State v. Guzek
| Citation | 797 P.2d 1031,310 Or. 299 |
| Decision Date | 20 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | CR-0373-TM |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Randy Lee GUZEK, Appellant. TC 87-; SC S35051. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Oregon |
Michael Mills, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief on behalf of appellant. With him on the brief was Mills & McMillin, P.C., Salem.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief on behalf of respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., and Jonathan H. Fussner, Diane S. Lefkow, and Brenda J Peterson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salem.
Before PETERSON, C.J., and CARSON, JONES *, GILLETTE, VAN HOOMISSEN, FADELEY and UNIS, JJ.
This criminal case is before us on automatic review of defendant's conviction of aggravated murder and sentence of death. ORS 163.150(1)(f). Defendant raises various challenges to both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The guilt phase challenge is not well taken. We therefore affirm defendant's conviction for aggravated murder. The penalty phase, however, was erroneously conducted. We therefore vacate defendant's sentence of death and remand the case for a new penalty phase proceeding.
The facts surrounding this vicious crime can be stated briefly. Defendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the offense, had dated a high school acquaintance during the 1986-87 school year. The high school acquaintance at the time lived with her uncle and aunt, Rod and Lois Houser, at Terrebonne, a rural community in Deschutes County. Rod Houser disapproved of defendant; Houser's niece broke off the relationship. The parting was not amicable; defendant resented both the niece and her uncle.
On Sunday, June 28, 1987, defendant met with two friends, Mark Wilson and Ross Cathey. The three men planned to burglarize a rural Deschutes County home where they believed a large amount of jewelry was kept. Defendant, who was the leader and planner in the group, instructed Cathey to cut the throat of their prospective victim with a knife that defendant supplied. Cathey agreed. That plan failed, however, when there turned out to be too many lights and too many cars at the targeted residence when the conspirators arrived.
Thwarted, the three men started to drive back toward Redmond, the nearest town. They were continuing to look for a house to burglarize. Cathey suggested the Houser residence, which he and Wilson had remarked upon earlier that day as a possible target for a burglary. All three agreed on this alternate target.
The three returned to the home in Redmond that defendant shared with his father. There, defendant secured two guns (a .22 rifle and a .32 pistol) to be used in robbing the Housers. The three then departed for the Housers'. On the way, they stopped at a secluded spot and defendant test fired the rifle, showing Wilson how to clear the action of the weapon if it jammed. The journey resumed.
Somewhere during the drive it seems to have been settled that, if the Housers proved to be home when the three arrived, the couple would be killed. The Housers were at home. 1 Defendant rang the doorbell and pounded on the door until Rod Houser finally answered it. A short, hostile discussion between defendant and Rod Houser ensued. Defendant then yelled "Do it!" to Wilson, who began firing the .22 at Rod Houser. Rod Houser retreated into the house, where he was felled by a fatal fusillade from the .22. Defendant ran upstairs and shot Lois Houser three times with the .32 pistol, killing her.
The men then ransacked the Houser residence, taking a great deal of personal property, including a ring that defendant pulled from Lois Houser's finger after he had murdered her. The men took the property to Redmond and stored it in various locations through the help of defendant's father.
The Housers' bodies were discovered two days after the murders. Suspicion came to center on defendant and Wilson, due to the enmity between defendant and the Housers. Eventually, police arrested defendant, Wilson, and Cathey. Wilson and Cathey confessed, implicating defendant. Both men testified against defendant at his trial. The state permitted each to plead guilty to a reduced charge in return for his testimony. A jury convicted defendant of both murders. The present appeal followed.
Defendant raises only one challenge that could be said to apply to the guilt phase of the proceedings in his case: He should have been given plea agreement opportunities equal to those given to Mark Wilson. A principal difficulty with defendant's argument, in addition to the fact that he made no issue of this question at the time, 2 is that defendant--unlike Wilson--has steadfastly maintained that he had nothing to do with the crime. (Defendant even put on an alibi defense at trial, but it was rejected by the jury.) Defendant therefore has consistently taken the position that he is not in the same position as Wilson. See State v. McDonnell, 310 Or. 98, 794 P.2d 780 (1990) ().
