresses the intention that, in addition to the grant payable each month, funeral expenses to the extent of $100 shall be paid upon the death of the senior citizen, and the only escape from making such payment would be some constitutional inhibition.

In Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d 686, it was contended that the act was unconstitutional for the reason...