State v. Gutierrez-Medina, A157141.
Decision Date | 16 August 2017 |
Docket Number | A157141. |
Citation | 403 P.3d 462,287 Or.App. 240 |
Parties | STATE Of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jorge GUTIERREZ-MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Ingrid A. MacFarlane, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Shorr, Judge.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) and third-degree assault. As part of his sentence, the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $154,827.63 for medical treatment that the assault victim had received for the victim's injuries. On appeal, defendant challenges the restitution order, arguing that the trial court erred when it refused to reduce the restitution amount based on the comparative fault of the victim. We conclude that the statutory comparative-fault scheme does not apply to the criminal restitution statute, ORS 137.106. Accordingly, we affirm.
The background facts are few and undisputed. Defendant was driving under the influence of intoxicants at night when he struck a pedestrian—the victim—who had entered the roadway in an area that was dark and not marked for pedestrian crossing. Defendant pleaded guilty to DUII and third-degree assault. As part of his plea, defendant admitted that he "recklessly caused serious physical injury to [the victim] by means of a motor vehicle, a dangerous weapon, while [he] drove on a public road under the influence of intoxicants."
The state sought restitution from defendant in the amount of $179,827.63 for the victim's medical bills, which included $31 for the Department of Human Services, and $179,796.63 for the victim's health insurer. At the restitution hearing, defendant objected to the requested restitution amount on two bases. First, defendant argued that the trial court should apply the civil-law concept of comparative fault and order defendant to pay only that amount of damages that represented his percentage of fault for the victim's injuries. To support that argument, defendant presented testimony from Webb, an expert in forensic accident investigation. Webb testified about his analysis of the accident and concluded that, based on the circumstances, a sober driver would not have been able to avoid the collision with the victim, and the victim was in the best position to have avoided the collision. Second, defendant argued that the final restitution amount awarded by the court should be reduced by $25,000, representing an insurance settlement that the victim had received for his injuries.
In a letter opinion, the trial court concluded that the total restitution award would be offset by the $25,000 settlement. With regard to comparative fault, the court concluded that the criminal restitution statute did not encompass comparative fault and, because defendant had admitted when he pleaded guilty to third-degree assault that he had caused the victim's injuries, defendant could not relitigate causation for purposes of restitution. Accordingly, the court ordered defendant to pay $154,827.63 in restitution.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it refused to apply comparative fault to the restitution ordered in his case.1
The trial court's award of restitution is governed by ORS 137.106, which provides, in part:
Thus, "there are three prerequisites to an order of restitution: (1) criminal activities, (2) economic damages, and (3) a causal relationship between the two." State v. Pumphrey , 266 Or.App. 729, 733, 338 P.3d 819 (2014), rev. den. , 357 Or. 112, 346 P.3d 1212 (2015).
With regard to "economic damages," the Supreme Court has recently stated that "neither ORS 137.106 nor the definition of economic damages in ORS 31.710(2)(a) requires that the damages awarded in restitution be the damages that would be recoverable in a civil action," because "[t]he statute requires only that the damages be ‘objectively verifiable monetary losses' that ‘result from’ a defendant's criminal activity." State v. Ramos , 358 Or. 581, 588, 368 P.3d 446 (2016). The Supreme Court further concluded, however, that "the legislature's cross-reference to the definition of ‘economic damages' applicable in civil actions, and the legislature's purpose in creating the restitution procedure as a substitute for a civil proceeding, make civil law concepts relevant to our interpretation of ORS 137.106." Id. at 594, 368 P.3d 446. However, in so recognizing that principle, the Supreme Court noted that it did Id. at 599 n. 11, 368 P.3d 446.
Here, defendant argues that the civil concept of comparative fault must be applied to the award of restitution in his case. Oregon's comparative-fault scheme, ORS 31.600 to 31.620, applies to nonintentional torts. See Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory School, Inc. , 199 Or.App. 352, 379, 111 P.3d 762, rev. den. , 339 Or. 406, 122 P.3d 64 (2005) ( ). Under that scheme, when the trier of fact determines that multiple people listed in ORS 31.600(2) —viz. , the claimant, any party against whom recovery is sought, and any third party liable in tort to the claimant—were negligent and the conduct of each was a cause of the claimant's injuries, the trier of fact is then required to determine the relative fault of those persons "and to apportion the [claimant's] damages [among] them on that basis." Lasley v. Combined Transport, Inc. , 351 Or. 1, 13, 261 P.3d 1215 (2011) ; see ORS 31.605(1) ( ); ORS 31.610(2) ( ).
In contending that the comparative-fault scheme applies to criminal restitution, defendant reasons first that, under ORS 137.106, a trial court is required to determine the amount of economic damages to be ordered as restitution, because that statute provides that the court shall enter a judgment for restitution "in a specific amount that equals the full amount of the victim's economic damages as determined by the court ." ORS 137.106(1)(a) (emphasis added). Because the trial court had to evaluate the amount of economic damages to award in his case, defendant then reasons that the court had to consider the victim's role in the accident because the victim "could have caused a portion of the claimed economic harm."
Based on those contentions, we understand defendant to be primarily arguing that the trial court had to consider the victim's comparative fault as part of the causation analysis that the trial court was required to conduct. We reject that argument for the reason that comparative fault is not considered in civil law as part of the causation analysis; the question of apportioning fault arises only after causation is...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Gutierrez-Medina
...statute expressly precludes the court from applying comparative fault principles to apportion damages. State v. Gutierrez-Medina , 287 Or. App. 240, 246, 403 P.3d 462 (2017). This court allowed review, and we now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, albeit on a different ground. We ......
-
State v. Manwiller
...to recognize that restitution is a criminal sanction that is sought by the state, not by the victim"); State v. Gutierrez-Medina , 287 Or. App. 240, 241-42, 244, 246, 403 P.3d 462 (2017), rev. allowed , 362 Or. 389, 411 P.3d 380 (2018) (concluding Oregon’s comparative fault scheme, ORS 31.6......
-
Lopez v. Nooth
... ... wants to have filed; I ask his attorney why he has not filed those claims; and then if the state has anything they want to add they usually do and then I make a decision on a claim by claim ... ...