State v. Hackett

• Decision Date: 30 November 1891
• Citation: 50 N.W. 472,47 Minn. 425
• Parties: STATE v HACKETT.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

47 Minn. 425

50 N.W. 472

STATEvHACKETT.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 30, 1891.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. A person who, having entered any building under such circumstances as to constitute burglary in any degree, commits the crime of larceny therein, is punishable therefor as well as for the burglary, and may be prosecuted for each crime separately.

2. When, in an indictment for the crime of larceny, it is explicitly charged that the defendant feloniously took, stole, and carried personal property away from another person alleged to be the owner, the intent to deprive the true owner thereof is sufficiently and adequately alleged.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; EGAN, Judge.

Indictment of Henry Hackett for grand larceny. From a judgment of conviction defendant appeals. Affirmed.

McCafferty & Noyes, for appellant.

T. D. O'Brien, Co. Atty., and Moses E. Clapp, Atty. Gen., for the State.

COLLINS, J.

Defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree, and appeals from an order refusing a new trial. The essential allegations of the indictment were that in the night-time of a specified day, and from and out of the properly described room of one Robinson, defendant wrongfully, unlawfully, and feloniously took, stole, and carried away certain personal property belonging to the last-named person, and of the value of $25. At the proper time defendant entered a plea of autrefois acquit, and, for the purpose of determining the issue presented by a stipulation as to the facts, the state demurred to the plea. From the stipulation it appeared that defendant had been twice indicted by the same grand jury. One of these indictments was that above mentioned, while the other was for the crime of burglary in the first degree. A trial was had upon the indictment last mentioned, resulting in an acquittal, wherein testimony was introduced tending to show that at the same time and place of the alleged burglary, defendant stole the property described in the pending indictment for larceny. It also appeared from the stipulation that the testimony was produced for the purpose of proving an intent to commit, and the commission of, the crime of burglary. While the facts which should have appeared in this plea of former acquittal were not lucidly set forth in the stipulation, we assume that the larceny and the alleged burglary were connected, and were but parts of the same transaction, so that the testimony in relation to the lesser crime was of the res gestæ; and we also assume that the acquittal was on the merits. Section 393 of the Penal Code would seem to cover this case, were any statutory enactment necessary when the Code was adopted. This section provides that “any person who, having entered any building under such circumstances as to constitute burglary in any degree, commits any crime therein, is punishable therefor, as...