State v. Guckian

• Decision Date: 29 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 14577,14577
• Citation: 627 A.2d 407,226 Conn. 191
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. William GUCKIAN.

Page 407

627 A.2d 407

226 Conn. 191

STATE of Connecticut v. William GUCKIAN.

No. 14577.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 25, 1993.

Decided June 29, 1993.

Jack W. Fischer, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Eugene J. Callahan, State's Atty., Robert Katz, Supervisory Asst. State's Atty., and Michael O'Hare, former Deputy Asst. State's Atty., for appellant (state).

Steven D. Brown, with whom was Desiree A. Ralls, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, KATZ and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

BERDON, Associate Justice.

The state appeals from the Appellate Court's determination that the defendant, William Guckian, who pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended in violation of General Statutes § 14-215(c) ¹ and to violating his probation contrary to General Statutes § 53a-32, was eligible for the state's substance abuse treatment program (treatment program). The Appellate Court upheld the portion of the decision of the trial court in favor of the defendant's eligibility. We granted the state's petition for certification and now affirm.

The treatment program, created by No. 89-390 of the 1989 Public Acts (act), is now codified in General Statutes §§ 17a-648 through 17a-658. ² Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-650, the trial court may order an examination to determine whether the defendant is alcohol-dependent or drug-dependent and eligible for the treatment program. ³ If the defendant is found eligible for the program, the trial court may suspend prosecution and order alcohol or drug treatment. General Statutes § 17a-653. ⁴ The court may also order alcohol or drug treatment for a defendant who has already been convicted of a crime, but not yet sentenced. General Statutes § 17a-656. ⁵

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On November 28, 1989, the defendant, William Guckian, pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a(a) and to reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months on each count, execution suspended and probation for one year. In addition, the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license was suspended for one year. These convictions are not presently at issue.

The defendant was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended in violation of § 14-215(c) and with violating his probation contrary to § 53a-32. The defendant was released from custody on a promise to appear on the condition that he participate in a substance abuse counseling program called Neon. Neon personnel referred the defendant to another treatment program at the Meriden Center. The Meriden Center counselors determined that the defendant needed residential treatment for his alcohol dependency and recommended Berkshire Woods Treatment Center. The defendant voluntarily entered Berkshire Woods Treatment Center on May 8, 1990. After successfully completing the treatment program, he was discharged on August 3, 1990.

On August 16, 1990, the defendant appeared before the trial court, Bingham, J., and moved for an examination for drug or alcohol dependency pursuant to § 17a-650. The state objected, arguing that the defendant, having been charged with a motor vehicle violation as opposed to a crime, was not eligible for treatment under the act. The trial court overruled the state's objection, granted the defendant's motion and ordered an evaluation.

After a hearing on August 23, 1990, the trial court concluded that the legislature intended the term "crime," as used in the act, to include motor vehicle violations. The trial court noted that in section 6 of the act, now codified in § 17a-653, the legislature had specifically excluded persons charged or convicted of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol pursuant to § 14-227a. The court determined that "there would be no reason to mention an exemption of § 14-227a in Section 6" if the term "crime," as used in the act, did not include motor vehicle violations.

After the defendant pleaded guilty to both charges on August 23, 1990, the trial court found that (1) the defendant was alcohol-dependent when he was charged with driving while his license was suspended, (2) there was a sufficient relationship between the defendant's alcohol dependency and the crime charged, and (3) the defendant needed and was likely to benefit from treatment. The trial court therefore concluded that the defendant was eligible for participation in the treatment plan pursuant to § 17a-656. Consequently, the trial court sentenced the defendant to six months imprisonment, suspended after thirty days with eighteen months probation. ⁶ The trial court also ordered, as a condition of probation, that the defendant submit to alcohol evaluation and treatment as deemed necessary by the probation department.

With the trial court's permission, the state appealed to the Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court's conclusion that a violation of § 14-215(c) is a crime for purposes of the act. State v. Guckian, 27 Conn.App. 225, 238, 605 A.2d 874 (1992). The Appellate Court also concurred in the trial court's determination that § 17a-656(b) does not require the defendant to show a contributory or causal link between the defendant's drug or alcohol dependency and the crime committed. Id., at 242-43, 605 A.2d 874. The Appellate Court concluded, however, that a remand was required for other matters not germane to the issues raised in this appeal. Id., at 247, 605 A.2d 874.

We granted the state's petition for certification limited to the following questions: "(1) Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the term 'crime' as used in Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390 [now codified in §§ 17a-648 through 17a-658] includes motor vehicle violations? (2) Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the requirement of Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390 that there be a 'relationship' between the alcohol or drug dependency and the crime committed does not require a showing of a causal or contributory link between the dependency and the crime?" State v. Guckian, 223 Conn. 907, 612 A.2d 57 (1992). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

The state argues that the defendant is not eligible for the treatment program because he was charged with a violation of § 14-215(c), which is a motor vehicle violation and not a crime. Under § 17a-650, "[t]he court, on its own motion or on motion of the state's attorney or a person charged with a crime or convicted of a crime but not yet sentenced, may order, if the interests of justice will be served, that such person be examined ... to determine if the person is alcohol-dependent or drug-dependent and eligible for treatment...." (Emphasis added.) Under § 17a-656(b), the court may order alcohol or drug treatment for a convicted person who was alcohol-dependent or drug-dependent "at the time of the crime for which he was convicted." (Emphasis added.) In this case, the defendant was admitted to the treatment program pursuant to § 17a-656.

The narrow question before us is whether the term "crime," as used in the treatment program statute, includes motor vehicle violations. The term "crime" is not defined in the statutory sections that establish the treatment program, nor is it defined in chapter 319j (alcohol and drug abuse) or title 17a (social and human services and resources) of the General Statutes, in which the treatment program is codified. Generally, when a statutory term is not defined, we focus on its ordinary meaning. General Statutes § 1-1. The term "crime" is ordinarily so broadly defined, however, that its common meaning is not instructive in determining whether the statutory term "crime" includes motor vehicle violations. ⁷

In the absence of an instructive definition of the term "crime" for purposes of determining whether an individual is eligible for the treatment program, we must construe the statute in accordance with the legislature's intent and purpose in drafting the legislation. "[T]he fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Warkentin v. Burns, 223 Conn. 14, 20, 610 A.2d 1287 (1992).

The state argues that our analysis should begin and end with General Statutes § 53a-24, which defines the term "crime" for purposes of the penal code. ⁸ We disagree. "What may or may not be a criminal offense for purposes of a particular statutory categorization is not necessarily determinative of whether it is a criminal offense for [other] purposes...." State v. Kluttz, 9 Conn.App. 686, 699, 521 A.2d 178 (1987). ⁹ Thus, in State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10 (1988), we concluded that a violation of § 14-215 was a crime for purposes of a search of the defendant's person without reaching the distinct question of whether a violation of § 14-215 is a crime for general classification purposes under § 53a-24 of the penal code. Similarly, the Appellate Court held in State v. Brown, 22 Conn.App. 108, 112, 575 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811, 580 A.2d 61 (1990), that "a violation of ... § 14-227a was, for purposes of the defendant's conditions of probation, a violation of the criminal laws of this state," even though a violation of § 14-227a is categorized as a motor vehicle violation and not a crime under § 53a-24. The Appellate Court noted that "whether the particular transgression of the law invoked here, which the legislature has deemed to be noncriminal for purposes of ... § 53a-24(a), should be regarded, nonetheless, as criminal for purposes of a condition of probation, depends not on that categorization but on the functions and purposes of probation. Those functions and purposes lead us to conclude that, under the facts of this case, a violation of ... § 14-227a was,...