Moreover, this record reflects ample justification for the District Attorney's decision to treat Wilson and defendant differently. Defendant was the leader of this gang; Wilson was a follower. The deaths of the Housers appear to have been the particular desire of defendant, who had a prior grudge against Rod Houser. Defendant supplied the murder weapons. Defendant had a history of vandalism and threatening acts, including one incident in which he told a woman he wished he had a gun with him so he could kill her. On this record, there is no basis for positing error in the decision of the District Attorney to The foregoing assignment of error is the only one relating to the guilt phase and is not well taken. Defendant's convictions on both counts of aggravated murder are affirmed. We turn to the penalty phase arguments.
offer a plea agreement to Wilson while not offering a similar one to defendant. See State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 138-42, 786 P.2d 161 (1990) ().
Defendant makes three assignments of error with respect to the penalty phase. The first contains eight subparts. We shall address these assignments in the order in which defendant presents them.
In this assignment of error, defendant mounts a massive, head-on attack on the constitutionality of Oregon's constitutional and statutory death penalty scheme. As all of defendant's arguments in this regard have previously been dealt with by other decisions of this court, we need note them only briefly.
Defendant first argues that the capital sentencing statute, ORS 163.150, is so vague and standardless that it will result in arbitrary application. This court rejected virtually identical arguments in State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 606, 789 P.2d 1352 (1990); and State v. Farrar, supra, 309 Or. at 184-86, 786 P.2d 161.
Defendant next argues that the concept of "future dangerousness" in ORS 163.150 is constitutionally insufficient to guide the jury's discretion and prevent arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty. We held to the contrary in State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 150-55, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988), vacated on other grounds and remanded sub nom Wagner v. Oregon, 492 U.S. 914, 109 S.Ct. 3235, 106 L.Ed.2d 583 (1989) (Wagner I ). We adhere to that ruling.
Defendant argues that because ORS 163.150 does not clearly provide for the number of votes required to answer any of its special verdict questions in the negative, the statute is unconstitutionally vague. However, since this case was argued, we have held that a single juror's "no" vote requires that the special verdict form question be answered in the negative. State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 95, 786 P.2d 111 (1990). This argument is not well taken.
Defendant next argues that ORS 163.150 impermissibly limits the way in which an Oregon jury can consider mitigating evidence concerning a defendant. As a facial attack on the statute, this argument is not well taken. As construed by this court after remand from the United States Supreme Court, a jury impanelled under the statute must be given the full range of authority to consider and act on mitigating evidence that the federal Constitution requires. State v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 14-20, 786 P.2d 93 (1990) (Wagner II ). However, Wagner II was not decided until after this case was tried. As a consequence, the actual jury instructions given in this case did not meet the constitutional requirements this court identified in Wagner II. As a result, defendant did not receive a proper penalty phase trial. Defendant's sentence of death therefore must be vacated, and the case remanded for a new trial on the sentencing phase or, at the election of the District Attorney, for entry of a life sentence for defendant. Wagner II, supra, 309 Or. at 20, 786 P.2d 93; State v. Farrar, supra, 309 Or. at 177-78, 786 P.2d 161.
Defendant next argues that, by directing the jury only to answer the special verdict questions and then directing the trial judge, if the answer to the questions is yes, to impose a sentence of death, ORS 163.150 "eliminates any personal responsibility for imposition of the death penalty." This court rejected the same argument in Wagner I, supra, 305 Or. at 155-56, 752 P.2d 1136.
Defendant argues that imposition of the death penalty constitutes treatment of an offender with "unnecessary rigor," in violation of Article I,...
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State v. Guzek
...case for a new trial of the penalty phase or, at the election of the district attorney, for a life sentence. State v. Guzek, 310 Or. 299, 305-06, 797 P.2d 1031 (1990) (Guzek I ). In 1991, a new jury was empaneled for the penalty phase pursuant to ORS 163.150(5)(a)(B) (1989). Before the jury......
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Cunningham v. Thompson
...evidence of "bad character" and thus is admissible as relevant to the jury's inquiry under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B). See State v. Guzek, 310 Or. 299, 307, 797 P.2d 1031 (1990) (evidence was sufficient to permit jury to conclude that the defendant was a "remorseless" killer who would commit othe......
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State v. Guzek
...1999, ch. 1055, § 1.2 This court previously affirmed defendant's conviction of two counts of aggravated murder, State v. Guzek, 310 Or. 299, 304, 797 P.2d 1031 (1990) (Guzek I), but twice vacated his sentence of death and remanded for further penalty-phase proceedings, as discussed below. O......
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State v. Guzek
...P.J.Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder in 1988. This court affirmed those convictions in State v. Guzek, 310 Or. 299, 797 P.2d 1031 (1990) (Guzek I ), but has three times vacated defendant's sentences of death and remanded for new penalty-phase trials. See id.; State......