State v. Haff
| Decision Date | 23 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 70296-3-I,70296-3-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. STEPHEN AUGUST HAFF, Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DWYER, J. — Following a jury trial, Stephen Haff was convicted of robbery in the first degree. On appeal, Haff contends both that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that he committed robbery "within" a financial institution and that his right to due process was violated when an eyewitness was permitted to identify him at trial. Because the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict and because the eyewitness identification was properly admitted, we affirm.
U.S. Bank had a branch located inside an Albertsons grocery store in north Marysville. The branch consisted of a vault room, an office, an ATM, and three teller lines. Customers in the teller lines were separated from the bank employees by a counter.
On August 9, 2011, Casey Montgomery and Tyson Farley were both working at the U.S. Bank branch when a tall, slim white man with short facial hair, who was wearing a dark jacket and a dark baseball cap, entered a teller line andapproached the counter in front of Montgomery. The man dropped a note1 in front of Montgomery and then placed his hands on the counter and waited. After Montgomery read the note, he handed the man the money in his cash register. The man took the money and walked away. The encounter lasted approximately 20 seconds and was captured on video.
Once the man had gone, Montgomery pulled the alarm and called the police. Montgomery and Farley later each gave a statement to the police recounting the robbery and describing the robber. The note was also collected and examined for fingerprints. Prints matching Haff's left thumb and index finger were identified on the note.
On August 17, 2011, Detective Corey Shackleton of the Marysville Police Department presented a photomontage of six photographs, including one of Haff, to Montgomery and Farley, separately. Montgomery did not identify anyone in the photographs as the robber. Farley identified Haff as the robber and stated that he was 70 percent certain.
Still images from the surveillance footage of the robbery were presented to Allen, Kelly, and Daniel Stickney, with whom Haff had been living around the time of the robbery. Each of them identified Haff as the man in the images. A dark baseball cap, resembling the one worn by the robber, was also discovered onAllen and Kelly Stickney's property. Haff's DNA was later identified on the hat. Additionally, a letter that Haff attempted to have delivered to Daniel Stickney, in which Haff indicated that Stickney had helped him plan the robbery, was given to a corrections officer by a jailhouse informant.
On September 7, 2011, Haff was charged with robbery in the first degree. Haff filed a motion to suppress evidence of Montgomery's and Farley's photomontage identifications and to prohibit them from identifying Haff in court. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court heard testimony and reviewed the photomontages presented to Montgomery and Farley as well as the descriptions they provided to the police immediately after the robbery. The court ruled that the photomontages were not unduly suggestive and that the State could ask the eyewitnesses whether they could identify the robber at trial.2
At trial, both Montgomery and Farley identified Haff as the robber. Montgomery said he was 100 percent certain. Farley continued to say he was 70 percent sure. The jury convicted Haff as charged, and he was sentenced to 48 months in prison. Haff now appeals.
Haff contends that insufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict of guilt.This is so, he asserts, because the State did not establish that the robbery was committed "within" a bank, as required by statute. His contention is unavailing.
The due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions require that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. "[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be . . . to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence. State v. Kintz, 169 Wn.2d 537, 551, 238 P.3d 470 (2010). Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence can be equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). We defer to the jury on questions of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Killinqsworth, 166 Wn. App. 283, 287, 269 P.3d 1064 (2012).
"Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is to discern and implement legislative intent." Johnson v. Recreational Equip., Inc., 159 Wn. App. 939, 946, 247 P.3d 18 (2011) (citing Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). If a "statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent." Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9-10. "The plain meaning of a statute may be discerned 'from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.'" State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (quoting Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11). While we may, in seeking to perceive the plain meaning of a statute, examine "the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole," State v. Enqel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009), we "must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them," and "must construe statutes such that all of the language is given effect." Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wn.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003). The court must avoid absurd results when interpreting statutes. J.P., 149 Wn.2d at 450; State v. Liden, 138 Wn. App. 110, 117, 156P.3d 259 (2007).
Haff was charged with robbery in the first degree. "A person commits robbery when he . . . unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another . . . against his or her will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his . . . property." RCW 9A.56.190. "A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree if: . . . He or she commits a robbery within and against a financial institution as defined in RCW 7.88.010 or RCW 35.38.060." RCW 9A.56.200(1)(b).
Per RCW 35.38.060, "'Financial institution[]'. . . means a branch of a bankengaged in banking in this state . . . and any state bank or trust company, national banking association, stock savings bank, mutual savings bank, or savings and loan association."3 The definition includes all branches of any qualifying bank. It is not limited, for example, by the type of space the branch occupies—whether it has its own freestanding building or shares space with another business.
There is no dispute that the robbery herein was committed against the U.S. Bank branch or that the branch meets the definition of "financial institution." The only issue is whether the robbery occurred "within" the bank branch.4 The ordinary meaning of "within" is no surprise; it means "in the inner or interior part of: inside of."5 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2627 (2002). It is plainly possible to be within one space that is itself located within a second space—for example, a store within a mall or a bank within a grocery store. Moreover, as noted above, the statutory definition of "financial institution" includes any branch of a qualifying bank; it is not limited based on the type of space the branch occupies. Therefore, the plain meaning of the relevant statutes supports the conclusion that it is possible for robbery in the first degree to be committed against a bank that is located within a grocery store.
The narrow question in this case, then, becomes whether sufficientevidence was presented at trial that the robbery at issue was, in fact, committed within the U.S. Bank branch located within the Marysville Albertsons grocery store. The evidence adduced at trial established the following: In August 2011, U.S. Bank had a branch located in the north Marysville Albertsons store. The branch consisted of three teller lines, an office, a vault room, and an ATM. On August 9, 2011, Montgomery and Farley were working at that U.S. Bank branch when Haff entered a teller line, walked up to the counter, dropped a note in front of Montgomery, placed his hands on the counter, and waited for Montgomery to respond. After reading the note, Montgomery handed Haff the cash from his drawer. Haff then walked away. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Haff committed the robbery within the U.S. Bank.
Haff next contends that Montgomery's in-court identification of Haff as the robber violated the federal due process clause.6 This is so, he asserts, because the in-court identification procedure itself was unduly suggestive and Montgomery's identification was unreliable—despite the fact that, on appeal, he does not allege any improper police conduct affecting the identification. Haff's position is foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Perry v. New Hampshire, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 716, 181 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2012...
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