State v. Guido

• Decision Date: 31 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-328-C,96-328-C
• Citation: 698 A.2d 729
• Parties: STATE v. Salvatore GUIDO. A.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 729

698 A.2d 729

STATE v. Salvatore GUIDO.

No. 96-328-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 31, 1997.

Lauren Sandler Zurier, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for plaintiff.

Kelly M. Fracassa, Louis B. Cappuccio, Jr., Westerly, for defendant.

Before WEISBERGER, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, and FLANDERS, JJ.

OPINION

BOURCIER, Justice.

The defendant, Salvatore Guido, appeals to this Court following his conviction by a Washington County Superior Court jury on one count of driving under the influence with serious bodily injury resulting, in violation of G.L.1956 § 31-27-2.6. Subsequent to his conviction the defendant had moved for a new trial alleging that the trial justice had improperly admitted hospital medical records that revealed his post-collision blood-alcohol level. His motion was denied, and he was sentenced to a term of ten years, with six years of that term to be served and with the remaining four years of the sentence suspended. He was also fined $2,500 and ordered to make restitution to the victim. His driver's license was revoked for two years. On appeal the defendant contends that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. He asserts that the admission of the hospital medical records was in violation of his doctor/patient privilege, that the records were obtained without a warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and finally that the records were obtained through a misuse of the statewide grand jury. We agree with the trial justice that the medical record evidence was properly admitted. We affirm the judgment of conviction and the trial justice's denial of the defendant's new trial motion.

I Case Facts and Travel

On May 15, 1993 at approximately 10:30 p.m., defendant and a sixteen-year-old girl named Sarah Anderson (Anderson) were each driving motor vehicles on Airport Road in the town of Westerly when they were involved in a head-on collision. Both defendant and Anderson were severely injured. Anderson was trapped inside her vehicle for over an hour until rescuers were able to extricate her using the "jaws of life." After being removed from the wreckage, she was taken to Rhode Island Hospital by an emergency medical helicopter. She was there treated for numerous injuries including broken ribs, bruised lungs, a dislocated hip and a fractured ankle and wrist. The defendant also sustained numerous and serious injuries. According to law enforcement personnel he was found unconscious, slumped across the front seat of his vehicle. Both of his legs were fractured, and he was bleeding profusely. Like Anderson, he was taken by medical helicopter to Rhode Island Hospital. His condition was diagnosed as critical.

During emergency-room treatment, pursuant to hospital protocol, a blood sample was drawn from the defendant and tested for the presence of alcohol. The blood tests performed indicated that alcohol was present in defendant's blood sample in the amount of 0.203 percent--twice the legal limit permitted in Rhode Island pursuant to § 31-27-2(b)(1). Experts would later opine that defendant's body blood-alcohol level was probably higher at the time of the collision in view of the fact that much of defendant's blood-volume had been replaced by intravenous fluids while he was en route to the hospital.

The cause of the accident was initially unknown to police. When authorities arrived at the scene, they found Anderson, hysterical and pinned inside her car. She told police that she might have been at fault and crossed the yellow line into defendant's lane of traffic. Other evidence, however, pointed to defendant. It was discovered that he had been traveling home from a bachelor party held at the Moose Club in Westerly where he had been seen drinking. One of the rescue personnel found an open, partially filled bottle of beer on the front floor of defendant's car. Another rescue member noticed a slight odor of alcohol emanating from defendant.

Three days later on May 18, 1993, Sergeant Larry Gwaltney (Gwaltney) of the Westerly police department appeared before the statewide grand jury sitting in Kent County and requested subpoenas duces tecum to obtain Rhode Island Hospital's medical records relating to the blood-alcohol levels of both defendant and Anderson. Gwaltney explained to the grand jury that he was investigating a serious motor vehicle accident and needed the medical records to assist in the investigation. He additionally requested to be made an agent of the grand jury for return of service on the subpoenas. The grand jury granted both requests. The subpoenas did not compel the keeper of the hospital records to appear before the grand jury and contained no return date for compliance but instead authorized Gwaltney to receive the records.

