State v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 02 March 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 38265,38265 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Plaintiff, v. Robert Hugh ROBINSON, Defendant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A defendant acquitted of a burglary charge involving an indecent assault is not twice put in jeopardy contrary to U.S.Const. Amend. V and Minn.Const. art. 1, § 7, if thereafter he is tried again for the same assault.
2. The record submitted on appeal held inadequate to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel bars defendant's prosecution for indecent assault after his acquittal of a burglary charge involving the same assault.
3. Attempts to show by affidavit the facts found in arriving at a verdict held an invasion of the jury's deliberations and entitled to no weight.
4. Unless defendant, previously acquitted of burglary, furnishes a sufficient record of the prior prosecution to support a finding that defendant's alibi was the only issue there litigated, a subsequent charge of indecent assault arising out of the same burglary is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
5. The time after which a defendant is entitled to a speedy trial under U.S.Const. Amend. VI and Minn.Const. art. 1, § 6, commences when he has been charged with an offense and has demanded an immediate hearing.
6. Extraneous and irrelevant matter in the briefs, not a part of the record, held improper and ordered stricken.
Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., William B. Randall, County Atty., Thomas M. Quayle, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for plaintiff.
Joseph Robbie, Minneapolis, for defendant; Andrew B. Kjos, St. Paul, of counsel.
John S. Connolly, Ramsey County Public Defender, St. Paul, amicus curiae.
This opinion is written pursuant to a reassignment made effective January 10, 1962. The issues here for decision arise out of an order of the district court denying motions to dismiss an indictment charging appellant with the crime of indecent assault. In entering its order the trial court, pursuant to Minn.St. 632.10, certified the following questions as doubtful and important:
'1. Under the circumstances disclosed by the record, upon which there is no dispute, does the indictment charging Indecent Assault, the object of the burglary charged in the previous indictment for which the defendant was tried and found not guilty by a jury, and a trial thereupon, constitute double jeopardy within the meaning of Article 5 of the Constitution of the State of Minnesota?
In answer to the first question, the matter is remanded for further proceedings pursuant to the decision we here reach. With respect to the second question, our answer is in the negative.
The pertinent facts governing a disposition of this matter are set forth in a stipulation entered by the county attorney and defendant's counsel. It appears that on May 25, 1959, an intruder entered the home of one Martha Hartwell at 1533 Van Buren Street in the city of St. Paul and took indecent liberties with her daughter, Lucella Hartwell. On June 23, 1959, defendant was charged with burglary in the second degree pursuant to the following indictment:
'The said Robert Hugh Robinson on the 25th day of May, A.D. 1959, at the City of St. Paul in said County, then and there being, did wrongfully, unlawfully, feloniously and burglariously break and enter the dwelling house of one Martha Hartwell, said dwelling house being then and there a building situate in said City, County and State, in which said dwelling there were then and there human beings, to wit: Martha Hartwell and Lucella Hartwell, with the intent then and there had and entertained by him, the said Robert Hugh Robinson, to commit a crime therein, to wit: Assault, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Minnesota.'
After a trial for this offense the defendant was acquitted by a jury in the District Court of Ramsey County. In June of 1960 the Hartwell home was again invaded and defendant was again apprehended, but instead of being prosecuted for this offense defendant was charged with indecent assault pursuant to the following indictment:
'The said Robert Hugh Robinson on the 25th day of May A.D. 1959, at the City of St. Paul in said County then and there being, did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take indecent liberties without her consent expressly given with and on the person of one Lucella Hartwell; she, the said Lucella Hartwell, being then and there over the age of sixteen years and not a public prostitute, which said acts of him, the said Robert Hugh Robinson, did not in law amount to a rape, an attempt to commit a rape, or an assault with intent to commit rape.'
As a part of their stipulation the state and the defendant agree that the assault referred to in the burglary indictment and the indecent assault alleged in the second indictment arose out of the same incident at 1533 Van Buren Street on May 25, 1959. The stipulation provides that the physical violence inflicted upon Lucella Hartwell on May 25, 1959, at 1533 Van Buren Street, St. Paul, furnished the factual basis for both the assault which was the object of the burglary and the indecent assault for which defendant is here indicted. In July 1960 the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for indecent assault on the ground that it is in violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy and for the further reason that it is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Subsequently he moved to dismiss the indictment because it denies defendant a speedy trial. The trial court, having denied defendant's motions, certified the questions here for review as doubtful and important.
