State v. Haddock
Decision Date | 31 July 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 101,101 |
Citation | 190 S.E.2d 208,281 N.C. 675 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Roy Arthur HADDOCK. |
Wallace C. Harrelson, Public Defender, and Dale Shepherd, Asst. Public Defender, for defendant appellant.
Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen., and Roy A. Giles, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State of North Carolina.
Defendant assigns as error the admission of his inculpatory statements to SBI Agent Poole, made while in custody and without benefit of counsel. He contends the incriminating statements are tainted and inadmissible because he was indigent at the time, charged with a capital offense, and incapable of waiving his right to counsel by the express language of G.S. § 7A--457(a). He relies on that statute and on State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 181 S.E.2d 561 (1971), and State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 186 S.E.2d 384 (1972), in support of his position.
The record discloses that defendant was twice advised of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Each time defendant said he knew his rights and fully understood them. He then freely, knowingly and understandingly signed a written waiver of his constitutional right to the presence of counsel. Thus the requirements spelled out in Miranda were fully met, and defendant's entire statement was competent insofar as federal constitutional standards are concerned. Miranda v. Arizona, supra. If defendant's statement, or any part of it, was incompetent, its incompetency arises solely by reason of G.S. § 7A--457(a) (1969) which at that time provided, Inter alia: 'A waiver shall not be allowed in a capital case.' The State contends defendant's statement was volunteered and not the result of a custodial interrogation. This requires a review of the setting and the circumstances under which defendant's incriminating statement was made.
The record reveals that upon his arrival at the Danville Police Station defendant had indicated he wanted to make a statement. He had already been given the Miranda warning when he was removed from the bus. Officer Poole 'asked him to wait just a moment' and again advised him of his rights as follows:
Officer Poole thereupon handed defendant the paper from which the Miranda warnings had been read. Defendant read the warnings himself and stated that he understood his rights. The paperwriting contained a Waiver of Rights at the bottom of the page in the following language:
Defendant then signed the waiver. Then, without any questions on the part of the officers, defendant reiterated his earlier statement that he was coming to turn himself in and added, 'The hardest thing I ever did was to pull that trigger.' When Officer Poole asked him to explain that statement defendant said: He said the man shot him in the arm and he then shot the man after which he got back into his car and the man shot a second time, shooting out the glass in the car. Defendant then said he 'sort of laid down in the front seat of the car and drove away as quickly as he could.' He said that prior to this incident he had been to the Kayo Station once before that morning, awakened the attendant, purchased two dollars' worth of gas, and departed. He said there was another party with him at that time and that earlier that night they had had a fight with some Negro males as a result of which he had gone to Burlington and obtained his shotgun and returned to Greensboro; that after purchasing the gas he went looking for the Negro males, couldn't find them, and returned to the Kayo Station to rob the man.
Defendant further stated that he had been to a doctor in Norfolk, Virginia, and had a bullet removed from his arm. Officer Poole asked him if he had the bullet and defendant took it from his wallet and handed it to the officer. Officer Poole asked defendant where the shotgun was and defendant stated he had thrown it in a creek near Greenville. Officer Poole asked him where this creek was located and defendant stated that These directions were later followed and the weapon was found at that exact spot in the creek.
Is the foregoing narration of events the result of 'custodial interrogation' and its admissibility prohibited by G.S. § 7A--457(a) due to absence of counsel? We think not.
The United States Supreme Court said in Miranda v. Arizona, supra: Thus, assuming defendant's indigency, the presence of counsel was not required because defendant's statement at the police station in Danville was not the result of an in-custody interrogation initiated by the officers. Rather, it was defendant's own voluntary narration, freely and understandingly related. It is perfectly apparent that from the moment defendant was removed from the bus he was anxious to talk and that his entire narration of events is properly classified as a volunteered statement. In fact, the officers would not allow him to talk until he had twice been advised of his constitutional rights and had freely, knowingly and...
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