Gwaltney subsequently made service of the grand jury subpoenas at Rhode Island Hospital and obtained the medical records, including those pertaining to defendant's blood-alcohol level. The hospital raised no objection to the subpoenas. The defendant's consent to the release of his medical records was never obtained.

Upon receiving the medical records, Gwaltney, rather than return them to the grand jury, instead turned them over to the Office of the Attorney General. The Attorney General later utilized the records to conclude probable cause for the filing of a criminal information in June of 1993 in which the defendant was charged, pre-empting the return of any indictment by the grand jury that had issued the subpoenas.

Prior to trial, defendant filed several motions to suppress the hospital records. He contended that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated because the hospital record blood-alcohol evidence obtained by the grand jury's subpoenas was privileged medical information and that the grand jury had been misused by the Office of the Attorney General. He additionally moved to dismiss the case for lack of probable cause. The trial justice denied each of defendant's motions. Thereafter, he was tried before a jury.

At that trial, the opinion testimony from two accident reconstruction experts was contradictory. The state's accident reconstruction expert, Joseph Cosentino, of the Westerly police department, opined, relying upon his firsthand observations of the evidence at the scene of the collision, that the point of impact occurred on Anderson's side of the roadway. The defendant's expert, on the other hand, Yau Wu, Ph.D., concluded that the impact occurred on defendant's side of the road. His opinion, however, unlike the state's expert, was not based upon firsthand observation of the evidence. The defendant was found guilty and convicted. His appeal was timely filed and he was released on bail pending his appeal.

II Analysis

A. The Search

The defendant first contends that when Gwaltney obtained the medical records from Rhode Island Hospital he, in essence, had conducted what amounted to a Fourth Amendment search and was therefore required to obtain a warrant for that search based upon probable cause. In rejecting that contention, the trial justice concluded that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was not implicated because there was no state action involved. Relying on State v. Lussier, 511 A.2d 958 (R.I.1986), she decided that the blood tests were performed as a result of hospital protocol rather than at the command of law enforcement and that no state action took place. We agree, but believe that state action was invoked when the grand jury authorized the subpoena for the medical records. However, no Fourth Amendment protections were triggered.

The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is "based upon the deterrence of illegal police or prosecutorial actions, [and] it is not triggered by the actions of private persons however egregious they may be." State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858, 861 (R.I.1991). In the instant case the sample of blood withdrawn from defendant at Rhode Island Hospital was taken by hospital personnel. They acted according to recognized hospital practice designed to assist hospital personnel in electing medical prescription and treatment rather than at the direction of state authorities. For this reason there was no state action involved when the blood was withdrawn and the private hospital's activity triggered no Fourth Amendment concern. Compare State v. Collins, 679 A.2d 862 (R.I.1996); (blood withdrawn by medical personnel for their own use); State v. Lussier, 511 A.2d 958 (R.I.1986) (blood withdrawn for use of medical personnel), with State v. Timms, 505 A.2d 1132 (R.I.1986) (blood withdrawn at direction of police for state use).

The defendant maintains, however, that when Gwaltney subsequently executed the subpoena for the medical records, he did so as the result of state action and invoked the Fourth Amendment. We acknowledge the distinction he draws between the initial private activity in withdrawing the blood and the subsequent grand-jury subpoenas compelling the production of the hospital records. A grand jury subpoena is not purely private action. However, we nonetheless reject the contention that the Fourth Amendment was implicated here. Putting aside the fact that grand juries are less cabined by Fourth Amendment restrictions, see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 93 S.Ct. 774, 35 L.Ed.2d 99 (1973), we are of the opinion that defendant had no legitimate Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in Rhode Island Hospital's medical records relating to his emergency treatment following his near fatal automobile collision.

The Fourth Amendment protects against state intrusions into legitimate expectations of privacy. See State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069 (R.I., 1997); State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14 (R.I.1991). The expectation must be one actually held by the defendant and one that society at large would recognize as reasonable. See Bjerke, op. at 18; Bertram, 591 A.2d at...