The two questions certified by the trial court inadvertently allude to Minn.Const. art. 5 and 6, whereas the correct reference is to U.S.Const. Amend. V and VI. Comparable provisions of the Minnesota Constitution are found in art. 1, § 7, dealing with double jeopardy, and art. 1, § 6, dealing with speedy trials.
1. No attempt is made by the defendant to distinguish State v. Hackett, 47 Minn. 425, 50 N.W. 472, but he characterizes its holding as 'archaic.' In that case the defendant was convicted of grand larceny after a prior acquittal for burglary, the object of which was the same larceny for which he was subsequently prosecuted. We held that Minn.St. 621.12 authorized the second prosecution and that it did not constitute a violation of defendant's right not to be twice put in jeopardy. We here decline to overrule the Hackett decision. The authorities cited by defendant do not require a different conclusion. 1 Minn.St. 621.12 reads thus:
'Every person who, having entered a building under such circumstances as to constitute burglary in any degree, shall commit any crime therein, shall be punished therefor as well as for the burglary, and may be prosecuted for each crime separately.'
2. The problems we here face do not involve the principles of double jeopardy as much as the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel. The question is whether the record requires us to hold that there was implicit in the verdict of 'not guilty' in the burglary prosecution a finding that defendant established an alibi which bars his prosecution for indecent assault. We are of the opinion that the record is too sketchy and fragmentary to permit such a holding.
The record which has been presented consists only of a stipulation between the prosecuting attorney and the defendant's attorney, a portion of the court's charge in the burglary case, the certification of the important and doubtful questions, and the consent of the defendant to having the questions certified. The state has stipulated that the person who committed the burglary on May 25, 1959, was the same person who committed the assault on that date. Paragraph 11 of the stipulation further provides as follows:
'* * * The Defendant was found not guilty of being the burglar who so broke and entered the Hartwell dwelling house.'
Literally construed, this statement would seem to concede that the alibi defense prompted defendant's acquittal. However, such a conclusion does not jibe with the position the state has elsewhere taken in its brief and argument, and the statement appears to us to be sufficiently ambiguous to leave the question open.
The record does not support defendant's claim that his only defense was an alibi. Without a transcript we can only speculate on what the defendant's evidence was. Neither do we have before us the closing argument of defendant's counsel or the full charge to the jury in the burglary case. The trial court did instruct the jury that the defendant denied having taken part in the crime which was committed May 25, 1959, in the following language:
However, it is significant that immediately following this part...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. DeSchepper, 44769
... ... Page 301 ... States v. Gugliaro, Supra; United States v. Tramunti, Supra. See, State v. Hite, 3 Wash.App. 9, 472 P.2d 600 (1970). See, also, State v. Robinson, 262 Minn. 79, 114 N.W.2d 737, certiorari denied, 371 U.S. 815, 83 S.Ct. 26, 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962) ... Buttressing our interpretation of Ashe is the fact that the Supreme Court did not overrule United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 71 S.Ct. 595, 95 L.Ed. 747 (1950), the only ... ...
-
State v. Hoskins, 41663
...Bauer v. Kummer, 244 Minn. 488, 70 N.W.2d 273 (1955); Fortier v. Newman, 248 Minn. 69, 78 N.W.2d 382 (1956); State v. Robinson, 262 Minn. 79, 114 N.W.2d 737, certiorari denied, 371 U.S. 815, 83 S.Ct. 26, 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962); Gardner v. Germain, 264 Minn. 61, 117 N.W.2d 759 (1962). See, also......
-
Boubelik v. Liberty State Bank
...fraud. Normally, we do not overturn jury verdicts lightly. Roemer v. Martin, 440 N.W.2d 122, 124 (Minn.1989); State v. Robinson, 262 Minn. 79, 85, 114 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn.1962) (quoting Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306-307, 25 S.Ct. 58, 67-68, 49 L.Ed. 193 (1904)), cert. denied, 3......
-
Lozoya v. City of Cloquet
... ... After ... pleading guilty to felony second degree assault in Minnesota ... state district court and spending two years in prison for ... that offense, Plaintiff Clarence Lozoya learned that the ... office of Carlton ... recorded reasoning to ascertain what issues that court ... decided. See State v. Robinson , 114 N.W.2d 737, 741 ... (1962) (quoting Fayerweather v. Ritch , 195 U.S. 276, ... ...